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Essays On Human Capital And Altruism
Abstract
This dissertation contains three self-contained chapters on human capital and altruism.
The first two chapters explore why women used to lag behind but now exceed men in college enrollment.
Chapter 1 shows that examining occupations that require only a high school degree ("non-college"
occupations) can help resolve two puzzles. First, why do women attend college at greater rates than men
today, when men work more and earn more than women? I document that non-college occupations for
men are both more plentiful and higher paying than those for women. Next, I link the occupational
inequality in the non-college labor market to the gap in college enrollment, by employing two empirical
exercises to show that non-college jobs dramatically affect college-going decisions. Using employment
changes in the oil and gas industry, I demonstrate that increases in men's non-college job opportunities
lead male high school graduates to forego college enrollment. Using the automation of the office, I
demonstrate that declines in the non-college employment opportunities of women lead female college
enrollment to grow over time. Thus, women's lower non-college job prospects contribute to their higher
college enrollment. This leads to the second puzzle: why did women initially attend college at lower rates
than men, when women have always had worse non-college job prospects than men? I develop a
theoretical model to demonstrate that both the importance and availability of non-college occupations for
women contributed to women's initially low enrollment, as well as to the growth in female enrollment over
time, such that women eventually overtook men in college-going.
Chapter 1 argues that gender differences in occupations, particularly in the non-college labor market, lead
women to choose to attend college at greater rates than men. In Chapter 2, I explore one key mechanism
behind the severe occupational segregation in the non-college labor market. Using data from the National
Longitudinal Study of Youth (1979), I show that there exist large differences in skill profiles between men
and women. In particular, "gender-based skill" for men tends to represent mechanical skill, while "genderbased skill" for women tends to represent numerical and coding ability. Using a Roy model adapted from
Rosen and Willis (1979), I show that "gender-based skill" for men commands a return in the non-college
labor market and therefore increases the opportunity cost of college attendance. "Gender-based skill" for
women, on the other hand, does not appear to increase women's non-college earnings. Finally, I find that
these skill differences significantly impact the likelihood of enrolling in college through their effect on
wages. By increasing the value of the outside option to attending college for men, gender-based skill
contributes to the greater college enrollment rate of women.
Chapter 3, joint with Judd Kessler and Katherine Milkman, explores altruism in a unique field context. We
examine how reciprocity, an important motivation behind altruism, changes over time using a large quasiexperiment in the field. Specifically, we analyze administrative data from a university hospital system. The
data include information about over 18,000 donation requests made by the hospital system via mail to a
set of its former patients in the four months following their first hospital visit. We exploit quasiexperimental variation in the timing of solicitation mailings relative to patient hospital visits and find that
an extra 30-day delay between the provision of medical care and a donation solicitation decreases the
likelihood of a donation by 30%. Our findings have important implications for models of economic
behavior, which currently fail to incorporate reciprocity's sensitivity to time. The fact that reciprocal
behavior decays rapidly as time passes also suggests the importance of capitalizing quickly on
opportunities to benefit from a quid pro quo.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON HUMAN CAPITAL AND ALTRUISM
Amanda Chuan
Iwan Barankay
This dissertation contains three self-contained chapters on human capital and altruism.
The first two chapters explore why women used to lag behind but now exceed men in college
enrollment. Chapter 1 shows that examining occupations that require only a high school degree
(“non-college” occupations) can help resolve two puzzles. First, why do women attend college
at greater rates than men today, when men work more and earn more than women? I document
that non-college occupations for men are both more plentiful and higher paying than those for
women. Next, I link the occupational inequality in the non-college labor market to the gap in college
enrollment, by employing two empirical exercises to show that non-college jobs dramatically affect
college-going decisions. Using employment changes in the oil and gas industry, I demonstrate
that increases in men’s non-college job opportunities lead male high school graduates to forego
college enrollment. Using the automation of the office, I demonstrate that declines in the noncollege employment opportunities of women lead female college enrollment to grow over time.
Thus, women’s lower non-college job prospects contribute to their higher college enrollment. This
leads to the second puzzle: why did women initially attend college at lower rates than men, when
women have always had worse non-college job prospects than men? I develop a theoretical model
to demonstrate that both the importance and availability of non-college occupations for women
contributed to women’s initially low enrollment, as well as to the growth in female enrollment over
time, such that women eventually overtook men in college-going.
Chapter 1 argues that gender differences in occupations, particularly in the non-college labor market,
lead women to choose to attend college at greater rates than men. In Chapter 2, I explore one key
mechanism behind the severe occupational segregation in the non-college labor market. Using data
from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (1979), I show that there exist large differences in
skill profiles between men and women. In particular, “gender-based skill” for men tends to represent
mechanical skill, while “gender-based skill” for women tends to represent numerical and coding
ability. Using a Roy model adapted from Rosen and Willis (1979), I show that “gender-based skill”
for men commands a return in the non-college labor market and therefore increases the opportunity
cost of college attendance. “Gender-based skill” for women, on the other hand, does not appear
to increase women’s non-college earnings. Finally, I find that these skill differences significantly
impact the likelihood of enrolling in college through their effect on wages. By increasing the value
of the outside option to attending college for men, gender-based skill contributes to the greater
college enrollment rate of women.
Chapter 3, joint with Judd Kessler and Katherine Milkman, explores altruism in a unique field context. We examine how reciprocity, an important motivation behind altruism, changes over time
using a large quasi-experiment in the field. Specifically, we analyze administrative data from a university hospital system. The data include information about over 18,000 donation requests made by
the hospital system via mail to a set of its former patients in the four months following their first
v

hospital visit. We exploit quasi-experimental variation in the timing of solicitation mailings relative
to patient hospital visits and find that an extra 30-day delay between the provision of medical care
and a donation solicitation decreases the likelihood of a donation by 30%. Our findings have important implications for models of economic behavior, which currently fail to incorporate reciprocity’s
sensitivity to time. The fact that reciprocal behavior decays rapidly as time passes also suggests the
importance of capitalizing quickly on opportunities to benefit from a quid pro quo.
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CHAPTER 1 : Non-College Occupations and the Gender Gap in
College Enrollment
1.1

Introduction

Women are enrolling in college at greater rates than men, despite the fact that men have higher
median earnings and higher labor force participation than women. This apparent contradiction has
perplexed economists for decades.1 I observe that for a high school graduate considering whether
or not to attend college, the choice set appears dramatically different depending on gender. Men
with only high school diplomas have viable, plentiful, and lucrative career prospects, especially
given the plethora of blue-collar and trade occupations that pay highly based on physical strength,
mechanical ability, or the willingness to face risky situations.2 In 2015, jobs traditionally filled
by men paid median incomes of $52,000 (truck driver), $53,000 (electrician), or $60,000 (police
officer).3 In contrast, the jobs typically held by women with only high school degrees are much
lower paying. For example, jobs traditionally filled by women paid median incomes of $20,000
(cashier), $22,000 (housekeeper), and $24,000 (hairdresser).4 If these occupational differences are
broadly representative of the job prospects of men and women without a college degree, women
may naturally respond by enrolling in college at greater rates than men.
The imbalance in occupations among workers with only high school degrees (hereafter, “noncollege” workers) is an under-explored and overlooked reason for the greater college enrollment
of women observed today. Moreover, this occupational gap contributed to the trends in the college
gender gap over time, wherein women used to lag behind but now exceed men in college-going.
This insight adds to the discussion on human capital investments by pointing out that: (1) women’s
supposed “over-investment” in college is not an over-investment at all, given the few alternative
1 See

Dougherty, 2005; Buchman and DiPrete, 2005; Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko, 2006; Becker, Hubbard, and
Murphy, 2010.
2 Men have been shown to possess greater physical strength, mechanical ability, and tolerance for risk than women
(see Miller et al., 1993; Eckel and Grossman, 2002; Blakemore et al., 2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009).
3 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014.
4 Ibid.
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options women have; and, similarly, (2) men’s comparative “under-investment” in college may not
only arise from their greater barriers to human capital investment,5 but also their more lucrative
outside options when making the college-going decision.
This paper proceeds in two parts. The first part argues that women’s bleak outside options make it
natural for them to exceed men in college-going. In Section 1.2, I document descriptive evidence
that women with high school diplomas appear to face dramatic disadvantages in the labor market
compared to their male counterparts. In Sections 1.3 and 1.4, I use two empirical exercises to show
that these disadvantages directly contribute to the gender gap in college enrollment. In both exercises, I show that when the non-college occupations of one gender are disproportionately affected,
there is a large gender difference in the college enrollment response, and therefore a significant
change in the gap in college enrollment. Together, these results imply that the non-college labor
market plays a large role in explaining why women attend college at greater rates than men today.
The second part of the paper addresses a related puzzle in the literature — why women first lagged
behind and then exceeded men in college-going, when their non-college job prospects have always
been worse than men’s. In Section 1.4, I present evidence suggesting that women’s non-college
employment opportunities dramatically declined over time, while men’s non-college job options
remained plentiful by comparison. In Section 1.5, I situate this dynamic in a theoretical model
to explain how declining non-college job options for women and increasing female labor force
participation complemented each other in contributing to the growth in female enrollment over
time, such that female enrollment eventually surpassed male enrollment. Finally, I use the model to
estimate the extent to which the change in college enrollment from 1970 to 2010 can be attributed
to changes in non-college job options.
In particular, Section 1.2 documents stylized facts regarding the large disparity in non-college occupations facing male and female high school graduates. Using decennial census microdata, I document a “missing quadrant” of high paying non-college occupations for women. The majority of
5 Prior research has shown that men tend to be more impulsive, more myopic, and less risk averse than women, which
may contribute to the lower high school graduation rates among men relative to women (see Bertrand and Pan, 2013;
Becker, Hubbard, and Murphy 2010; Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko 2006).

2

non-college occupations are male-dominated, while the few non-college occupations that employ
women tend to exhibit low median earnings. I calculate the observed premium to college-going
for men and women by constructing a weighted median of annual earnings, using the proportion of
workers in each occupation as weights. I find that this premium is consistently higher for women
than men by at least 30 log points from 1950 to 2010. Non-college women appear to face even larger
disadvantages when it comes to careers, as opposed to just jobs. Over the life cycle, non-college
men earn roughly the same as college women by age, but non-college women make far less, experience little earnings growth over their work lives, and are less likely to work in occupations that
offer benefits. Overall, the job prospects of male high school graduates appear much more plentiful,
higher paying, and more likely to be careers than the prospects of female high school graduates.
Does the imbalance in the non-college labor market translate to the gap in college enrollment? If so,
do changes in non-college jobs shift enrollment rates for women, men, or both? Sections 1.3 and
1.4 address these questions for men and women, respectively. Both sections show that shocks to
specific occupations and industries change the non-college job prospects of women relative to men,
and correspondingly change the college enrollment gap.
Section 1.3 uses employment changes in the oil and gas industry to demonstrate that increases in the
non-college employment opportunities of men in this industry lead men to forego attending college.
Jobs in the oil and gas industry (e.g., oil field worker or driller) are dominated by men, and employment changes in this industry have a larger impact on male employment than female employment.
Using oil and gas production data from Allcott and Keniston (2018), I find that natural variation in
oil and gas reserves predicts the capacity of different counties to increase or decrease employment
for oil and gas workers. Exploiting this variation, I estimate that an additional 1 percentage point
increase in oil and gas employment leads to an additional 2-4 percentage point reduction in college enrollment among male high school graduates. This estimate is economically and significantly
greater than the estimated response of female college enrollment, which is effectively zero.
Section 1.4 demonstrates that automation led to dramatic declines in the non-college employment
opportunities of young women, which led female college enrollment to grow over time. I build
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on the routine-biased technical change literature, which reports that automation displaced routineintensive occupations and drastically changed the structure of the non-college labor market (see Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003). I present new evidence that routine-intensive occupations employed
over 60% of the young non-college female work force in 1970, and demonstrate that women’s
non-college jobs were especially vulnerable to the displacing effect of automation. Guided by this
finding, I then use a shift-share instrument that predicts exposure to automation to isolate the causal
effect on college enrollment. I demonstrate that an additional percentage point decline in routineintensive jobs led to a 0.7 percentage point increase in the female college enrollment rate, which was
significantly greater than the effect on male enrollment. This empirical exercise illustrates that like
men, women respond dramatically to their non-college employment opportunities, suggesting that
the anemic non-college prospects women face today contribute to their greater college enrollment.
Finally, Section 1.5 situates these findings in a theoretical model to simultaneously explain two
puzzles: 1) why women attend college at greater rates than men now, even though men have earned
more and worked more than women for most of history;6 and 2) why women historically lagged
behind men in college-going when their observed college premium was always higher than men’s.
The model illustrates that men’s higher earnings and greater labor force attachment explain why
male college enrollment shot up quickly and leveled off quickly. In contrast, the labor force participation of married women was initially low but grew substantially starting in the 1970s, making
labor market outcomes more important for women just as automation began to displace the bulk
of their non-college job options. The decline in women’s non-college job prospects and the growth
in female labor force participation were complementary in enabling women to realize their larger
premium from schooling relative to men and propelling female college enrollment to surpass male
college enrollment. A back-of-the-envelope calculation estimates that changes in non-college jobs
account for 15% of the growth in female college enrollment and 1-12% of the change in male college
enrollment between 1970 and 2010.
6A

long literature on the gender gap in wages has shown that earnings for men tend to be higher than earnings for
women, and that male labor force participation has been greater than female labor force participation (see Blau and Kahn,
2017 for a review).
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This paper addresses an old but open question, but takes a distinct approach from most of the
related literature. Rather than discuss the ability of women to outperform men academically (see
Buchmann and Diprete, 2005; Jacob, 2002; Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko, 2006; Becker, Hubbard,
and Murphy 2010; Bertrand and Pan, 2013), or explore marriage market returns to attending college
(see Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss, 2009; Chiappori, Salanie, and Weiss, 2015; Chiappori, Costas
Dias, Meghir, 2016; Bronson, 2015; Zhang, 2016; Low, 2017), I focus on labor market returns.
The majority of the literature on labor market returns and the college gender gap focuses on college
jobs and uses structural models, Oaxaca decompositions, or panel data with the hope of isolating
causal relationships (see Jacob, 2002; Dougherty, 2005; Charles and Luoh, 2003; Olivieri, 2014). In
contrast, my paper uses exogenous variation in labor demand to test the hypothesis that the superior
non-college job options of men lead to greater demand for college degrees among women. I show
that women’s enrollment rates increase when their non-college employment opportunities become
scarce, and thus that their deteriorating non-college job options drove their college enrollment to
grow and surpass that of men. I show that men’s enrollment rates decline when their non-college
labor market outcomes improve, and thus that their comparatively more plentiful non-college job
options led a larger proportion of men than women to rationally forego attending college.
I make four contributions to the literature. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to connect gender
differences in non-college job prospects to 1) the greater demand for a college degree observed today
and 2) the trajectory of the college gender gap over time. The (few) other papers in this vein had
other objectives, and therefore either do not show that changing non-college job opportunities lead
to gender gaps in college enrollment (Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo, forthcoming), or do not
show that individuals qualified to attend college actively forego college enrollment in the presence
of more attractive outside options (Cascio and Narayan, 2015).7
Second, I leverage the task-based approach to measure occupational skill demands (Autor, Levy,
7 Cascio and Narayan (2015) find that fracking increased high school drop-out rates among boys, but the focus of their
paper is not to address gender differences in the choice to attend college. The mechanism for their findings may operate
along dimensions other than choice. For example, if part-time jobs working in the oil and gas industry become more
available for boys, boys may find it harder to balance a job with high school coursework, and therefore fail to complete
high school even if they wished to graduate and attend college. In contrast, my paper finds that even among individuals
qualified to attend college, men choose to forego college given an increase in oil and gas employment in their area.
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and Murnane, 2003; Autor and Dorn, 2013), which provides more granular measures of the labor
market returns to skill profiles than the conventional approach of examining wage gaps (see Goldin
and Katz, 2010). Using this approach reveals that the returns to skills performed by non-college
women declined relative to the skills performed by non-college men. I thus provide empirical facts
that invite revisions of prior models, which overlook the role of declining non-college jobs for
women in increasing the college premium for women (Welch, 2000; Rendall, 2010; Huang, 2013).
Third, I contribute to the literature on routine biased technical change. I demonstrate that automation propelled women to enter college at greater rates than before, by displacing their non-college
employment opportunities. In contrast to the prior literature, which has mostly focused on how
automation led to job market polarization (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Goos, Manning, and
Salomans, 2009; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Goos, Manning and Salomans, 2014), I show that automation also affected the human capital investment decisions of women in irreversible ways.
Fourth, I present a simple model that resolves two contradictions. The first contradiction is that
women attend college at greater rates than men, yet men have greater earnings and stronger labor
force attachment (see Dougherty, 2005). The second contradiction is why men used to attend college
at greater rates than women when outside options have always been worse for women.8 My model
demonstrates that men’s greater earnings and labor force participation led them to attend college at
higher rates than women at first, but that women’s growing labor force participation allowed them
to realize their greater labor market returns, which pushed women to eventually surpass men in
college-going.
My results have direct implications for policy and future research. Policymakers have become increasingly concerned that men are lagging behind women in educational attainment (Rosin, 2010).
Several countries have already implemented interventions intended to help men catch up, such as
hiring more male teachers to serve as role models for boys, and tailoring class curricula to appeal to
8 Becker,

Hubbard, and Murphy (2010) identify a related mystery. For them, the true contradiction was why men
surpassed women in college-going at first when a greater proportion of women were academically prepared to attend
college relative to men.
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boys (Rosin, 2010; The Economist, 2015).9 The results of my paper suggest that these actions may
be misguided. If men attend college at lower rates because they possess better outside options, then
the gap in college enrollment may not be as inefficient as it seems, and interventions to minimize
this gap may be ineffective at best and destructive at worst. Indeed, recent evidence from Carrell
and Sacerdote (2013) indicates that interventions to encourage college-going have not shown much
promise for men, and in their survey evidence, men cite larger expected earnings with only a high
school degree as one key reason for choosing to not attend college. The aforementioned policy
measures could even decrease welfare, for example if male teachers were hired at the expense of
more qualified female teachers or if classroom curricula were changed to interest boys but ended up
alienating girls. This paper suggests that before we devote public resources to eliminating educational differences between men and women, we should first re-examine why these differences exist
in the first place, in order to determine the best role of policy in addressing the college gender gap.

1.2

Stylized Facts

To motivate the role of the non-college labor market in the college gender gap, this section presents a
set of stylized facts regarding the gender disparity in non-college jobs using raw data from the 2010
American Community Survey. The evidence presented in this section is merely descriptive, and
does not purport to isolate the causal effect of the non-college labor market on college enrollment
rates. However, patterns in the raw data strongly suggest that gender-based sorting into occupations,
particularly among non-college workers, contribute to the greater college enrollment of women over
men.
Within the non-college labor market, men and women sort into different occupations at different
rates, and the earnings of “traditionally female” occupations tend to be far lower than the earnings of
“traditionally male” occupations. Based on these differences alone, the observed college premium
(defined as the difference between median log college wages and median log non-college wages) is
9 For

example, Britain recently began a campaign to make reading more appealing to boys (Sommers, 2013).
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dramatically greater for women than men. Women’s apparent disadvantages in the non-college labor
market take shape not only in the form of lower observed median earnings, but also worse observed
career prospects in terms of lifetime earnings, earnings growth, and access to employment benefits.
The greater college enrollment rate of women may be a natural result of these stark imbalances in
observed non-college prospects between men and women.
Stylized Fact 1. In the non-college labor market, there exists a “missing quadrant” of high paying
jobs occupied by women.
Figure 1.2 depicts the median annual earnings percentile and worker gender composition for each
non-college occupation in 2010.10 Each data point is an occupation as defined by the 1990 Census
Bureau occupational classification scheme. To capture labor market returns for individuals most
likely to consider the college-going decision, I restrict the data to only 18-30 year olds.
The figure makes two important points. First, the majority of non-college occupations are maledominated. In fact, almost 65% of all non-college occupations employ 20% or fewer women. Many
of these occupations are trade or blue-collar occupations, which either paid highly for work that
demanded physical strength or mechanical ability, or paid highly for work that was unpleasant (see
Chapter 2). For example, male-dominated occupations like miner, machinist, and truck driver report
median annual earnings that fall between the 40th and the 80th percentile of median earnings for
all occupations in 2010 (see table 1.1).11 Second, “traditionally male” occupations tend to pay
more than “traditionally female” occupations. The occupations that employ a non-trivial share of
women (over 30%) have significantly lower median annual earnings than occupations that consist
of over 80% men. As shown in table 1.1, common jobs among non-college women include cashier,
cosmetologist, or housekeeper, where annual median earnings fell below the 10th percentile of
median earnings for all occupations.
10 I

define “non-college occupations” as occupations where over 50% of workers have never enrolled in college.
2 presents some evidence that men tend to exhibit greater physical strength, mechanical ability, and risktaking behavior than women, characteristics which command a wage premium in the non-college labor market. Additionally, employer discrimination may make it especially difficult for women to hold blue-collar occupations (see Hsieh et
al., 2017). Whatever the reasons may be, the vast majority of non-college occupations employed very few women, which
appears to contribute to the imbalance in non-college earnings between men and women.
11 Chapter
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These two points indicate that there exists a “missing quadrant” of high paying jobs held by women.
There exist both low and high paying jobs for men, but women without college degrees only occupy
low paying jobs. Figure 1.3 shows that there is a mirroring “missing quadrant” of low paying college
jobs held by men. This second missing quadrant is to be expected, since no men would enter college
to earn a low wage if there existed high paying alternatives which did not require a college degree.
Together, figures 1.2 and 1.3 demonstrate that men typically sort into high paying occupations in
the non-college market, whereas women do not. This sorting may in turn influence the composition
of men and women who elect to attend college.
The evidence indicates that gender differences in the allocation of workers to occupations lead
non-college women to earn less than non-college men. The occupational gender differences in the
non-college labor market, which are more severe than those in the college labor market, create a
greater gap between college and non-college earnings for women than for men.12
Stylized Fact 2. Women have a higher observed college premium than men.
Figure 1.4 explores this point in greater detail. The observed college premium in earnings for 1830 year old workers is much higher for women than for men for all decades from 1950 to 2010.
This difference was approximately 30 log points in 1950, rose to 50 log points by 1970 and 1980
right before women began to surpass men in college-going, and diminished to a little less than 40 log
points by 2010 when the gap in college enrollment began to finally stop growing.13 Appendix figure
A.1 breaks down this difference by plotting the weighted median log wages by sex and education
type, which reveals that the greater observed college premium of women is driven primarily by their
12 Note that only legal occupations are shown. If illegal non-college occupations pay highly for women, then it could
be the case that women have valuable alternatives to college-going that are not represented by figure 1.2. However, the
estimated market for illegal work is quite small in the United States, especially in comparison to transition or developing
countries (Fleming et al., 2000). Employment opportunities in illegal activities for women, such as prostitution, would
therefore be correspondingly scarce. Many forms of illegal work for women are also quite dangerous and impose serious
health risks (Gertler et al., 2005; Levitt and Venkatesh, 2007).
Even when taking into account the market for illegal work, women without college degrees face a disadvantage compared to their male counterparts. For women without college degrees, high-paying work can be obtained through entering
an occupation that is male-dominated, entering a risky illegal occupation, or earning a college degree. Men, on the other
hand, can obtain high-paying jobs without resorting to illegal market activity or obtaining a college degree.
13 This analysis is complementary to the results shown in Charles and Luoh (2003), which finds a higher college
earnings premium for women than men using observed log median earnings instead of log median earnings weighted by
occupation.
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lower non-college median log earnings. Within the college labor market, the gender difference in
median log earnings is much smaller, since gender-based segregation across occupations is not as
pronounced as it is among non-college occupations.
Overall, the evidence suggests that sorting across occupations creates larger gender differences in
observed earnings among non-college workers than college workers. This sorting may stem from
employer gender discrimination, which may limit women’s opportunities in certain non-college
occupations, or from employee preferences regarding work, which may result in a lower proportion
of women willing to work in certain non-college occupations relative to men. Obtaining a college
degree might therefore enable women to escape some of the observed inequalities entrenched in the
non-college labor market through entering the (less unequal) college labor market.
Stylized Fact 3. Among non-college workers, women’s career characteristics appear worse than
men’s. Non-college occupations that employ women tend to have lower earnings growth, are less
likely to offer retirement pensions, and are slightly less likely to offer health insurance.
Attending college may change the worker’s ability to pursue a career, as opposed to just a job.
Based on the raw data, the non-college market appears more favorable to the career pursuits of
men than women. I show that “traditionally male” non-college occupations enable their workers
to support a family and remain committed to the same occupation in the long-term. In particular,
“traditionally male” non-college occupations exhibit earnings growth and the provision of benefits,
such as retirement pensions and employer-sponsored health insurance. “Traditionally female” noncollege occupations, on the other hand, have little earnings growth, and are substantially less likely
to provide retirement pensions. The data suggest that for the majority of women, obtaining a college
degree is a pre-requisite for a rewarding career, while men can excel in their career without a college
degree.
To approximate how earnings grow with age over an individual’s work life, I use the National
Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 cohort and focus on the subsample of men and women with at
least a high school diploma. I then split individuals by gender and college degree status to determine
how hourly wage rates differ between non-college and college workers.
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Figure 1.5 presents the median log hourly wage rate by age for workers between the ages of 25
and 55. Non-college women’s career prospects appear to fare worse than non-college men’s. In
particular, the figure demonstrates that 1) the median earnings of non-college women are far lower
at each age level than the median earnings for other occupations; and 2) the median earnings for
non-college men are approximately equivalent to the median earnings of college women at each
year of age. Although the evidence is purely descriptive and selection into working or collegegoing presents challenges to causal inference, Figure 1.5 provides motivating evidence that the
non-college earnings gap between men and women may propagate throughout the work life and
lead to large disparities in the value of a college degree for women relative to men.
Careers tend to exhibit not only earnings growth but also the provision of benefits, such as retirement pensions and health insurance. The last two columns of table 1.1 summarize information about
benefits taken from the 2010 Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population
Survey (CPS-ASEC).14 “Traditionally female” non-college occupations are far less likely to have
access to retirement pensions with their work, and are slightly less likely to be included in an employer group health plan. For example, among “traditionally male” occupations like truck driver,
miner, and machinist, 46-62% of workers reported that their job offered retirement pensions, compared to only 11-36% of workers in female-dominated occupations like cashier, cosmetologist, or
housekeeper. Among these occupations, over 95% of workers in “traditionally male” occupations
reported being included in an employer group health plan, compared to less than 92% for workers
in female-dominated occupations.
The descriptive evidence presented in this section establishes basic facts regarding the relationship
between the non-college labor market and the gender gap in college enrollment. Several factors
14 The American Community Survey (ACS) is large enough to estimate reliable summary statistics regarding work and
earnings within occupations. Its measures regarding retirement income and health insurance, however, are too general for
the purposes of this paper. Its retirement income questions ask about whether the respondent has income from retirement,
survivorship, or disability benefits broadly. Its health insurance questions ask if the respondent is on employer-sponsored
health insurance but does not ask about the policyholder, who can be any member in the respondent’s family. In contrast,
the CPS-ASEC Supplement asks individuals whether they have retirement income as a result of their employment, separate from survivorship payments, disability benefits, Social Security income, Veteran’s administration payments or other
forms of income. The CPS-ASEC also asks individuals if they are the policyholder for their employer-sponsored health
insurance.

11

make it difficult to determine the causal effect of these non-college occupational gaps on the college
gender gap. For instance, if higher ability individuals select into attending college, the observed
college premium would be an inaccurate measure of the actual value of a college degree for the
marginal man or woman. In addition, if women with low earnings potential select out of labor force
participation, observed occupational sorting and earnings may incorrectly reflect the true difference
in earnings potential between men and women. Furthermore, changes in the college gender gap
could in turn affect the non-college occupation gap between men and women – for example, an
exogenous increase in women’s college enrollment relative to men’s may mechanically decrease
the labor share of “traditionally female” non-college occupations relative to “traditionally male”
non-college occupations.
To isolate the role of the non-college labor market on the greater college enrollment of women over
men, the next section employs two empirical exercises. These empirical exercises construct plausibly exogenous shifts in employment opportunities in various industries and occupations, allowing
me to explore the college-going responses of men and women separately.

1.3

Male College Enrollment and the Oil and Gas Industry

Are non-college jobs important in influencing college enrollment rates? Access may be a limiting factor which determines who goes to college and who does not. College is expensive, timeconsuming, difficult, and localized to certain areas. Lack of access is still a large public policy
concern, as shown by the plethora of studies on expanding financial access to college (see Hoxby
and Turner, 2015; Hill et al., 2005), expanding colleges to remote areas (see Garza and Eller, 1998),
and providing students with the skills to succeed in college (see Bragg et al., 2006). If differential
access to a college degree plays a large role in the college-going decision, then ability and means
may explain much of the variation in college enrollment rates among high school graduates. Under such a model, changes in non-college employment may do comparatively little to shift college
enrollment rates.
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Therefore, the first question to address is whether changes in non-college jobs empirically lead to
significant shifts in college enrollment, and whether men and women are differentially affected.
I leverage the descriptive evidence in the previous section, which shows the large degree of gender segregation in the non-college labor market. This section uses employment in the oil and gas
industry, a male-dominated field, to isolate the causal effect of male non-college employment on
college-going.
Oil and gas production has substantial effects on local labor markets (see Bartik et al., 2017; Feyrer,
Mansur, and Sacerdote, 2016; Allcott and Keniston, 2018; Cascio and Narayan, 2015), particularly
for non-college work. For example, in 2006 breakthroughs in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal
drilling enabled unprecedented quantities of oil and gas production in North Dakota (NPR, 2011;
Brown, 2013). Oil production catapulted from 40 million barrels to 150 million barrels within the
span of five years from 2006 to 2011, which created sudden and enormous changes in the labor
market returns to work in the oil and gas industry.15 By some estimates, the oil boom created
35,000 new jobs in 2011, which is enormous for a state with a population of 670,000 (McChesney,
2011). Unemployment in North Dakota fell to 3.3% in 2012, the lowest in the entire United States.
Wages for non-college work also saw drastic growth: average salaries for oilfield workers rose to
$70,000-$100,000, and truckers routinely made $70,000-$80,000 a year (Gold, 2015).
The example of North Dakota illustrates the ramifications of oil and gas production on the labor
market. To explore whether oil and gas employment influenced the demand for a college education
across the entire United States over last few decades, I use fluctuations in oil and gas production
from the contiguous United States from 1970 to 2010.
Upticks in oil and gas production increase the employment demand for not only workers directly
involved in oil and gas production (e.g., oil-well drillers, miners, drillers of earth), but also other
workers in related fields. Truck drivers, shippers, material handlers, material movers, and haulers
are required to transport oil to refineries; welders, electricians, mechanics, installation technicians,
15 This information is obtained from oil production data provided by Allcott and Keniston (2018), which is described
in detail later.
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and millwrights are required to build and maintain the equipment required to facilitate production;
structural metal workers, construction workers, concrete pourers, and foremen are required to build
residential and commercial properties. My analysis considers occupations directly employed in
the oil and gas industry, as well as “related” industries where employment demand is positively
correlated with oil and gas employment.
Work in the oil and gas industry is especially dangerous and requires intensive physical labor. The
industry is considered one of the most dangerous in America, and the workplace death rate in North
Dakota had grown to five times the national average since the oil boom began (Berzon, 2015). It is
perhaps for these reasons that employment opportunities in the oil and gas industry have historically
attracted overwhelmingly male, blue-collar workers (Eligon, 2013). Figure 1.6 graphs the composition of workers in the oil and gas industry by sex and education group. Among workers with at
least a high school diploma, men comprise the majority of the workforce in the oil and gas industry,
while college and non-college women each constituted less than 10% of the entire workforce. Male
high school graduates comprised of 50-70% of the workforce in occupations with high labor shares
in the oil and gas industry, such as truck, delivery, or tractor driver, laborers outside construction, or
miners.
To identify a causal channel between non-college labor market outcomes and college enrollment, I
employ an instrumental variable strategy that exploits the fact that oil and gas production depends
on the geology of the earth. There is a great deal of geographic heterogeneity in natural oil and
gas reserves, which influences the sites of active oil and gas production. When demand for oil and
natural gas is high, areas rich in natural reserves are able to dramatically increase employment, as
demonstrated by the example of the North Dakota boom. However, areas poor in natural reserves
show little change in employment over time. I also exploit time-series variation in domestic oil and
gas employment and changes in international oil prices.
Using two instruments based on the geological variation in natural oil and gas reserves, national
employment share in the oil and gas industry, and international import costs for crude oil, I find that
a 1 percentage point increase in men’s part-time non-college employment opportunities decreases
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male college enrollment by 2-4 percentage points. Among part-time college enrollees, the male
college enrollment response is significantly greater than the female college enrollment response.
This effect is strongest for individuals closest to the margin of college-going, and persists even after
accounting for migration.

1.3.1

Data and Summary Statistics

Data on education, occupation, earnings, work, and demographic characteristics come from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Surveys (CPS-ASEC), which are
conducted every year jointly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau, and provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Flood et al., 2015). The CPS-ASEC contains
rich information regarding the occupations and industries in which each respondent worked, as well
as detailed information regarding their earnings, hours and weeks worked, employment history, and
schooling. Moreover, the CPS-ASEC contains rich data of migration patterns, which is especially
useful when employing analysis that exploits spatial and time trends across labor markets.16
The main outcome variable used to measure college enrollment is schlcoll, the proportion of 16-24
year olds who report that they are currently enrolled in college full-time or part-time. To exclude
students who may not have graduated from high school at the time of data collection, I restrict this
sample to 18-24 year olds. There are two main advantages to using this variable as opposed to
the educational attainment variables educ or higrade, which are the variables traditionally used in
the education literature (see Autor and Acemoglu, 2011). First, by examining the proportion of
students currently in college, I can measure instantaneous responses in the education decision to
changing labor market conditions. This allows me to better hone in on the time window of interest,
and decreases the likelihood that changes in college-going stem from events prior to the change
in oil and gas employment that is of interest. Second, the variable distinguishes between full-time
and part-time enrollees. I can therefore investigate whether changes in non-college employment
opportunities have differential effects on different subgroups of the population. If individuals choose
16 For

more detail regarding the samples used in the analysis, see Data Appendix A.3.
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to discontinue their education in the face of better non-college labor market conditions, we would
expect the marginal college-goers, i.e. part-time college enrollees, to exhibit greater responses to
changes in oil and gas employment opportunities. Indeed, my results show that the effect of oil and
gas employment on college enrollment is most pronounced among male part-time college enrollees.
County-level data on natural reserves and oil and gas production were graciously provided by Hunt
Allcott and Daniel Keniston. Allcott and Keniston (2018) compile a unique data set of resource
endowments at the county level in the contiguous United States from 1962-2012 using information
from DrillingInfo (a market research company), the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), and local reports and geological surveys. I only use data for the years 1970-2010, since
much of the data prior to 1970 is missing. Allcott and Keniston (2018) calculate the natural oil and
gas reserve endowment per square area using the equation

rc =

T
Productionct + Proven Reservesct + Undiscovered Reservesct
∑t=1960
Areac

Productionct represents the production of oil or gas in year t in county c; Proven Reservesct represent
the reserves that oil and gas producers know to exist with relative certainty; Undiscovered Reservesct
are resources which oil and gas producers believe to exist due to the type of geological formations
found in the earth, but have not yet determined to exist with certainty. The variable rc represents
the total amount of oil and gas reserves believed to ever exist beneath the earth in county c; it is
invariant to oil and gas production from year to year.
I examine the effect of employment in the oil and gas industry, as well as employment in the oil,
gas, and “related” industries. I classify workers as being employed in the oil and gas industry if
they worked in oil and gas extraction, petroleum refining, petroleum production, mining, trucking,
or warehousing and storage. For “related” industries, I add workers who were not explicitly employed in the aforementioned categories but had skills that were transferable to the work commonly
performed in the oil and gas industry, such as construction workers, material handlers, geologists,
miners, excavation operators, drillers of earth, operators of machinery, and petroleum engineers. In
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the results, I separately display my regressions for employment in the oil and gas industry and in
oil, gas, and “related” industries. As expected, the results are larger for the sample of oil and gas
workers, whose employment and education decisions are most directly impacted, than the sample
of oil, gas, and “related” workers.
To establish baseline evidence that the oil and gas industry is especially relevant for men without
college degrees, appendix table A.1 calculates the growth in employment share by gender and college status following national growth in oil and gas employment. I use two periods of time that
experienced marked increases in national oil and gas employment: 1970-1980 and 2000-2010. The
table demonstrates that the change in employment share is largest for non-college men by an order
of magnitude in oil, gas, and “related” industries. In contrast, college men, college women, and
non-college women experienced very little change in employment share. Table A.1 provides further
support for the evidence in figure 1.6 that changes in oil and gas employment affect the non-college
labor prospects of men the most.
My last data set comprises of the import prices of crude oil from foreign countries obtained from
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). I use the price series of the landed costs of
imported crude oil from 1973 (the first available year) to 2010.17 These prices capture specific
forms of variation in the cost of importing foreign oil, which influences the demand for domestic
oil and gas production. The next section discusses this variation in greater detail.

1.3.2

Instrumental Variable Strategy

Using the resource endowment measure rc , Allcott and Keniston (2018) construct a shift-share
instrument that interacts county-level resource endowments with time-varying national employment
in the oil and gas industry. I use a leave-one-out version of their instrument in my estimation
procedure, but my analysis aggregates resource endowments to the state level. I compute the first
17 Landed

costs are the per-barrel price of oil, which include purchase, transportation, and insurance costs incurred
from the purchase point to the point of discharge. Landed costs do not include costs incurred at the point of discharge,
such as import tariffs or wharfage charges (EIA, 2018).
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instrumental variable, the “employment instrument”:

rs E−s,t

where E−s,t represents national employment in the oil and gas industry in year t and all states except
for s, and rs = ∑c∈s rc represents the natural resource endowment in state s.
The first specification uses this instrumental variable, which I call the “employment instrument”.
My instrumental variable strategy makes two assumptions. First, it assumes that the geological
composition of the earth affects oil and gas employment demand. Prior studies on the energy industry have found ample evidence for this causal channel (see Bartik et al., 2017; Feyrer, Mansur, and
Sacerdote, 2016; Allcott and Keniston, 2018; Cascio and Narayan, 2015). Indeed, changes in oil
and gas employment exhibit greater changes over time in states with above-median oil and gas natural resources (“high-resource” states) than states with below-median oil and gas natural resources
(“low-resource” states). Figure 1.7 graphs the labor share of workers in the oil and gas industry
by high- and low-resource state.18 There exists a great deal of fluctuation in male employment in
high-resource states, but male employment in low-resource states remains relatively constant. Female employment in both high- and low-resource states also remains constant over time, since the
labor share of employment in oil and gas was very low (less than 1%) for women. The figure illustrates that states with rich natural resources are able to expand or diminish employment in the oil
and gas industry, while states with relatively poor natural resources do not. The variation in natural
resources influences the labor market outcomes of men far more than women, since jobs in the oil
and gas industry comprise an extremely low share of female employment.
Second, the strategy assumes that the geological composition of the earth only affects changes in
educational attainment through its effect on oil and gas employment opportunities. It is unlikely for
18 States with above median natural resource endowments are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. States with below median natural resource endowments are Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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educational attainment to directly affect the composition of natural oil and gas reserves below the
ground, but omitted variables correlated with educational attainment may also be correlated with
the geology of the earth. To investigate, I compare the observable characteristics in states with high
resource endowments to states with low resource endowments for each year from 1970 to 2010.
The results are summarized in appendix tables A.2-A.6.19 Overall, resource endowments do not
appear to determine significant differences across states: female college enrollment, male college
enrollment, the proportion of women in a state, the proportion of blacks in a state, and the proportion
by age bin do not differ systematically or significantly by the state’s level of natural resources. In
a few of the years, the proportion of individuals by different age bins are significantly different
between high- and low-resource states – for example, the proportion of individuals between the
ages of 18 to 25 differs significantly between high- and low-resource states in 2000, but for all other
years, this relationship is insignificant. In all regressions, I include state fixed effects to control for
any time-invariant characteristics correlated with education and employment.
The leave-one-out variable for employment E−s,t captures time-series variation in total domestic
employment in the oil, gas, and “related” industries for all states except for the state of interest, s.
Oil and gas employment in all other states is positively correlated with employment in state s, since
oil and gas employment expands when demand for domestic oil and gas is high. But because actual
employment in state s in year t is excluded, the instrument by construction nets out contemporaneous
local labor market shocks that may influence both employment and college enrollment. Note that
even if shocks are correlated across states and E−s,t is not exogenous to college enrollment rates in
state s, the exclusion restriction for the instrument is satisfied as long as natural resources for oil and
gas production do not depend on college enrollment rates (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018).
Overall, the intuition behind the employment instrument is that when national employment in the oil
and gas industry rises, states with richer natural resource endowments can take advantage of their
greater capacity for production by increasing oil and gas employment relative to states with poorer
natural resource endowments. The effect of the geology of the earth on the demand increase in oil
19 Only the years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 are shown for brevity, but all other years are available upon
request.
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and gas workers should be uncorrelated with other factors that influence college enrollment. For
example, during a rise in national oil and gas production, employment opportunities in oil, gas, and
related industries will dramatically increase in North Dakota, a state rich in oil and gas reserves, but
stay constant in South Carolina, a state with no known oil and gas reserves. This variation is useful
in assessing the change in the proportion of current college enrollees as a result of expanding oil
and gas employment.
In Specification 1, I regress employment state s in year t on the employment instrument, a vector of
state-level controls, and state fixed effects. The controls include percent female, percent black, and
percent by ten-year age bin.

Est = α0 + α1 rs E−s,t + α2 Xst + θs + ust

(1.3.1)

In a second specification, I add a second instrumental variable that interacts the resource endowment
variable with foreign oil prices. This “price instrument” is computed as

rs pt

where pt is the average price of imported crude oil in year t. As before, rs = ∑c∈s rc represents the
natural resource endowment in state s.
One feature of using international oil prices is that landed import costs of foreign crude oil imports,
which depends on the supply of oil from other countries and the demand for oil worldwide, should
influence labor demand for domestic oil and gas production. Moreover, supply and demand factors
in the U.S. oil and gas market should play a small role in affecting international oil prices.20 In
robustness checks, I use other price series for imported crude oil, namely the price of oil from
OPEC countries and non-OPEC countries (Specifications 3 and 4, respectively). I find very similar
20 Note

again that the instrumental variable strategy does not require that international oil prices be completely exogenous to U.S. oil and gas employment. Rather, the exclusion restriction only requires that the resource endowment
variable rs be unaffected by U.S. oil and gas employment (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018).
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results in all regressions.
In the first stage for specifications 2-4, I regress employment state s in year t on the employment
instrument and the price instrument, a vector of state-level controls, and state fixed effects. The
controls include percent female, percent black, and percent by ten-year age bin.

Est = α0 + α1 rs E−s,t + α2 rs pt + α3 Xst + θs + ust

(1.3.2)

From the first stage, I obtain the linear prediction in employment demand for the oil and gas industry,
Eest . Under the assumptions stated above, Eest should be exogenous to state-specific characteristics
that would be correlated with both college enrollment and employment in the oil and gas industry.
Using the results from the first stage, I then estimate the effect of changes in employment demand on
Yst : the male college enrollment rate, the female college enrollment rate, and the college gender gap
(the male college enrollment rate - the female college enrollment rate). The second stage regression
for specifications 1-4 is

Yst = β0 + β1 Eest + β2 Xst + θs + εst

(1.3.3)

The identification assumption in the instrumental variable specification would be violated if increasing employment demand changed the composition of workers in a state by attracting migrants. Any
negative relationship between oil and gas employment opportunities and college enrollment rates
may be caused by a net influx of non-college migrants, as opposed to existing residents choosing
to forego attending college due to a rise in non-college employment opportunities. I therefore run
additional regressions using subsamples of only individuals who did not migrate across states in
the last year or who did not move for work purposes. The results are robust to these alternative
specifications.
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1.3.3

Results

All regressions are conducted at the state-year level. All regressions control for demographic characteristics at the state level (proportion female, proportion black, proportion by 10-year age bin, oil
production, gas production), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Regressions are clustered at
the state level and robust against heteroskedastic error terms.

Ordinary Least Squares

To examine baseline relationships between college enrollment and employment in the oil and gas
industry, I run an ordinary least squares regression. Table 1.2 summarizes the coefficient estimates
for employment in the oil and gas industry (Panel A) and for employment in the oil, gas, and
related industries (Panel B). I separately examine the correlation in enrollment for full-time male
enrollees (column 1), part-time male enrollees (column 2), full-time female enrollees (column 3),
and part-time female enrollees (column 4). Overall, employment and college enrollment do not
appear to be significantly correlated. The one exception is the significantly negative correlation
of −0.48 (p < 0.05) between male full-time college enrollment and employment in oil, gas, and
related industries.
The estimates in table 1.2 alone cannot be used to make causal statements regarding non-college
employment and education. For example, ordinary least squares cannot account for reverse causality: the proportion of individuals who choose to enroll in college may affect labor supply in the oil
and gas industry. Additionally, there may be omitted variables that influence both education and
employment. For instance, areas with high oil and gas employment may also be more rural, and
more rural areas tend to have lower college enrollment rates. To isolate the effect of employment on
education, I use a series of instrumental variable approaches. The next sections report the results of
these approaches.

22

First Stage Results

Specifications 1 and 2 estimate the main results of the model. Specification 1 uses only the employment instrument (equation 1.3.1), while Specification 2 uses both employment and price instruments
(equation 1.3.2). Both specifications produce similar estimates, despite using difference sources of
variation to estimate the causal effect of interest. Specification 1 solely uses time-series variation
in oil and gas employment in all states except for the state of interest. Specification 2, on the other
hand, includes time-series variation in the foreign cost of importing crude oil, which has been shown
to affect domestic oil and gas employment (see Hamilton, 2004).
Table 1.3 summarizes the first stage regressions. The upper panel presents the results of estimating Specification 1, while the lower panel presents the results of estimating Specification 2. The
instruments have strong and significant positive correlations with both oil and gas employment (column 1) and oil, gas, and related employment (column 2). Under Specification 1, I estimate that a
marginal 1 percentage point increase in the employment instrument leads to an additional 2 percentage point increase in oil and gas employment (p < 0.01). When including employment in related
industries, this estimate increases to about 3 percentage points (p < 0.01). Under Specification 2,
the point estimates on the employment instrument decreases, although not significantly. An additional 1 percentage point increase in the employment instrument increases employment in the oil
and gas industry by about 1.4 percentage points and employment in oil, gas, and related industries
by about 2.6 percentage points. The price instrument is economically significant and positively predicts employment, suggesting that domestic employment in oil and gas increases when the cost of
foreign imports is high. All specifications pass the Anderson-Rubin test for weak instruments.
Figure 1.8 presents the results of the first stage predictions on actual employment. The left panel
graphs the average labor share across the 48 contiguous states for oil and gas employment, while
the right panel graphs the average labor share for oil, gas, and related employment. The solid
line represents actual labor share. The long dashed line represents the first stage prediction from
Specification 1, and the short dashed line represents the first stage prediction from Specification 2.21
21 Year

dummies are not included in the first stage prediction, since discrepancies between the actual and predicted
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The first stage predictions appear to fit actual average labor share quite well after 1980 for both oil
and gas employment and oil, gas, and related employment. Moreover, the first stage predictions
do not depend on the choice of instruments: there is little discrepancy in the predictions between
Specifications 1 and 2 when these predictions are averaged across states. In the results presented
below, I nevertheless show the estimates from both Specifications 1 and 2, since average labor share
masks the heterogeneity in labor share predictions across states. The difference in predictions for
labor share, Eest , may still differ between Specifications 1 and 2 from state to state.

Second Stage Results

Using both Specifications 1 and 2, I then estimate the second stage regression represented by equation 1.3.3. The results for oil and gas employment are presented in table 1.4, while the results for oil,
gas, and related employment are presented in table 1.5. In both tables, the top panel presents Specification 1, which only uses the employment instrument, and the bottom panel presents Specification
2, which uses both the employment instrument and the price instrument. I separately examine the
impact of employment on male full-time enrollment (column 1), male part-time enrollment (column
2), female full-time enrollment (column 3), and female part-time enrollment (column 4).
Overall, employment appears to have no effect on full-time enrollment for men or women. However,
as depicted in Table 1.4, employment in the oil and gas industry has a substantial and significant negative impact on part-time college enrollment among men. A marginal 1 percentage point increase in
employment leads to a decline in part-time male college enrollment by almost 4 percentage points
in both Specifications 1 and 2 (p < 0.01). For female part-time enrollment, the coefficient on employment is marginally significant (p < 0.10) in Specification 1 but insignificant in Specification
2.
When examining the effect of employment in oil, gas, and related industries (Table 1.5), the results
are qualitatively similar but smaller in magnitude, as expected. Because the sample now includes
values load on year dummies. This would lead to perfect predictions of actual mean labor share after 1980 or so.
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workers who are less directly impacted by changes in the availability of oil and gas job opportunities,
one would expect the effect on college enrollment decisions to be less pronounced. Employment
in oil, gas, and related industries appears to have no significant impact on full-time enrollment for
men or women, but a substantial and significant negative impact on part-time college enrollment for
men. Increasing the labor share in oil, gas, and related industries by 1 percentage point leads to a 2
percentage point decline in the proportion of 18-24 year old men enrolled in college part-time. Similar to Table 1.4, the fourth column of Table 1.5 shows that employment has a marginally significant
negative impact on female part-time enrollment under Specification 1 but not Specification 2.
Overall, the results lend support to the story that non-college employment opportunities shift college
enrollment decisions. Such a mechanism would shift people at the margin of college-going, who
are likely to be those who enroll in college part-time. In both tables 1.4 and 1.5, we find that among
men, part-time college enrollees are significantly affected by changing employment opportunities
but full-time college enrollees are not. Furthermore, the group most affected by the change in
employment opportunities (in this case, young men) appears to have significantly stronger responses
in their current college enrollment rates. The negative coefficient on enrollment for part-time male
enrollees is significantly larger than that for part-time female enrollees in all specifications, for
both oil and gas employment (Table 1.4) and for oil, gas, and related employment (Table 1.5).
While the coefficient for part-time male enrollment is significant, large, and robust to alternative
specifications, the coefficient on part-time female enrollment is marginally significant at best, and
often insignificant. The results indicate that changes in oil and gas employment elicit a significantly
stronger response among men than women when it comes to foregoing a college education.

1.3.4

Robustness

I perform a series of robustness checks in order to evaluate the strength of the results reported in
Tables 1.4 and 1.5. First, the results may be driven by compositional effects: low-skill migrant
workers could relocate to areas with booming oil and gas economies, which would mechanically
create a negative correlation between oil and gas employment and college enrollment status. I
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therefore take advantage of the CPS’s rich data on migration patterns and replicate my main results
using subsamples of the worker population. Second, the results may be sensitive to the choice
of international oil prices. Instead of the average oil prices used in the main analysis, I use two
additional price series: oil prices from OPEC countries and oil prices from non-OPEC countries.22

Migration

The CPS contains rich information regarding migration patterns and reasons for moving. To determine if my main results are driven by the influx of low-skilled workers into areas of high oil and
gas production, I use the CPS’s migration data to restrict my analysis sample further. I restrict my
first sample to workers who did not report moving for work purposes. My second sample includes
only workers who reported having not moved across states in the past year.
My main results hold among workers who did not move for work purposes, as shown by Tables
A.7-A.9. Table A.7 replicates the first stage results, table A.8 replicates the second stage results
with oil and gas employment, and table A.9 replicates the second stage results with oil, gas, and
related employment. The point estimates for the first stage regressions using Specifications 1 and 2
are nearly identical to those estimated using the full analysis sample, and once again all regressions
pass the Anderson-Rubin test for weak instruments. The second stage results are also extremely
similar to those obtained using the full analysis sample: there is no significant effect on full-time
college enrollment for men or women, but a significant and large negative effect on male college
enrollment (coefficients are around −3.6, p < 0.01). Among workers who did not move for work
purposes, the coefficients on female part-time enrollment are all insignificantly different from 0.
Again, male part-time college enrollment has a significantly stronger negative response than female
part-time college enrollment.
Among workers who reported not having moved across states in the past year, the main results also
22 OPEC stands for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. OPEC countries consist of Algeria, Angola,
Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and
Venezuela.
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remain robust. Table A.10 replicates the first stage results. Although Specification 1, which only
uses the employment instrument, produces almost identical results as the main analysis sample, the
inclusion of the price instrument in Specification 2 leads to a weak first stage in the regression of oil
and gas employment on the instruments (column 1, F-statistic< 10). Specification 2 passes the weak
instrument test in the regression of oil, gas, and related employment on the instruments (column 2,
F-statistic = 11.850).
In spite of the weak first stage in Specification 2, Table A.11 shows that the effect of oil and gas
employment on college enrollment among non-migrants is extremely similar to the effect for the
main analysis sample. Again, oil and gas employment appears to have no significant effect on fulltime college enrollees (although the coefficient for male college full-time enrollment is marginally
significant in Specification 2, p < 0.10). The effect of oil and gas employment on female part-time
enrollment becomes entirely insignificant. The effect for male part-time enrollees is on the order of
4 percentage points for each additional 1 percentage point increase in oil and gas employment share
(p < 0.01). Table A.12 demonstrates that coefficient estimates on oil, gas, and related employment
among non-migrants is extremely similar to the main analysis sample. While labor share has no
effect on full-time enrollment for men, or enrollment for women, there is a significant and sizable
effect on part-time male enrollment rates.

Prices

The first stage predictions for employment in the oil and gas industry, Eest , may be sensitive to the
choice of prices for imported crude oil. I therefore substitute average prices with the import price
from OPEC countries (Specification 3) and from non-OPEC countries (Specification 4). Overall, I
find very similar estimates in both the first stage results and the second stage results. Table A.13
presents the first stage results of regressing employment share on instruments. Compared to using
average prices, using OPEC and non-OPEC prices barely changes the coefficient estimates on the
employment IV and the price IV. In all cases, the first stage regressions pass the Anderson-Rubin
weak instruments test. Table A.14 replicates the two-stage least squares regression of college enroll27

ment on oil and gas employment, while table A.15 replicates the regression of college enrollment on
oil, gas, and related employment. The results are extremely similar across specifications. Employment share has a substantial and significantly negative impact on male part-time college enrollment,
but no systematic significant effect on male full-time enrollment or female enrollment. As before,
the coefficient estimates are consistently larger when considering the impact of oil and gas employment than oil, gas, and related employment, perhaps because oil and gas workers are most directly
impacted by changes in oil and gas job opportunities and would therefore be more responsive in
their college enrollment decisions.

1.4

Female College Enrollment and Automation

Section 1.3 presents evidence that men’s college-going decisions are extremely responsive to changes
in non-college employment opportunities. Does this same effect hold for women? It may be the
case that women attend college for different reasons than men (e.g., attending college increases the
likelihood of marrying a high earning spouse), so shifts in non-college employment opportunities
may do little to shift college enrollment rates for women. This is important in determining how important non-college jobs are in contributing to the gender gap in college enrollment: do non-college
jobs only affect the college gender gap by limiting the proportion of men who select into collegegoing? Or do non-college employment opportunities contribute to the growth in college enrollment
for women as well?
I investigate this question by using the case of automation. Examining the correlation between
college enrollment and non-college job opportunities alone is insufficient to isolate causal effects of
non-college employment on college enrollment, since areas with high proportions of female collegegoers will mechanically have lower shares of female workers in non-college jobs. Instead, I use an
instrument for predicted automation exposure to show that a decline in non-college jobs for women,
brought about by the automation of the office, leads to an increase in female college enrollment.
Automation led to dramatic changes in labor market (see Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003; Spitz28

Oener, 2006; Goos, Manning, and Salomans, 2009; Goos, Manning, and Salomans, 2014; Autor and
Dorn, 2013; Autor and Acemoglu, 2011; Jaimovich and Siu, 2012; Cortes et al., 2014; Cortes et al.,
2016), particularly for women (Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010; Autor and Wasserman, 2013; Beaudry
and Lewis, 2014). I show that the continuous automation of the office decreased women’s noncollege job prospects and induced them to enter college at greater rates. This analysis complements
the results from Section 1.3 by demonstrating that like male enrollment, female enrollment responds
to changes in their non-college opportunities. Combining this result with the stylized facts in section
1.2 implies that the anemic options for women in today’s non-college labor market are a key reason
behind the greater proportion of women than men on college campuses today.
A secondary finding in this section is that automation led to historical growth in female college
enrollment over time. Jobs that were displaced by automation, such as secretarial work, clerical
work, telephone operators, and typists, employed the majority of non-college working women in
1970. From 1970 to 2010, the labor share of secretaries declined by 30%, while the labor share
of typists declined by 86%. These large changes in key occupations for non-college female labor
transformed the labor market, such that the labor market alternatives to college-going for women
became increasingly scarce over time.
The adoption of automated systems by firms was an ongoing process throughout the 20th and 21st
century. Automation significantly changed the content of jobs, by changing the marginal productivity of machines relative to that of human labor at certain tasks. To measure this change, the literature
on automation focuses on the “routine”, “manual”, and “abstract” content of tasks performed in each
occupation (see Autor and Dorn, 2013). “Routine” tasks are defined to be codifiable tasks that can
be executed following an explicit set of rules. Technological development increasingly made it easier to write computer programs to execute these tasks, which had previously been performed by
human labor. “Manual” tasks are defined as tasks required to be performed in person, such as physical tasks or service tasks. Finally, “abstract” tasks require more mental energy and involve more
complex processes that could not be directly programmed, such as problem solving, management,
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and complex communication.23 Prior work argues that automation directly substituted for routine
jobs and complemented abstract and manual jobs.24
The other significant effect of automation, which has been overlooked and under-explored, is the
disproportionate impact of automation on the occupations of women (Autor and Wasserman, 2013;
Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010). Routine-intensive occupations were overwhelmingly dominated by
female workers. In fact, I present new evidence that routine-intensive occupations employed over
60% of the high school graduate work force among women between the ages of 18 and 30. Moreover, “abstract”-intensive occupations tended to require a college degree, while occupations that
were relatively “routine”- or “manual”-intensive did not. Thus, by displacing routine-intensive jobs
but complementing abstract-intensive jobs, automation could have changed the labor market returns
to attending college, and this change may have been stronger for women than for men. To my
knowledge, this paper is the first to show that the decline in routine jobs significantly increased
women’s college enrollment. Thus, automation directly changed the college gender gap over time,
by helping drive women’s enrollment to grow and eventually surpass men’s enrollment.
This empirical exercise, combined with the results from Section 1.3, reveals that non-college employment opportunities have dramatic effects on the college enrollment rates of both men and
women. Due to gender differences in the distribution of workers to occupations, shocks to certain occupations can change the gender disparity in the non-college labor market, and therefore the
enrollment rate of women relative to men. Putting these findings together, it would then be natural for women’s worse non-college job prospects to generate greater demand for a college degree
among women relative to men.
23 Research

has shown that “abstract” tasks are becoming increasingly automated, but that this is a more recent phenomenon that began after the 1990s (Frey and Osborne, 2017; Hershbein and Kahn, 2016).
24 Prior work has demonstrated that computers and routine tasks functioned as substitutes in production while computers and abstract tasks were complements (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Bresnahan et al., 2002). Computers increased
the marginal productivity of abstract tasks and labor demand for workers with abstract skills (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000;
Bresnahan et al., 2002; Spitz-Oener 2008; Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2002). Abstract tasks typically had larger educational requirements of workers, and the onset of computerization increased these educational requirements (Spitz-Oener,
2006; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2002).
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1.4.1

Data

The analysis in this section utilizes the census microdata for all decades in 1950-2000 and American
Community Survey (ACS) data for each year from 2001 to 2010. Both the census microdata and
the ACS data are collected by the U.S. Census Bureau and provided by the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (IPUMS; Ruggles et al., 2017). The census and ACS data are the largest publicly
available data sets, making them some of the only data appropriate for occupation-level analyses of
employment and wage trends at disaggregated levels of geography. The census data for 1950, 1960,
and 1970 include 1% of the population. The census data for 1980, 1990, and 2000 include 5% of the
population. The American Community Survey data include around 0.4% of the population for the
years 2001-2004 and 1% of the population for the years 2005-2010. For the analysis in this section,
I use either the sample of all men and women or the sample of 18-30 year old men and women. The
data provide information on college enrollment, work characteristics, and demographic variables.
To measure how automation changed the demand for skill profiles over time, I use pre-existing
occupational measures and the task-based approach for measuring the impact of automation that is
typically used in the literature (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Goos, Manning,
Salomans, 2014), following the suggestion in Autor (2013) that researchers re-use, recycle, and reapply “off-the-shelf” measures of occupational skill requirements so that findings can be assessed
under common metrics. In particular, I use the data set on work content compiled by Autor and
Dorn (2013). Autor and Dorn (2013) uses the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and the
Occupational Information Network (O*NET) to construct measures of routine, manual, or abstract
task content for each occupation.
The primary measure of occupational task content in my analysis is the composite measure of
routine task intensity (RTI), which represents the relative routine-intensity of an occupation. It
is constructed by Autor and Dorn (2013) using the routine-, manual-, and abstract-task measures for
each occupation k:
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RTIk = ln(routinek ) − ln(manualk ) − ln(abstractk )

(1.4.1)

Occupations with high levels of the variable routinek relative to the variables manualk and abstractk
score high on RTIk , while occupations with low levels of the variable routinek relative to the other
two task measure variables score low on RTIk .

1.4.2

Descriptive Evidence

The descriptive evidence presented here serves two objectives. First, it demonstrates that young
women’s non-college employment opportunities were especially vulnerable to displacement by automation, relative to young women’s college employment opportunities and young men’s (college
and non-college) employment opportunities. Second, it illustrates the variation that drives the identification of the instrumental variable approach.
I start by evaluating a well-known result in the routine-biased technical change literature: the routine
task intensity of occupations declined over time because automation displaced routine-intensive jobs
(Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003; Goos, Manning, and Salomans, 2014).
Figure 1.9 graphs the average routine task intensity (RTI) in the labor force for 18-30 year old
workers separately for men and women. A comparison between men and women reveals that the
RTI content of women’s jobs was much higher than the RTI content of men’s jobs for all years in the
data period, indicating that a greater proportion of the female labor force was employed in highly
routine occupations relative to the male labor force. In 1950, average RTI was almost 0.8 standard
deviations higher for women than for men.
Most importantly, figure 1.9 shows that the RTI of women’s jobs plummeted from 1970 on, while
the RTI of men’s jobs stayed relatively steady at 0.2 standard deviations below the average. Thus,
the documented decline in routine-intensity discussed in the prior literature appears to only exist for
young women; for young men, RTI stayed relatively level. The evidence indicates that women’s
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jobs drove the decline in routine task intensity among young workers. Increased automation, and
the subsequent decline in the routine content of human labor, appears to have displaced women’s
job prospects by more than men’s job prospects.
Appendix figure A.2 decomposes the change in RTI into its three component parts: the routine intensity measure, the manual intensity measure, and the abstract intensity measure. The raw data
show that the decline in RTI for women is driven entirely by the decline in the routine intensity
measure.25 These trends are consistent with the evidence in appendix table A.16, which summarizes correlations between routine and abstract work for college and non-college female workers
from 1950 to 2000. For women, the strong positive correlation between not attending college and
working in routine-intensive jobs dissipates over the decades, while the positive correlation between
attending college and working in abstract-intensive jobs becomes stronger and larger.
Figure 1.9 suggest that women’s jobs experienced declines in routine-intensive task content while
men’s jobs did not. Did the automation of the office displace some jobs more than others in way
that affected women more than men? Figure 1.10 shows that this appears to be the case. The top
panel demonstrates a precipitous decline in high-RTI occupations since 1970, while the labor share
of low-RTI occupations increased.26 In the middle panel, I separately plot the labor share of highand low-RTI occupations and find that labor share for women in high-RTI occupations declined,
whereas the labor share for men in high-RTI occupations did not. Women in high-RTI occupations
peaked at a little over 25 percent of the labor force in 1970, before declining precipitously to about
20 percent of the labor force in 2000. In contrast, women in low-RTI occupations, and men in
high- and low-RTI occupations did not experience declines in labor share. In fact, their labor share
actually rose slightly during this period.
The natural next question is: did automation affect the college-going margin for women? The bot25 Abstract intensity increased by the same extent for both men’s and women’s jobs, while manual intensity remained
relatively constant during this time.
26 To accord with measures commonly used in the literature, I define high-RTI occupations as occupations in the top
third of RTI in 1980, and low-RTI occupations as occupations in the bottom third of RTI in 1980 (see Autor and Dorn,
2013). Because that the graph only depicts the labor share for occupations at the top and bottom third of RTI, the labor
shares do not sum to one in any year.
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tom panel of figure 1.10 breaks down the change in labor share for college and non-college women
by high- and low-RTI occupations. The employment share of high-RTI non-college women peaked
at 14 percentage points before dropping almost 60% by 2000. For non-college women in low-RTI
occupations, labor share remained steady, and for college women, the labor share increased during this period. These trends suggest that the displacement of jobs by automation documented by
the prior literature disproportionately impacted the non-college job prospects of women. Simultaneously, the labor share of college women in both high- and low-RTI occupations increased. The
results point to an asymmetrical effect of automation on labor market prospects, where the occupations that employed a large share of the non-college female workforce declined in labor share but
the occupations that employed college women did not.
Finally, automation fundamentally changed the labor structure of non-college occupations. Figure
1.11 graphs the density of occupations by proportion of female workers in each occupation. The left
panel displays the density for “non-college” occupations, in which the majority of workers had only
high school degrees, while the right panel displays the density for “college” occupations, in which
the majority of workers had college degrees. There were striking changes in gender composition
among college and non-college occupations from 1970 to 2010. In 1970, the majority of non-college
occupations were male-dominated (less than 30% women), some non-college occupations were
female-dominated (at least 70% women), and very few occupations were “gender-equitable” (3070% women). The female-dominated occupations that form the mass at the right of the 1970 noncollege occupation distribution were all highly routine-intensive occupations: stenography, typist,
secretary, telephone operator, etc. In contrast, college occupations were overwhelmingly maledominated.
Over time, as automation displaced routine-intensive jobs, the mass at the right of the non-college
occupation distribution declined and eventually disappeared. By 2010, almost all non-college occupations were male-dominated, and the non-college labor market became a relatively inhospitable
place for women. In contrast, the number of female-dominated or gender-equitable college occupations rose. The descriptive evidence suggests that in the 1970s, women had job options in the non-
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college market but relatively few job options in the college market. Over time, their non-college job
prospects declined while college occupations became more accessible. By 2010, the reverse is true.
Very few non-college jobs were accessible to women, and the occupations that employed women
had significantly lower wages, as shown by figure 1.2. On the other hand, women’s access to the
college labor market dramatically expanded, since college occupations that used to be traditionally
male are now gender-equitable or even female-dominated.

1.4.3

Identification

To instrument for the decline of routine-intensive employment opportunities, I follow the approach
of Autor and Dorn (2013) and construct a modified shift-share instrument that predicts the employment share of routine-intensive occupations in a local labor market. The logic behind this instrument
is that local labor markets with higher 1950 shares of routine-intensive employment (“routine employment share”) experienced greater automation than local labor markets with low 1950 shares of
routine-intensive employment. The instrument is constructed as follows:

I

d c = ∑ Ei,c,1950 RSHi,−c,1950
RSH

(1.4.2)

i=1

where a local labor market is a commuting zone, indexed by c. Ei,c,1950 represents the employment share of industry i in commuting zone c in 1950. RSHi,−c,1950 represents the share of routine
occupations in industry i in all states except the state with commuting zone c.
In the first stage regression, I interact the shift-share instrument with a matrix of year dummies to
nonparametrically predict the effect of the instrument on the actual labor share of routine-intensive
employment in future years. The idea behind the identification strategy is that local labor markets
with high baseline shares of industries that experienced a large amount of automation later on will
experience larger displacement of women’s non-college labor market opportunities later on. The instrument relies on the assumption that high 1950 shares of industries that automated later on should
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influence employment opportunities in future years, but not directly influence college enrollment
rates in future years.
The first stage regression is

d c,1950 × 1(year = t) + α2 Xct + φt + θc + ect
RSHct = α0 + α1 RSH

(1.4.3)

where c indexes local labor market, t indexes the year, Xct is a vector of controls for local labor
market c at year t, φt is a vector of year dummies, and θc is a vector of fixed effects for local labor
markets. I use the estimates from the first stage regression to predict variation in actual routine share
g ct .
employment for each year t, denoted by RSH
The second stage regression is

g ct + β2 Xct + φt + θc + εct
Yct = β0 + β1 RSH

(1.4.4)

The IV regression estimates the effect of declining employment opportunities in routine-intensive
industries on the female college enrollment rate, the male enrollment rate, and the college gender
gap (defined as the male college enrollment rate less the female college enrollment rate).
The first stage regression obtains the variation in actual routine employment share due to the industry composition of a local labor market in the base year of 1950, weighted by the national routine
employment share of each industry in 1950. The measure is compiled from industry characteristics in 1950, which pre-date the changes in automation that occurred starting in the 1970s. The
instrument should therefore net out any post-1950 correlations between employment opportunities
and college enrollment, as long as these relationships are independent of 1950 industry composition. Moreover, since the instrument takes the average routine share of employment per industry for
all states except the one that contains the commuting zone of interest, it nets out local labor market
shocks that influence educational outcomes along dimensions other than changes in the employment
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share of routine-intensive occupations.
The exclusion restriction specifies that industry composition in a base year influences college enrollment decisions in a future year only through changing non-college occupations in that future year.
This instrument leverages the argument in Autor and Dorn (2013) that labor markets with large
baseline shares of industries high in routine-intensive work were the ones with greater demand
for automation. Since automation displaced routine-intensive work, the instrument should predict
future declines in job market opportunities for workers in routine-intensive occupations. My firststage results, presented in table 1.6, are consistent with this argument. The correlation between the
actual employment share of routine-intensive occupations and the instrumental variable is negative
for all years starting in 1970, when routine-intensive employment shares first began declining. The
correlation grows strictly more negative with each successive decade, which is also consistent with
the story that the growth of automated processes in the workplace lead to persistent contractions in
employment demand among routine-intensive occupations.27
There are a number of alternative explanations that lead to a violation of this exclusion restriction.
First, one might argue that increased automation in different labor markets could have made it easier
to attend school through decreasing the costs of finishing high school or expanding the resources
of post-secondary institutions. For this alternative hypothesis to explain my findings, automation
would have had to affect men and women differentially, since I find a significantly larger increase
in female enrollment relative to the insignificant effect on male enrollment. This appears unlikely.
Another alternative hypothesis is that high 1950 levels of routine-intensive employment are correlated with omitted characteristics that influence both non-college employment and schooling
choices. For example, local labor markets with social norms that were conducive to women work27 First stage regressions were also conducted using median wages in routine-intensive occupations (not shown).

Autor
and Dorn (2013) do not find that automation uniformly decreased wages in the way that it did with employment. My
findings are similar. When the instrument is interacted with year dummies, the resulting coefficients do not appear
to be significantly negative and decreasing. The first stage regressions show that wages do not experience monotonic
declines in labor markets with high predicted 1950 routine share employment, which violates a necessary condition
of the LATE theorem for IV estimation (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Because the instrument is a better predictor of
employment opportunities in routine-intensive occupations, the analysis focuses on the relationship between employment
opportunities in routine-intensive occupations and college enrollment.
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ing may have had higher 1950 routine employment shares. These social norms could then have
encouraged more women to attend college twenty years later. Here, it is important to note that my
identifying variation draws from predicted routine employment shares, not actual routine employment shares. The variation in my specification arises from the industry composition in a local labor
market in 1950. In other words, local labor markets with high 1950 shares of the industries that happened to automate faster later on were the markets that had high college enrollment among women
(but not men) later on. By constructing predicted routine employment share using a shift-share approach, the instrumental variable strategy nets out the confounding effects of actual initial market
conditions, as well as unobservable characteristics correlated with actual initial market conditions.

1.4.4

Results

I find that declining routine-intensive occupations, which employed the majority of the non-college
female workforce among young workers, increased the college enrollment rate significantly more
for women than for men. The main instrumental variable regression results are reported in table
1.7 for the sample of 18-25 year olds. Table 1.8 reproduces the regression for the larger sample of 18-30 year olds. For both tables, the first two columns report the results for women, the
second two columns report the results for men, and the last two columns report the results with
the gender gap (male enrollment minus female enrollment) as the dependent variable. All regressions include fixed effects for commuting zone, year, and region. The even-numbered columns also
include commuting-zone level controls for total population, proportion of women, proportion of
blacks, proportion of Hispanics, proportion by ten-year age bin.
Table 1.7 reports the main regression estimates, where the outcome variable is the proportion of
18-25 year olds who have ever enrolled in college. Decreasing the share of routine-intensive occupations by an additional percentage point leads the female enrollment rate among 18-25 year
olds to increase by 0.50 percentage points (p < 0.05), as shown in column (1). In contrast, the
effect on male enrollment, shown in column (3), is very close to zero (point estimate of -0.04) and
statistically insignificant. The coefficient estimates are both economically and statistically signifi38

cantly greater for women than for men. Column (5) shows that the net impact on the college gender
gap (male enrollment less female enrollment) is a decline of 0.46 percentage points (p < 0.01).
Columns (2), (4), and (6) add demographic controls at the commuting zone level, which allow for
variation in enrollment rates due to the demographic composition of individuals within the commuting zone. I find that in all cases, the point estimates do not significantly change after the inclusion
of demographic controls. Column (2) shows that the effect size increases directionally, such that
an additional percentage point decline in the labor share of routine-intensive occupations increases
female enrollment by 0.74 percentage points (p < 0.01). Column (4) show that the effect on male
enrollment remains insignificant. Again, the estimated effect on female enrollment is economically
and statistically significantly greater for women than for men. Finally, the net impact on the college
gender gap, shown in column (6), is a decline of 0.54 percentage points.
Table 1.8 expands the sample to the proportion of 18-30 year olds who have ever enrolled in college. Since the sample now includes individuals who are further from the margin of college-going,
the point estimates noticeably decline. As shown by column (1), decreasing the share of routineintensive occupations by an additional percentage point leads to an increase in female enrollment
by 0.35 percentage points. In contrast, column (3) shows that the effect of routine occupations on
male enrollment is much smaller and insignificant. Column (5), which presents the results on the
college gender gap (male enrollment less female enrollment), shows that the corresponding effect is
a 0.18 decline in the college gender gap. As with the sample of 18-25 year olds, I find that the point
estimates do not significantly change after including demographic controls. Column (2) shows that
adding demographic controls directionally magnifies the effect of routine-intensive occupations,
such that the estimated effect of an additional percentage point decline in routine-intensive labor
share on female enrollment is now 0.48 percentage points. The effect on male enrollment, shown
in column (4), remains insignificant. The net effect on the college gender gap is a 0.25 percentage
point decline, shown in column (6).
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1.5

Explaining Time Trends in the Reverse College Gender Gap: Theoretical Model

So far, the paper makes the case that women’s worse non-college job prospects contribute in major
ways to their greater college enrollment rate. But women’s non-college prospects have always been
worse than men’s, so why have women not always exceeded men in college-going? The literature on
the college gender gap has identified two symmetric puzzles: first, why did women attend college
at greater rates than men after 1980, when men have always worked more and earned more than
women?28 Second, why did men attend college at greater rates than women before 1980, when
women have always had a higher observed college premium than men?29 This section presents a
theoretical model that reconciles both of these contradictions.
The theoretical framework demonstrates that non-college jobs played a growing role in women’s
college-going decisions, and that this contributed to the growth and eventual dominance of women
in college classrooms. Since this paper focuses on the role of labor market returns, the model
purposefully abstracts from other factors that have already been shown to contribute to the college
gender gap, such as abilities (see Becker, Hubbard, and Murphy, 2010; Jacob, 2002; Bertrand and
Pan, 2013; Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko, 2006), marriage market outcomes (see Chiappori, Iyigun,
and Weiss, 2009; Chiappori, Costa Dias, and Meghir, 2015; Chiappori, Salanie, and Weiss, 2015;
Bronson, 2015; Zhang, 2016; Low, 2017), or gender differences in preferences (see Niederle and
Vesterlund, 2010), by treating these factors as equal between men and women. The model assumes
three key differences between men and women: expected wage rates, time available for labor, and
exposure to fertility risk.30 Within the model, these three differences are sufficient to explain why
men exceeded women in college-going at first while women exceeded men in college-going later
on. In addition, one natural implication of this model is that the greater enrollment rate of women
28 For literature that identifies this question, see DiPrete and Buchmann 2008; Jacob 2002; Becker, Hubbard, and
Murphy 2010; Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko 2006
29 Becker, Hubbard, and Murphy (2010) and Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006) have identified men’s initially greater
enrollment rate to be the major puzzle in the literature.
30 Fertility risk has been identified as one key reason why women used to have lower labor force participation and
lower educational attainment than men (see Goldin and Katz, 2003; Bailey, 2006; Low, 2017; Gershoni and Low, 2017).
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leads to the lower college wage rates for women compared to men. In other words, the gender wage
gap among college workers is a direct result of the gender gap in college enrollment.

1.5.1

Model Setup

Individuals live for two periods. In each period, they have quasilinear utility over consumption ct
and leisure `t , as well as a fixed amount of housework that must be completed. Individuals maximize
their utility by choosing how to allocate their remaining time net of housework.
In period 0, individuals must decide whether to attend college. The decision to attend college is
denoted s ∈ {0, 1}, where s = 0 represents the choice to not attend college and s = 1 represents the
choice to attend college. Individuals make the decision to attend college based on their decisions
regarding expected utility in periods 1 and 2.
In periods 1 and 2, individuals must choose how to allocate their time net of housework. Housework
requirements are represented by Ht in period t ∈ {1, 2}. The household efficiency parameter is given
by α. Completing housework amount Ht takes

Ht
α

units of time. Individuals’ time net of housework

is therefore represented by T − Hαt , which I abbreviate to Tt to simplify notation.
In period 1, all individuals are single. They must allocate their time net of housework T1 = T − Hα1
between college s, labor x1 , and leisure `1 . If they work in period 1, they will receive expected wage
rate w. College enrollees must pay the costs of attending college, which consist of monetary costs d
and idiosyncratic non-monetary costs ε, where ε is drawn from the distribution G(ε).31 In addition,
attending college requires z units of time, where z = 1 is sufficient to obtain a college degree. As I
will discuss in detail later, individuals face an unplanned pregnancy with probability q and expect
to complete only z < 1 of their college requirements.
In period 2, all individuals marry. Individuals allocate their time net of housework T2 = T − Hα2
between labor x2 and leisure `2 . Importantly, couples can pool their time to complete the household
31 Following the formulation of Becker, Hubbard, and Murphy (2010), ε can be considered an ability cost. Highability individuals have low non-monetary costs of college, while low-ability individuals have high non-monetary costs
of college.
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production required by the family. Their expected wage rate in period 2 is determined by whether a
college degree was earned at the end of period 1, as denoted by sz, where w(sz) ∈ {w, w}. Individuals
who do not earn a college degree by the end of period 1 (sz < 1) receive wage rate w, and individuals
who receive a college degree by the end of period 1 (sz = 1) receive wage rate w, with w > w.

In period 2, the maximization problem is given by32

V2 (s, z) = max c2 + ln(`2 )
c2 ,`2

(1.5.1)
subject to w(sz)[T2 − `2 ] = c2
| {z }
x2

In period 1, the maximization problem is given by

V1 (s, z) = max c1 + ln(`1 ) − εs + βV2 (s, z)
c1 ,`1

(1.5.2)
subject to w[T1 − `1 −sz] = c1 + dsz
| {z }
x1

In period 0, the utility maximization problem is given by

max EV1 (s, z) = max (1 − q)V1 (s, z = 1) + qV1 (s, z < 1)
s

1.5.2

(1.5.3)

s

Gender

Denote women by the subscript f and men by the subscript m. Men and women differ in three
key ways. First, I assume that men have a higher expected wage rate than women to represent
the empirical fact that men sort into higher paying occupations relative to women. Here, expected
wage rates can be considered the sum of earnings in each occupation weighted by the probability of
filling an occupation. A decline in non-college employment opportunities would be represented as
32 The

main results of the model are generalizable to the case where utility with respect to leisure follows a function
v, where v is quasiconcave, twice differentiable, and homogeneous of a degree between 0 and 1.
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a decline in the expected wage rate. In this formulation, men have higher wage rates than women
within education groups. Following the data, I assume wm > w f and wm > w f . The gender disparity
among workers without a college degree is larger than the gender disparity among college graduates:
w f − w f > wm − wm .
Second, men and women have potentially different time net of housework to allocate to labor xt ,
leisure `t , and schooling s. In period 1, single men and women without children have the same
amount of housework they must complete, given by H1 . Men and women will have an equal amount
of time net of housework T1 = T − Hα1 to allocate to labor, leisure, and schooling. In period 2, men
and women marry and pool their time to complete the housework needed for the family. The time
devoted to housework will differ between men and women, because married couples can specialize.
The higher wage rate of men implies lower opportunity costs for women to engage in housework,
assuming that both are equally efficient at it and that the marginal productivity of time in housework
is constant. The comparative advantage of men in market work leads women to spend more time
completing housework needed by the family, following Becker’s theory of household specialization
(Becker 1981, 1985).33 Let T2i = T − Hα2i represent the time net of housework in period 2, with
H2i = H2 f for wives, H2i = H2m for husbands, and H2 f > H1 > H2m . To remain consistent with
observed trends, the model assumes married men will always work. In other words, men’s time net
of housework T2m = T − Hα2m is high enough that it is always optimal for married men to work.
Lastly, women face fertility risk but men do not (qm = 0). With probability q f > 0, women will have
an unplanned pregnancy in period 1 while single. Having an unplanned pregnancy introduces the
expectation that female college enrollees will leave school without fulfilling the time requirements
necessary to earn a college degree. In the state where women do not have an unplanned pregnancy
in period 1, z = 1. In the state where women have an unplanned pregnancy in period 1, z < 1. They
would then receive expected wages w f instead of w f in period 2. All women know the probability of
an unplanned pregnancy q f prior to making their decision to attend college in period 0. They know
33 An

alternative formulation which achieves the same result is to assume a comparative advantage in housework for
women, which leads men to specialize in market work and explains their higher expected wage rates (Becker, 1985; Galor
and Weil, 1996).
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whether or not they have an unplanned pregnancy once period 1 starts, after their college-going
decision is made but before their labor or leisure decisions in each period are made.
The discount factor for period 2 utility, β, may also differ between men and women. However, the
crucial differences explored in the model are the three key differences described above. I therefore
assume β is the same between men and women.

The timeline for the model can be summarized briefly as:
Period 0: Individual chooses s ∈ {0, 1}. Then, z is realized.
Period 1: Individual chooses leisure `1 , and in doing so chooses labor x1 = T1 − `1 .
Period 2: Depending on choice of s and realization of z, individual receives wage w(sz).
Individual chooses `2 (sz) and labor x2 (sz) = T2 − `2 (sz).

1.5.3

When is enrollment higher for men than women? When is enrollment higher
for women than men?

Based on equations (1.5.1)-(1.5.3) and the three key differences between men and women, the
schooling decisions for men and women can be derived. I assume that single men and women
have sufficient time for leisure and schooling in period 1 (T1 >

1
wm

+ 1, T1 >

1
wf

+ 1). The time

assumption for single men guarantees that married men will always work in period 2 (T2m >

1 34
wm ).

However, married women may not necessarily work in period 2. The schooling decision si for
gender i is given by

"

#

si = 1 γi > ε
34 T
2m

> T1 and T1 >

1
wm

+ 1 imply that T2m >

1
wm .
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(1.5.4)

The threshold college-going value γi differs by gender i. For men,

γm = β[T2m (wm − wm ) − ln(wm/wm )] − wm − d

(1.5.5)

For women,

γf

=





−[1 − q̆ f ](w f + d)







1

 if wives do not work (T2 f ≤ w f )














β(1 − q f )A f − [1 − q̆ f ](w f + d)



if only female college graduates work ( w1f < T2 f ≤ w1 )


f
















β(1 − q f ) T2 f (w f − w f ) − ln w f/w f − [1 − q̆ f ](w f + d)







 if all wives work ( 1 < T2 f )
w
f

where q̆ f = q f (1 − z) and A f = w f (T2 f − w1f ) − ln(w f T2 f ).
The schooling rule si states that individuals choose to attend college if and only if their future
discounted earnings gain in period 2 exceeds their future discounted loss in utility from less leisure
in period 2,35 their foregone earnings from attending college in period 1, and the total (monetary
and non-monetary) college costs in period 1.
Theory Appendix A.2 lists further derivations, details, and analysis. The three key points are summarized as follows.
First, men’s higher earnings and higher labor force participation make their college-going decisions
35 Recall

that obtaining a college degree lowers the optimal leisure amount from
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1
w

to

1
w.

strictly more responsive to labor market returns than the college-going decisions of women (see
Proposition A.2.3 and A.2.4 in the Theory Appendix A.2). Since labor market returns for men were
high, male enrollment shot up quickly and leveled off quickly. In contrast, female enrollment grew
gradually but steadily over time. Initially, women’s college-going decisions were not very responsive to their labor market returns, for many potential reasons. The model focuses on two reasons
that have been identified by the literature: housework responsibilities kept most married women out
of the labor force prior to the 1980s, and the risk that an unanticipated pregnancy would prevent
women from finishing educational investments created uncertainty in whether women could capitalize on their labor market returns. Increased access to contraceptive technologies and advances
in household production efficiency increased the responsiveness of women’s college-going decisions to labor market returns over time (see Figure A.3, Equation A.2.23, and Equation A.2.24 in
Appendix A.2).
Second, the model delivers closed form solutions regarding whether and how much women will
work, based on their expected wage rates and the time they have available after housework. Expected non-college wage rates directly figure into women’s college-going decisions even when married women do not work in period 2, since non-college wage rates represent the opportunity cost
of college attendance when women are single in period 1. In contrast, expected college wage rates
only play a role in women’s college-going decisions when it is optimal for female college graduates
to work when married in period 2. Consequently, women derive labor market benefits from earning
a college degree only when female college graduates become efficient enough at housework to have
time for market work (see Propositions A.2.3 and A.2.4 in the Theory Appendix A.2).
Third, fertility risk mediates the slope of the growth in female enrollment, in that declines in fertility risk increase the responsiveness of women’s college enrollment decisions to their labor market
w −w

returns. When fertility risk q f is above 1 − wmf −wm , female enrollment will always be below male enf

rollment. When fertility risk declines below 1 −

wm −wm
w f −w f ,

it becomes possible for female enrollment

to surpass male enrollment.36
36 Setting

the slopes of the college enrollment threshold for men and women equal, we have
β(1 − q f )[w f − w f ] = β[wm − wm ]
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Figure 1.12 delivers the final result of the model. The left panel summarizes the role of increasing
housework efficiency and declining fertility risk on how wage rates affect women’s college-going.
The x-axis is T2i = T − Hα2i , time net of housework for gender i in period 2. The figure depicts how
γi , the threshold college-going value for gender i, changes as T2i increases.
The effect of increasing household efficiency is represented by an increase in α, which increases
the time net of housework for women, T2 f . The female college-going threshold γ f grows as T2 f
increases, represented by right-ward movement along the x-axis. This growth stems entirely from
the result that increasing T2 f increases the strength of the college-going response to wage rates.
This growth is discontinuous, depending on the relationship between time net of housework T2 f and
wage rates (w f , w f ). When T2 f <

1
wf

, it is not optimal for married women to work in period 2. They

will attend college if and only if ε < −[1 − q̆ f ](w f + d). A marginal increase in α will do nothing
to increase the college-going threshold γ f along this interval. On the other hand, if α is sufficiently
high such that T2 f ∈ ( w1f , w1 ), then only married women with college degrees will work in period 2.
f

H

A marginal increase in α increases the threshold γ f by β(1 − q f ) α22f [w f − T12 f ], which is positive due
to the assumption that T2 f >

1
wf

. Lastly, if T2 f >

1
wf

, it is optimal for all married women to work.

The slope of γ f is the largest in this region – a marginal increase in α increases the threshold γ f by
H

β(1 − q f ) α22f [w f − w f ].
The figure also graphs male enrollment, γm which grows as rising household production efficiency
α increases the time net of housework for men T2m (represented by a right-ward shift along the same
x-axis).
The effect of declining fertility is represented by the shift from γ f (e
q f ) to γ f (b
q f ), where qef > 1 −
wm −wm
w f −w f

> qbf . Again, 1 −

wm −wm
w f −w f

is the threshold below which it is possible for female enrollment to

surpass male enrollment. For this reason γ f (b
q f ) crosses γm , but γ f (e
q f ) never crosses γm .
Proposition 1 summarizes the conditions which create gender differences in college enrollment.
Proposition (Proposition 1). Let T2 f denote time net of housework for women and q f denote the
Solving for q f , we obtain that the slope of the female enrollment threshold exceeds that of the male enrollment threshold
w −w
if and only if q f < 1 − wmf −wm .
f
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probability that a woman will experience an unanticipated pregnancy in period 1. Let T2m denote
the time net of housework for men. If q f < 1 −

wm −wm
w f −w f ,

then there exists Tb where γ f (q f , Tb) ≥ γm (Tb).

Then ∀T2 f ∈ (Tb2 f , Tb2m ),
γ f (q f , T2 f ) > γm (Tb2m )
Women will exceed men in college enrollment.
w −w
w −w
For T2 f < Tb2 f when q f < 1 − wmf −wm or for T2 f < T2m when q f ≥ 1 − wmf −wm
f

f

γ f (q f , T2 f ) < γm (Tb2m )

Men will exceed women in college enrollment.

Proof. See theory appendix A.2.

Proposition 1 demonstrates that necessary conditions for women to exceed men in college enrollment are that fertility risk q f must fall below 1 −

wm −wm
w f −w f

and that housework time must fall to a point

where it is optimal for college women to work (in other words, household production efficiency
parameter α must be high enough that time net of housework T2 f = T −

H2 f
α

must exceed

1
wf

). Once

these two conditions are met, it is possible for women to take advantage of their higher labor market
returns. Because w f − w f > wm − wm , the slope of female enrollment γ f exceeds the slope of male
enrollment γm . As long as housework time and fertility risk for women is sufficiently low, female
college-going will be higher than male college-going even if women have less time for work and
lower wage rates than men.
The right panel of figure 1.12 illustrates the change in female college-going threshold γ f given
a decline in the female non-college wage rate w f . The figure shows that a decline in the noncollege wage rate of women makes it possible for women to surpass men in college enrollment
at a lower level of household production efficiency than before. Consider a decline in w f to w f ,
which shifts γ f up and shifts the vertical axis

1
wf
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further to the right, increasing the slope of γ f .

This change is represented by the shift from γ f (w f ) to γ f (w f ). As before, there exists Tb such
that γ f (w f , Tb) = γm (Tb). Pick an arbitrary Tb2m > Tb and define Tb2 f and Tb 2 f such that γm (Tb2m ) =
γ f (w f , Tb2 f ) = γ f (w f , Tb 2 f ). It can be shown that Tb 2 f < Tb2 f .37
This result is significant because it shows that declines in non-college wage rates for women complement increasing housework efficiency and decreasing fertility risk in enabling female enrollment
to grow and overtake male enrollment. A decline in non-college wage rates enable female college
enrollment to exceed male college enrollment at lower levels of household efficiency and higher
levels of fertility risk. Declining employment opportunities in the non-college market therefore
help explain not only why women overtook men in college enrollment, but also why the overtaking
occurred as early as the 1980s, when female labor force participation was still quite low at 50%.

1.5.4

Estimating the impact of non-college jobs on aggregate trends

To show that non-college occupations played an important role in the evolution of the college gender
gap, I conduct a back-of-the-envelope calculation to determine how much of the aggregate change
in college enrollment can be explained by changes in non-college employment for men and women.
Table 1.9 shows the change in non-college employment for men and women. It is important to
note that these changes arise from both supply and demand effects. Supply-driven declines in noncollege employment may arise, for example, from workers obtaining college degrees at higher rates
for reasons unrelated to employment changes, non-college workers choosing to leave the labor
force, or influxes of non-college workers from foreign countries. Demand-driven changes in noncollege employment, on the other hand, stem from changes in employer demand for non-college
workers. To estimate changes in college enrollment that stem from demand-driven changes in noncollege jobs, I perform a simple variance decomposition which utilizes the relationship between the
ordinary least squares estimator and the two-stage least squares estimator to back out the proportion
of an aggregate change that can be attributable to demand changes (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013).
Using the point estimates from Sections 1.3 and 1.4, my back-of-the-envelope calculations show that
37 See

appendix A.2 for a formal proof.
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non-college jobs explain about 15% of the change in female enrollment and 1-12% of the change in
male enrollment from 1970 to 2010.
Next, I use the model results to estimate the counterfactual college gender gap based on changes in
non-college jobs alone by holding all other factors that influence college enrollment fixed at 2010
levels. I use the derivative of the schooling rule in the model to obtain a closed form expression of
how college enrollment responds to non-college employment:



∂(college enrollment) 
= β(time spent at workt ) − time spent at school
∂(non-college employment) t

(1.5.6)

The equation produces a measure of the responsiveness of female college-going to non-college
employment. This responsiveness depends on the amount of time worked in the labor market.
Historically, female enrollment was low – in 1970, only 30% of married women participated in the
labor market at all – making the responsiveness of female college-going to non-college employment
low. If married women had always worked as much as they did in 2010, they would have been far
more responsive to their non-college labor market conditions. How would the trajectory of female
college enrollment have changed in this case?
I perform a back-of-the-envelope counterfactual calibration exercise where I multiply the first term
in equation (1.5.6) with the ratio of the time spent at work in 2010 over the time spent at work in
a prior year t. This provides a rough approximation of how responsive female college-going would
have been if women always worked as much as they did in 2010. I then take information from the
American Time Use Survey, the American’s Use of Time Survey, and the Time Use in Economic
and Social Accounts Study to obtain measures of time spent in school and time spent at work for
women (Aguiar and Hurst, 2007; Sayer, 2014).
Figure 1.13 presents the counterfactual estimation of college enrollment for men and women, where
changes in college enrollment arise solely from changes in non-college jobs. If women had always
worked as much as they did in 2010, they would have been much more responsive to their non-
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college job prospects. Based on the counterfactual estimation, their relatively anemic options in
the non-college labor market would have pushed their college enrollment to exceed the college
enrollment of men for all years in the estimation exercise. In other words, if women had always
worked in the labor market as much as they have in recent years, they would have never lagged
behind men in college enrollment. This back-of-the-envelope exercise provides suggestive evidence
that the low hours women used to work were a key reason behind why women did not attend college
at higher rates than men before 1980.

1.6

Conclusion

The greater college enrollment of women over men has been a long-standing open question. While
most of the literature has focused on how college-going decisions are driven by preparedness, marriage market concerns, social concerns, or labor market outcomes for college graduates, this paper
provides new evidence that the labor market for high school graduates plays a key role in explaining
this gender gap. I document the large gender disparity in non-college job options and demonstrate
that these disparities create unequal demand in a college degree between men and women. I then
construct a theoretical model to explain how the gender imbalance in non-college job options can
rationalize the greater enrollment of men before the 1980s and the greater enrollment of women after the 1980s, despite the fact that women’s observed college premium has been consistently higher
than men’s during this time.
This paper speaks to the importance of outside options in contributing to the large difference in
human capital investments between men and women. My findings demonstrate that men may not
be “under-investing” in education as much as it may at first seem. Much of the public debate on
the college gender gap has focused on how myopia, poor behavior in school, and lack of interest in
learning present barriers to men from optimally investing in their education (Economist, 2015). In
contrast, I show that one key reason behind why men enroll in college at lower rates than women is
because they have more attractive alternatives to attending college. Thus, even if everyone behaved
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rationally, men would still be expected to enroll in college at a lower rate than women.
In addition to explaining present conditions, this paper rationalizes trends in the college gender gap
over time, which have puzzled social scientists for decades. I demonstrate that the increasing rate of
automation disproportionately displaced the non-college job options of young women just as female
labor force participation began to grow substantially, which in turn led female college enrollment
to increase at rates higher than male college enrollment. At the same time, men’s non-college job
opportunities remained plentiful by comparison, leading a greater proportion of men than women to
rationally forego attending college. The combination of these factors contributed to both the greater
college enrollment of men prior to 1980 and the greater college enrollment of women after 1980.
The results presented here raise further questions that merit exploration. Since women have access
to fewer lucrative options with only a high school degree, higher earnings are required to induce
the marginal man to enter college relative to the marginal woman. Average wages for male college
graduates will therefore be higher than average wages for female college graduates. The gender gap
in college enrollment thus creates a persistent gender gap in earnings among college workers. The
large steady gap in college enrollment between men and women may explain why the gender gap in
wages has failed to close, despite efforts from governments and firms alike. To my knowledge, this
paper is the first to reveal a tension between the gender gap in college enrollment and the gender
gap in wages, wherein interventions to narrow the gender gap in wages will widen the gender gap
in college-going, and interventions to narrow the gender gap in college enrollment will widen the
gender gap in wages.
A second, related implication of this paper is that women are more likely than men to choose nonSTEM fields among college enrollees. Since the opportunity cost of attending college is lower for
women than men, women have greater freedom to major in a less lucrative field and still make
the investment in attending college worthwhile. Recent work by Card and Payne (2017) support
this prediction. They show that men are 13 percentage points more likely than women to major
in a STEM field, and that 9 of these 13 percentage points can be attributed to the higher college
enrollment rate of women.

52

Overall, highlighting the role of the non-college labor market in the college gender gap yields the
insight that different outside options lead men and women to self-select into attending college at differential rates. The marginal college-going woman will differ from the marginal college-going man,
and this creates persistent differences in the fields that men and women choose, the average wages
of men and women across the population of college workers, and a variety of other employment
outcomes.
A third implication of this paper is that greater study should be devoted to non-college jobs in order
to determine the optimal role of policy in individuals’ private education decisions. If men choose to
forego valuable college investments due to high paying non-college job prospects, future research
should focus on what these jobs are. Do they pay enough to support a family over a lifetime? Are
they viable career paths? How do people who forego formal human capital investment to work in
these jobs weather adverse labor market shocks in the future? In the next chapter, I take one step
in this direction by estimating a structural Roy model to show that some men can indeed maximize
lifetime earnings by foregoing a college degree. However, more work to investigate the non-college
labor market is needed in order to determine the welfare consequences of foregoing a college degree.
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Figures
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F IGURE 1.1
C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT BY G ENDER
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Notes: Figure 1.1 shows the proportion of men and women between the ages of 18 and 30 who have ever enrolled in
college. Before the 1980s, the proportion of men ever enrolled in college was greater than that of women. The gender gap
in college enrollment closed when women’s college enrollment rate converged to that of men. After the 1980s, the gender
gap in college enrollment reversed when the college enrollment rate of women surpassed that of men. The male college
enrollment rate has leveled off since the 1980s while the female college enrollment rate continued to increase from 1980
to 2010. The figure uses census microdata for each decade in 1950-2000 and American Community Survey (ACS) data
for each year in 2001-2010.
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F IGURE 1.2
N ON -C OLLEGE O CCUPATIONS BY G ENDER C OMPOSITION AND P ERCENTILE M EDIAN
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Notes: The figure depicts a scatter plot of all non-college (at least 50% workers with only a high school degree) occupations by proportion of female workers and median earnings percentile. First, the majority of occupations (over 60%) are
male-dominated, with 20% or fewer female workers. Second, occupations which employ a non-trivial fraction of women
pay significantly lower median earnings than male-dominated occupations. The figure uses 2010 American Community
Survey (ACS) data and the definition of occupation based on the 1990 Census Bureau occupational classification scheme.
To focus on the non-college labor structure for young workers, only 18-30 year olds are included in the calculation of
worker composition and median earnings percentile.
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F IGURE 1.3
C OLLEGE O CCUPATIONS BY G ENDER C OMPOSITION AND P ERCENTILE M EDIAN E ARNINGS
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Notes: The figure depicts a scatter plot of all college (at least 50% workers who were college enrollees) occupations by
proportion of female workers and median earnings percentile. The figure uses 2010 American Community Survey (ACS)
data and the definition of occupation based on the 1990 Census Bureau occupational classification scheme. To focus
on the non-college labor structure for young workers, only 18-30 year olds are included in the calculation of worker
composition and median earnings percentile.
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F IGURE 1.4
L OG WAGE G AP (W EIGHTED BY O CCUPATION ) BETWEEN C OLLEGE AND H IGH S CHOOL
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Notes: The figure depicts the observed college premium for men and women based on occupational differences alone.
Median earnings are calculated by summing over the median earnings of each occupation, weighted by the share of
each worker type employed in that occupation (where type is indexed by college enrollment status and sex). Figure 1.4
demonstrates that among 18-30 year olds, the difference in median wages between college graduates and high school
graduates is consistently and substantially larger for women than for men.
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F IGURE 1.5
M EDIAN A NNUAL E ARNINGS BY AGE

Notes: Figure 1.5 shows the median annual earnings among four occupation categories. All groups exhibit some growth
in annual earnings over time, with college male occupations exhibiting the highest earnings at all ages, non-college male
occupations making about as much as college female occupations, and non-college female occupations exhibiting the
lowest earnings at all ages. The gender gap in annual wages and lifetime earnings is smaller among college occupations
than non-college occupations. Women appear to face a larger earnings disadvantage in the non-college market than the
college market. In addition, in contrast to the other groups, non-college female occupations exhibit almost no earnings
growth over the working lives of their workers. This is consistent with the notion that non-college women tend to fill
occupations that are not “careers”, which typically exhibit some earnings growth with tenure.
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F IGURE 1.6
O IL AND G AS E MPLOYMENT, W ORKER C OMPOSITION

Notes: Figure 1.6 depicts the composition of workers by gender and education in the oil and gas industry.
Male non-college workers comprise most of the workforce in the data period. College and non-college women
make up less than 10% of the workforce each. The evidence suggests that male workers would be most affected
by changes in the employment demand of the oil and gas industry, since they make up the overwhelming
majority of workers in oil, gas, and related industries. This figure uses data from the CPS-ASEC for the years
1970-2010.
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F IGURE 1.7
S HARE OF E MPLOYMENT IN O IL AND G AS I NDUSTRY

Notes: Figure 1.7 graphs the share of employment in the oil and gas industry by gender and whether the state is a highor low-resource state. In both high- and low-resource states, employment of men in the oil and gas industry far exceed
employment of women. Substantial employment fluctuations are only found among male employment in high-resource
states. Employment of men in low-resource states, women in high-resource states, and women in low-resource states
remains relatively constant despite booms and busts in the oil and gas industry during this period. The figure provides
evidence that natural resources matter in determining employment in the oil and gas industry, and that these natural
resources substantially determine the employment rates of men but have little effect on the employment rates of women.
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Notes: The figure shows the labor share in the oil and gas industry (left panel), and in the oil, gas, and related industries (right panel) averaged over the 48 contiguous
states for each year. The solid line represents actual mean labor share. The long dashed line represents the predicted mean labor share from the first stage regression
using Specification 1 (equation 1.3.1). The short dashed line represents the predicted mean labor share from the first stage regression using Specification 2 (equation 1.3.2).
95% Confidence Intervals are graphed for both predictions. Overall, there is little discrepancy between the two predictions. Both predictions appear to fit the actual mean
employment share quite well for every year after 1980.
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F IGURE 1.9
ROUTINE TASK I NTENSITY (RTI) IN L ABOR M ARKET OVER T IME
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Notes: Figure 1.9 depicts the measure for routine task intensity (RTI) in the labor force for young men (blue) and young
women (red). This figure shows that the displacement of high-RTI jobs by automation fell on women but not men among
young workers. The evidence suggests that the employment opportunities of women were most affected by the erosion of
routine-intensive jobs. Data obtained from census microdata, ACS data, and the job characteristic measures constructed
by Autor and Dorn (2013). Only individuals between the ages of 18 and 30 are included.
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F IGURE 1.10
E MPLOYMENT C HANGES OVER T IME , BY ROUTINE -I NTENSITY OF J OB TASKS
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Notes: Figure 1.10 graphs the proportion of employed workers by high (top third in 1950) and low (bottom third in
1950) routine task intensity (RTI), the measure of how routine the tasks in an occupation are. The top panel shows that
beginning in 1970, the share of high-RTI occupations declined while the proportion of low-RTI occupations increased,
consistent with the literature on the decline in routine-intensive tasks over time. The middle panel splits the relationship
by gender. Importantly, the decline in highly routine occupations corresponds to a decline in the employment share for
women but not men. For men, the employment share of high-RTI labor actually increased steadily during this period.
Low-RTI labor share increased for both men and women. The bottom panel breaks down this relationship even further by
education. The decline in routine-intensive employment is entirely driven by non-college women in high-RTI occupations.
For all other groups, employment share did not decline. Female college workers gained employment share in both highand low-RTI jobs. The fraction of non-college women in low-RTI occupations remained relatively unchanged during this
period.
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Notes: Figure 1.11 graphs the distribution of occupations by percent female for 1970 and 2010, for “non-college” occupations (left) and “college” occupations (right).
“College” occupations are those with over 50% college workers; “non-college” occupations are those with over 50% non-college workers. 1950 is excluded since few
occupations were comprised of over 50% college workers. Only individuals between the ages of 18 and 30 are included.
In 1970, over 60% of occupations employed at least 80% men among both college and non-college occupations, while a much smaller proportion of occupations were
female-dominated, and very few occupations employed relatively equal amounts of men and women. The female-dominated occupations all concentrated among non-college
occupations. Over time, non-college occupations continued to be segregated by gender, with few occupations that employed relatively equivalent amounts of men and
women. However, the female-dominated non-college jobs declined in number, while college jobs became more gender-equitable. In other words, the jobs that used to employ
non-college women declined, while the jobs that used to employ a majority of college men became accessible to college women.
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Notes: The left panel of figure 1.12 illustrates the impact of household production efficiency and the role of declining fertility risk on the enrollment of women relative to
men. γm represents the growth in male enrollment as men’s time net of housework increases, while γ f represents the growth in female enrollment as women’s time net of
housework increases. As household production efficiency increases, the time needed to complete housework decreases and individuals have more time to work. The labor
market returns to attending college therefore increase, which leads college enrollment to increase. Since women complete the housework required by the family, increasing
household efficiency should increase women’s enrollment by more than men’s enrollment.
Secondly, the decline in fertility risk for women q f is represented by a shift from γ f (e
q f ) to γ f (b
q f ). The figure demonstrates that for high fertility risk qef , women can never
surpass men in college enrollment, while for low fertility risk qbf , women can surpass men in college enrollment as long as household production is sufficiently efficient.
The right panel of figure A.3 demonstrates that declines in non-college wages complement household production efficiency and contraceptive technology in accelerating
growth in female enrollment. A decline in non-college wage rates from w f to w f shifts the γ f function up and increases the slope of growth. The decline in non-college wage
rates therefore makes it possible for women to surpass men in college-going at a higher level of fertility risk and lower level of household production efficiency than before.
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F IGURE 1.12
T HRESHOLD C OLLEGE -G OING VALUES FOR M EN AND W OMEN

F IGURE 1.13
R EAL AND C OUNTERFACTUAL C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT R ATES

Notes: The bold, dashed lines represent the counterfactual college enrollment rates, where changes in college enrollment
arise only from changes in the share of non-college jobs over time. The pale solid lines represent the true college
enrollment rate. The graph demonstrates that if women had always worked as much as they did in 2010, women would
have never lagged behind men in college enrollment.
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Cashiers
Housekeepers and cleaners
Hairdressers and cosmetologists
Miners
Machinists
Truck, delivery, and tractor drivers

Occupation, 1990 basis

71%
82%
88%
3%
4%
5%

Percent of
female
workers
3%
4%
9%
81%
60%
41%

Earnings
percentile

36%
24%
11%
62%
62%
46%

Work has
pension plan

TABLE 1.1
E XAMPLES OF N ON -C OLLEGE O CCUPATIONS , 2010

92%
89%
60%
99%
97%
95%

Employersponsored
health
insurance

Notes: Table 1.1 lists examples of non-college occupations. The first three occupations (cashiers, housekeepers and cleaners, hairdressers and cosmetologists) are
“traditionally female” occupations. The last three occupations (miners, machinists, and truck drivers) are “traditionally male” occupations. The “female” and “male”
occupations differ greatly in terms of annual earnings and whether or not they provide benefits such as retirement pensions and health insurance. “Male” occupations
pay between the 40th to the 80th percentile of median annual earnings among all occupations in 2010, while “female” occupations pay below the 10th percentile of
median annual earnings. “Male” occupations are significantly more likely to offer a pension retirement plan for workers, and slightly more likely to offer employersponsored health insurance. The provision of these benefits indicate that “male” occupations are more likely to have the trappings of careers than “female” occupations.
The proportion of female workers and earnings percentile data were obtained from the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS). The benefits data were obtained from
the 2010 Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS-ASEC). The American Community Survey provides reliable summary statistics
regarding work and earnings within occupations. Its measures regarding retirement income and health insurance, however, are too general for the purposes of this paper.
In contrast, the CPS-ASEC Supplement asks individuals whether they have retirement income as a result of their employment, separate from survivorship payments,
disability benefits, Social Security income, Veterans administration payments or other forms of income. The CPS-ASEC also asks individuals if they are the policyholder
for their employer-sponsored health insurance.
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TABLE 1.2
OLS R EGRESSION OF C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT ON O IL & G AS E MPLOYMENT
Male Enrollment
Full-time Part-time
(1)
(2)

Female Enrollment
Full-time
Part-time
(3)
(4)

Panel A: Employment in Oil & Gas Industry
Employment Share

-0.245
(0.346)

-0.076
(0.123)

-0.195
(0.309)

-0.134
(0.149)

Panel B: Employment in Oil, Gas, & Related Industry
Employment Share

Demographic controls
State FE
Observations

-0.477∗∗
(0.221)

-0.012
(0.098)

-0.258
(0.240)

0.040
(0.118)

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Notes: Ordinary least squares regression of college enrollment on employment share. Regressions control for proportion female, proportion black, proportion by ten-year age bin, year dummies, and state dummies. All regressions
conducted at the state-year level. Standard errors clustered at state level. Panel A displays the effect of employment
share in only the oil & gas industry on college enrollment. Panel B displays the results of employment share in oil,
gas, & related industries on college enrollment. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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TABLE 1.3
F IRST S TAGE R EGRESSION OF O IL & G AS E MPLOYMENT ON I NSTRUMENTS
Main Analysis Sample
Oil & Gas Employment Oil, Gas, & Related Employment
(1)
(2)
Specification 1: Employment IV (rs E−s,t )
Employment IV
F-statistic

2.087∗∗∗
(0.804)
11.684

3.223∗∗∗
(1.028)
20.441

Specification 2: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Average Prices
Employment IV
Price IV
F-statistic
Demographic controls
State FE
Observations

1.433∗
(0.853)
7.8e-05∗
(4.6e-05)
10.860

2.614∗∗∗
(0.865)
7.7e-05∗∗
(3.6e-05)
11.580

Yes
Yes
1782

Yes
Yes
1782

Notes: First stage regression of employment share on instruments. Regressions control for proportion female, proportion black, proportion by ten-year age bin, year dummies, and state dummies. All regressions conducted at the
state-year level. Standard errors clustered at state level. Specification 1 uses only the employment instrument. Specification 2 uses both the employment and the price instrument. In all cases, the first stage regression passes the
Anderson-Rubin test for weak instruments. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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TABLE 1.4
2SLS R EGRESSION OF C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT ON O IL & G AS E MPLOYMENT
Main Analysis Sample
Male Enrollment
Female Enrollment
Full-time Part-time
Full-time
Part-time
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Specification 1: Employment IV (rs E−s,t )
Oil & Gas Employment

-1.777
(1.773)

-3.805∗∗∗
(1.055)

-1.871
(1.358)

-1.414∗
(0.765)

Specification 2: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Average Prices
Oil & Gas Employment

Demographic controls
State FE
Observations

-1.806
(1.334)

-3.838∗∗∗
(1.089)

-1.811
(1.431)

-1.095
(0.698)

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Notes: Second stage regression of college enrollment on employment share in the oil & gas industry. Regressions
control for proportion female, proportion black, proportion by ten-year age bin, year dummies, and state dummies.
All regressions conducted at the state-year level. Standard errors clustered at state level. Specification 1 uses only
the employment instrument. Specification 2 uses both the employment and the price instrument. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE 1.5
2SLS R EGRESSION OF C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT ON O IL , G AS , & R ELATED E MPLOYMENT
Main Analysis Sample
Male Enrollment
Full-time Part-time
(1)
(2)

Female Enrollment
Full-time
Part-time
(3)
(4)

Specification 1: Employment IV (rs E−s,t )
Oil, Gas, & Related Employment

-2.358∗∗∗
(0.503)

-1.101
(0.981)

-1.159
(0.833)

-0.876∗
(0.521)

Specification 2: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Average Prices
Oil, Gas, & Related Employment

Demographic controls
State FE
Observations

-0.990
(0.709)

-2.114∗∗∗
(0.436)

-0.817
(0.808)

-0.369
(0.444)

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Notes: Second stage regression of college enrollment on employment share in the oil, gas, & related industries. Regressions control for proportion female, proportion black, proportion by ten-year age bin, year dummies, and state
dummies. All regressions conducted at the state-year level. Standard errors clustered at state level. Specification 1
uses only the employment instrument. Specification 2 uses both the employment and the price instrument. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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TABLE 1.6
F IRST S TAGE R EGRESSION OF ROUTINE L ABOR S HARE ON I NSTRUMENTS
Routine labor share
(1)

Routine labor share
(2)

predicted routine labor share * 1980

-0.123∗∗∗
(0.0232)

-0.132∗∗∗
(0.0265)

predicted routine labor share * 1990

-0.336∗∗∗
(0.0272)

-0.356∗∗∗
(0.0302)

predicted routine labor share * 2000

-0.493∗∗∗
(0.0267)

-0.460∗∗∗
(0.0304)

2888
193.8

2888
127.1
Yes
Yes
Yes

Observations
F
Demo. ctrls
Commuting zone dummies
Year dummies

Yes
Yes

Notes: First stage regression of actual routine labor share on Bartik prediction of routine labor share (based on 1950
industry shares). Column (2) adds demographic controls for total population, proportion female, proportion black,
proportion Hispanic, and proportion by ten-year age bin. Commuting zone and year dummies included. Regressions
conducted at the commuting zone-year level. Standard errors clustered at the commuting zone level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2888
193.8
0.0554

Observations
First Stage F-stat
RMSE
Demo. ctrls
Commuting zone dummies
Year dummies
Yes
Yes

2888
193.8
0.0572

-0.0423
(0.182)

% male
enrollment
(3)

2888
127.1
0.0463
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.206
(0.175)

% male
enrollment
(4)

Yes
Yes

2888
193.8
0.0348

0.460∗∗∗
(0.118)

college
gender gap
(5)

2888
127.1
0.0345
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.536∗∗∗
(0.148)

college
gender gap
(6)

Notes: Effect of declining routine-intensive employment on college enrollment among 18-25 year olds, using Bartik instrument for employment in high-routine occupations. Columns (2), (4), and (6) add demographic controls for total population, proportion female, proportion black, proportion Hispanic, and proportion by ten-year
age bin. Commuting zone and year dummies included. Regressions conducted at the commuting zone-year level. Standard errors clustered at the commuting zone level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Yes
Yes

-0.742∗∗∗
(0.191)

-0.502∗∗
(0.200)

Routine share
employment
2888
127.1
0.0442
Yes
Yes
Yes

% female
enrollment
(2)

% female
enrollment
(1)

2SLS R EGRESSION OF C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT ON ROUTINE L ABOR S HARE (18-25)

TABLE 1.7
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2888
193.8
0.0451

Observations
First Stage F-stat
RMSE
Demo. ctrls
Commuting zone dummies
Year dummies
Yes
Yes

2888
193.8
0.0503

-0.172
(0.173)

% male
enrollment
(3)

2888
127.1
0.0400
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.222
(0.168)

% male
enrollment
(4)

Yes
Yes

2888
193.8
0.0275

0.179∗∗
(0.0824)

college
gender gap
(5)

2888
127.1
0.0270
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.254∗∗
(0.105)

college
gender gap
(6)

Notes: Effect of declining routine-intensive employment on college enrollment among 18-30 year olds, using Bartik instrument for employment in high-routine occupations. Columns (2), (4), and (6) add demographic controls for total population, proportion female, proportion black, proportion Hispanic, and proportion by ten-year
age bin. Commuting zone and year dummies included. Regressions conducted at the commuting zone-year level. Standard errors clustered at the commuting zone level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Yes
Yes

-0.476∗∗∗
(0.158)

-0.351∗∗
(0.164)

Routine share
employment
2888
127.1
0.0355
Yes
Yes
Yes

% female
enrollment
(2)

% female
enrollment
(1)

2SLS R EGRESSION OF C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT ON ROUTINE L ABOR S HARE (18-30)

TABLE 1.8

TABLE 1.9
AGGREGATE C HANGES IN N ON -C OLLEGE E MPLOYMENT
Year

Change in non-college jobs for women

Change in non-college jobs for men

1970-1980

−0.086

−0.086

1980-1990

−0.092

−0.075

1990-2000

−0.056

−0.028

2000-2005

−0.024

−0.017

Notes: The table presents the change in the labor share of non-college jobs for women and men. These tabulations
are used to construct counterfactual college enrollment rates for men and women, depicted in figure 1.13.
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CHAPTER 2 : Gender Differences in Skill Profiles, Wage Returns, and
College Enrollment
2.1

Introduction

Chapter 1 targets occupational segregation as a key force behind the greater college enrollment
rates of women relative to men today. Chapter 2 investigates one primary reason behind the gender
segregation among non-college occupations and links it to gender differences in the returns to a
college degree. Using detailed data on cognitive and non-cognitive skills from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979, I employ principal component analysis to construct skill profiles
for each individual. The data point to the existence of “gender-based skill”, which differs between
men and women. I then estimate a structural Roy model to compute the returns to different skills
in the college and non-college labor markets. The model estimates reveal that gender-based skill
commands high returns on non-college wages for men but not for women, since non-college occupations with high pay tend to value the gender-based skills of men. Overall, my findings suggest
that gender-based skill complements non-college work for men and college work for women.
Using the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), I construct skill profiles separately
for men and women using scores from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB).
I find that in addition to cognitive skill, individuals possess another dimension of skill that varies
by gender. For men, this gender-based skill loads heavily on the ASVAB tests designed to measure
mechanical skill. For women, however, gender-based skill loads on the ASVAB tests designed to
measure coding and numeracy. In a naive probit regression, I find that controlling for cognitive skill,
men with higher measures of gender-based skill tend to be less likely to attend college. For women,
on the other hand, gender-based skill does not significantly predict attending college.
I then use these skill profiles in a Roy model that separately identifies the impact of skills on initial
wage rates and on the growth of wages over time, following the framework of Rosen and Willis
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(1979). In the model, I use a Heckman selection correction procedure to correct for the tendency
of higher-ability individuals to both attain more schooling and earn higher wages (Heckman, 1979).
The model demonstrates that for men, gender-based skill leads to significantly greater wage growth
over the life cycle in the non-college labor market, but not the college labor market. In contrast,
for women, gender-based skill increases initial wages in only the college labor market. Finally, I
use the model to estimate counterfactual college and non-college wages for each individual. I find
that increases in non-college wages decrease college enrollment. Therefore, if men have higher
non-college wages, they would be expected to rationally choose a lower level of college enrollment
than women.
Overall, the results build a strong case that gender-based skill complements non-college labor for
men. Additionally, they provide some evidence that gender-based skill complements college labor
for women. I find that controlling for cognitive skills, higher gender-based skill predicts a lower
probability of enrolling in college for men. The Roy model reveals one important channel behind
this finding: gender-based skill commands a high non-college wage rate for men, which in turn
increases the opportunity costs to attending college and decreases the earnings premium from a
college degree. For women, gender-based skill increases college earnings in the same way that
cognitive skill does. The results suggest that men face a trade-off between college and non-college
earnings with respect to their skills. Having high gender-based skill is costly for men, in that it
raises the value of their outside option. For women, no such trade-off exists: high gender-based
skill operates in parallel with high cognitive skill by increasing future college wages.
This chapter contributes to existing knowledge by demonstrating that skill endowments create a
comparative advantage in non-college work for men, such that it is natural for more women than
men to choose to attend college. In the NLSY79 data, I demonstrate a stark gender difference
with respect to certain skill profiles. Although cognitive and socio-emotional skills are approximately equivalent between men and women, men categorically score better on tests designed to
measure mechanical ability. I present new evidence that this disparity has substantial implications
for the college-going decision through affecting college and non-college wage rates. The results in-
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dicate that pre-existing differences between men and women make the greater college enrollment of
women a more efficient outcome than it may at first appear. My empirical evidence provides further
support for prior work on how the returns to brawn (physical ability) and brains (cognitive ability)
impacts gender differences in employment and educational outcomes (see Welch, 2000; Rendall,
2017).

2.2

Data

This chapter uses data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), which is
conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). The study
surveys a nationally representative sample of the same 12,686 individuals each year from 1979 to
1994 and every two years from 1996 to 2010. The NLSY79 is especially useful for examining the
impact of skills on future occupational success, for two reasons. First, the NLSY79 contains rich
longitudinal data for each year of work, which is critical for examining how skills influence the
evolution of earnings over time. I use the longitudinal nature of the data to separately capture how
skills influence initial wages and wage growth rates over the work life.1
Second, to explore the role of skill profiles in determining wage returns, I use the Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) tests, which are taken by a little over 90% of the sample
in 1981. ASVAB tests are designed and used by the military for enlistment screening and job
assignment purposes (Prada and Urzua, 2014), and are widely used to measure cognitive and noncognitive skill in the labor economics literature (see Neal and Johnson, 1996; Juhn et al., 2015; Lise
and Postel-Vinay, 2016). Moreover, the NLSY79 routinely surveys respondents on socio-emotional
skills, time preferences, and risk preferences, which have all been shown to be relevant in succeeding
both at school and at work.
In particular, this chapter focuses on cognitive skill, “gender-based” skill, and socio-emotional skill.
1 Individuals in the sample are born in the period 1955-1965. They are 14-22 when first surveyed by the NLSY79 in
1979 and 47-52 in 2012, the last year in the data.
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Following the literature in labor economics (see Neal and Johnson, 1996; Juhn et al., 2015; Lise
and Postel-Vinay, 2016), I measure cognitive skill using scores on the Armed Forces Qualification
Test (AFQT), which is a combination of four ASVAB subtests: Arithmetic Reasoning, Mathematics
Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, and Word Knowledge. Using principal component analysis
on ASVAB scores, I determine that in addition to cognitive skill, there exists a second dimension of
skill. Crucially, this second dimension differs for men and women. For men, this second skill loads
on ASVAB subtests designed to test mechanical ability: Auto and Shop Information, Electronics
Information, and Mechanical Comprehension. For women, this second skill loads on the Coding
Speed and Numerical Operations subtests. Due to these stark gender differences, I call this second
dimension of skill “gender-based” skill. Lastly, I use the Rotter Locus of Control and the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem scales to measure socio-emotional ability (see Rotter, 1966; Rosenberg, 1965). The aim
of this chapter is to demonstrate that, controlling for cognitive and socio-emotional skill, “genderbased skill” contributes to men’s greater non-college wages and therefore their lower rate of college
enrollment relative to women.

2.3

Wage Returns to Skill Profiles

Many occupations that do not require a college degree might still pay highly under the theory of
compensating wage differentials (Smith, 1776; Rosen, 1986; Welch, 2000). For example, in trucking and transportation, construction, or law enforcement, employers value mechanical skill, physical
strength, or risk-tolerance, among other attributes. Men face a comparative advantage in finding employment in such occupations, as shown by figure 1.2 and table 1.1 in Chapter 1. The evidence is
consistent with prior work on gender differences in attributes and preferences. Experimental evidence has shown that women tend to be more risk-averse (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Eckel and
Grossman, 2008), which may contribute to the scarcity of women in risky occupations. Biological
studies have demonstrated that in general, men are physically stronger than women (see Miller et al.,
1993; Leyk et al., 2007), which likely contributes to the dominance of men in physically demanding occupations. This chapter argues that men appear to have higher mechanical skill than women,
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and that this mechanical skill presents costs to attending college for men by increasing expected
non-college wages.2
To paint a baseline picture of the stark earnings differences between non-college men and women,
table 2.1 lists the 18 highest-paying occupations that only require a high school diploma or equivalent (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). Median salaries are obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics Occupational Outlook Handbook. I use 2010 census data to calculate the proportion of
women employed in each occupation.3 Women comprise less than 25% of the workforce in 11 of
the 17 occupations for which 2010 census data exists.4 The majority of male-dominated occupations
involve work that requires risk, mechanical skill, and physical strength. For example, the Occupational Outlook Handbook reports that elevator installers and repairers “may suffer falls from ladders,
burns due to electrical shocks, and muscle strains from lifting and carrying heavy equipment” (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). Additionally, elevator installers and repairers are constantly exposed
to hazardous substances. In a survey of work context, 94% of respondents reported being exposed to
hazardous conditions “every day” and 80% reported being exposed to hazardous equipment “every
day”. Among the respondents, 99% reported exposure to high places “every day” (O-NET, 2015).
While table 2.1 mostly serves to present motivating examples, it is telling that the overwhelming
majority of high paying non-college occupations employ very few women. The labor market rewards skills other than intelligence. If mechanical skill is one of these skills, and men possess
greater endowments of mechanical skill than women, how might these ability differences influence
the return to a college degree? The model in the next section explores these questions in greater
detail.
2 I remain agnostic as to why men may have higher mechanical skills than women. Perhaps biological differences
lead to differences in mechanical skill. Perhaps more boys than girls grow up learning about cars or electronics, which
enable them to perform better on tests that measure knowledge about automobiles, mechanics, and electronics. This
chapter explores the ramifications of ability differences on future earnings independent of how they might have arisen.
3 See data appendix A.3 for details.
4 There is no 1990 occupational classification code for gaming manager in the 2010 American Community Survey
data.

81

2.4

Model and Estimation Strategy

In this section, I investigate how gender differences in skill profiles contribute to differences in
wages and college-going. I use principal component analysis to construct skill profiles, and find
substantially different skill profiles between men and women. I then examine the impact of these
skill profiles within a Roy model framework modified from Rosen and Willis (1979). The model
allows for a direct comparison of whether different skill profiles garner different wage returns for
male and female workers, since it enables the estimation of counterfactual wage rates for each
individual in the data set. Finally, I examine whether gender differences in earnings over the life
cycle contribute to gender differences in college-going.

2.4.1

Model of Wage Determination and the College-Going Decision

I extend the Rosen and Willis (1979) framework to incorporate a two-type (` ∈ {male, female}),
multi-skill model of the college-going decision. As in Rosen and Willis (1979), wages evolve
according to
c,`
c,`
wc,`
it = w̄i exp(gi t)

(2.4.1)

where w̄i is initial wage for individual i and gi is growth rate of wages. Both initial wages and
wage growth rates are indexed by c ∈ {0, 1}, the decision to attend college, and `, the gender of the
individual.
Initial wages and wage growth rates are determined according a vector of skills for each individual.
Specifically,

lnw̄1,`
i = xi β1,` + u1i

if c = 1

lnw̄0,`
i = xi β0,` + u0i

if c = 0
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(2.4.2)

g1,`
i = xi γ1,` + u3i

if c = 1

g0,`
i = xi γ0,` + u2i

if c = 0

(2.4.3)

where u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 are jointly normally distributed. Here, xi includes skill profiles and a vector of
demographic controls (age, race, family background, and location).
Individuals can choose to forego college and start work right away at year00 for wage w0,`
it (c = 0)
or attend college and start their career at a later year, year01 , for wage w1,`
it (c = 1). They make their
decision based on whether college-going maximizes their lifetime earnings:

c = 1{lnV 1,` > lnV 0,` }

(2.4.4)

where life-time earnings follow the equation5

V

c,`

Z ∞

=

yearc0

c,`
w̄c,`
i exp(gi t)exp(−rit)dt

≈

w̄c,`
i
ri − gc,`
i

exp(−ri yearc0 )

(2.4.5)

Plugging equation (2.4.5) into equation (2.4.4) yields

0,`
1,`
0,`
1
0
c = 1{lnw̄1,`
i − lnw̄i − ln(ri − gi ) + ln(ri − gi ) − ri (year0 − year0 ) > 0}
|
{z
}

(2.4.6)

S

Taylor approximating the non-linear terms around population terms ḡ1 , ḡ0 , r̄ yields an equation that
c,`
allows for separate identification of the effects of initial wages lnw̄c,`
i and wage growth rates gi .

c = 1{α0 + α1 (lnw̄1,` − lnw̄0,` ) + α2 g1,` + α3 g0,` +
|{z}
|{z}
1
r̄−ḡ1

− 10
r̄−ḡ

α4
|{z}

r > 0}

(2.4.7)

−[S− 1 1 + 1 0 ]
ri −ḡi
ri −ḡi

5 Equation (2.4.5) integrates to infinity, which is unrealistic since individuals end their careers before then. This is
merely an approximation, since the difference between ending a career at infinity and at 65 leads to negligible differences
in the closed form solution.
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The Taylor approximation also leads to sign predictions of the α values, which serve as an additional
estimation check when the model is taken to the data. α2 should be positive, α3 should be negative,
and α4 should be negative as long as S − year01 − year00 is sufficiently large. The model estimates
reflect these predictions.
Substituting equations (2.4.2) and (2.4.3) into equation (2.4.7) leads to the estimation equation

c = 1{α0 + α1 (Xβ1 − Xβ0 ) + α2 Xγ1 + α3 Xγ0 + α4 r > −(α1 (u1 − u0 ) + α2 u3 + α4 u2 )}
|
{z
}

(2.4.8)

ε

Because u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 are jointly normal, ε is normally distributed. With equation (2.4.8) alone, the
parameters of interest α cannot be separately identified. Rather, equation (2.4.9) must be estimated
in order to construct a control function that approximates the probability of an individual i attending
college given wi = (xi , ri ):

c = 1{α0 + X(α1 (β1 − β0 ) + α2 γ1 + α3 γ0 ) + α4 r > −ε} = 1{W π > −ε}

(2.4.9)

The function k̂(X) constructed using estimates from equation (2.4.9) can then be used to control
for selection into college. If certain characteristics directly affect both an individual’s probability
of attending college and his wages, the β coefficients would be biased. The control function approach addresses these concerns by including in the regression model a term that approximates an
individual’s probability of college attendance as a function of her underlying characteristics.
The wage regression equations are then

lnwc,` = Xβc,` + σw k̂(X) + uc
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(2.4.10)

gc,l = Xγc,` + σg k̂(X) + uc+2

(2.4.11)

From equations (2.4.10) and (2.4.11), I obtain βˆ c,` and γ̂c,` . I then construct counterfactual wages
0,`
1,`
d
d
b1,`
terms for each individual i if he had gone to college and if he had not: ln
w̄i , ln
w̄i , gb0,`
i , and g
i .

Finally, using these counterfactual wages terms, the model then estimates the coefficients of interest,
α, which represent the effect of college and non-college wages on the college-going decision:

1,`

d
c = 1{α0 + α1 (ln
w̄

0,`

d
− ln
w̄ ) + α2 gb1,` + α3 gb0,` + α4 r

(2.4.12)

The α1 estimated from equation 2.4.12 represents the effect of the difference in log initial wages on
the college-going decision; α2 represents the effect of the college wage growth rate on the collegegoing decision; α3 represents the effect of the non-college wage growth rate on the college-going
decision. The next section reports the results from the model.

2.5
2.5.1

Results
Gender Differences in Skill Measures

I use principal component analysis to transform the scores of the ten ASVAB scores into aggregate
skill measures. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the component loadings for men and women, respectively.
Loadings for component 1 are displayed on the x-axis, while loadings for component 2 are displayed on the y-axis. Component 1 loadings are similar for men and women, and the loadings are
high on all the ASVAB tests designed to measure intellectual skill (Word Knowledge, Paragraph
Comprehension, Arithmetic Reasoning, Mathematical Knowledge, Numerical Ability, and Coding
Speed) (Prada and Urzua, 2014).
However, the principal component analysis reveals that one component alone is insufficient to ex-
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plain the variation in ASVAB scores for men and women. There exists a secondary component,
which loads heavily onto the three ASVAB tests designed to test mechanical skill (Automobile and
Shop information, Electronics Information, and Mechanical Comprehension) only for men. For
women, the secondary component loadings are on Coding Speed and Numerical Operations. The
component 2 loadings provide evidence that men have greater endowments in mechanical skill relative to women. For women, variation in the mechanical ability test scores and intellectual ability
test scores are captured by the same component, suggesting that performance on the mechanical
ability tests is primarily explained by intellectual skill. For men, variation in mechanical ability test
scores is captured by a component that is orthogonal to the component that captures variation in
intellectual ability test scores.
The second component is important for explaining ability for both men and women, but represent
different skills. For men, the second component represents mechanical skill. For women, the second
component measures additional intellectual skill (that might differ slightly from the intellectual skill
measured by the first component). Since the second component loads onto Numerical Operations
and Coding Speed scores for women, it appears to represent some measure of technical intellectual
ability. For simplicity, it is useful to think of the second component as a representative measure
of “gender-based” skill, which represents mechanical skill for men and technical intellectual skill
for women. The labor market may reward gender-based skill, in addition to the more traditional
intellectual skill that has been the focus on most of the labor economics literature.6 I explore this
point in the Roy model.
Table 2.2 lists the (standardized) gender-based ability measure computed from the principal component analysis. Table 2.2 also lists the raw ASVAB scores of the three battery tests designed to test
mechanical ability: Automobile and Shop Information, Electronics Information, and Mechanical
Comprehension. In all three measures, men significantly outperform women independent of the
college-going decision. This corroborates the principal component analysis result that men possess
6I

use exploratory factor analysis as well, and obtain similar results. For women, the loadings for component 2 are
on word knowledge instead of coding speed and numerical ability, but otherwise the results of the Roy model remain
similar.

86

mechanical ability but that mechanical ability is difficult to detect in women, since figure 2.2 shows
that performance on the three mechanical ability tests seems to be primarily explained by intellectual ability in women. For women, gender-based ability loads on Coding Speed and Numerical
Operations. On average, scores for both subtests are higher for women than men within education
categories, but the differences are negligible.
Table 2.2 also shows the average of Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores, which has
been commonly used in the economics of educational literature as a measure of intellectual ability
(see Neal and Johnson, 1996). Individuals who attend college score significantly higher in the
AFQT than individuals who do not attend, and this result holds for both men and women. The
AFQT is calculated as a linear combination of the Paragraph Comprehension, Word Knowledge,
Mathematical Knowledge, and Arithmetic Reasoning subtests in the ASVAB (ASVAB Fact Sheet).
Table 2.2 also lists socio-emotional ability, which is roughly similar between men and women.
Socio-emotional skill is constructed as an arithmetic average of the Rotter Locus of Control scale
and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale from the NLSY79 dataset (following Prada and Urzua, 2014;
Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006). The loadings of component 1 and component 2 are close
to 0 on the socio-emotional measure for both men and women, while the loading for the third and
last component (not shown) is close to 1 on the socio-emotional measure for both men and women.
These results are consistent with the assumptions of orthogonality between socio-emotional skills
and intellectual skills used in prior literature (see Prada and Urzua, 2014; Heckman, Stixrud, and
Urzua, 2006). I control for socio-emotional ability in the model, since it has been shown to matter
for educational attainment and for wage determination.
Finally, the table breaks down log hourly wages by gender and education. College-goers make
more than those who only hold high school diplomas. Male college-goers make more than women
college-goers, and male high school graduates make more than female high school graduates. As in
the census data, the gender wage gap among non-college workers is higher than that among college
workers. The model separates hourly wages into two components: log initial wage rate at the start
of the career, and the growth rate of wages over the life cycle. Log initial wage rates are higher
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for college graduates than high school graduates, and higher for men than women within education
categories. However, wage growth rates are similar at around 0.08 across the four categories.

2.5.2

Roy Model Results

Table 2.3 reports the probit of individual skill profiles (including gender-based ability, intellectual
ability, and socio-emotional skill) on whether the individual attended college. It presents the estimates from equation (2.4.9). Only individuals with at least a high school diploma are included.
Columns (1) and (2) display the coefficient estimates for men, while columns (3) and (4) display the
coefficient estimates for women. Columns (1) and (3) use the raw ASVAB scores for mechanical
ability (Automobile and Shop Information, Electronics Information, and Mechanical Comprehension), while Columns (2) and (4) use gender-based skill constructed from the principal component
analysis. The regression controls for socio-emotional skill, risk aversion measures, time preferences, and a quadratic in AFQT as a measure of intellectual ability. Controls for geographic region,
urban environment, height, race, age, and number of siblings are also included, since all of these
measures have been shown to matter for college enrollment status.
Column (1) shows that for men, scoring high on the Automobile and Shop Information test or the
Mechanical Comprehension test is negatively associated with the probability of attending college,
holding intellectual ability constant. According to column (3), this effect does not hold true for
women. There is a high degree of correlation between scores on each of the three mechanical
ability ASVAB tests, which explains why the coefficient on Electronic Information is insignificant
and why the coefficient on mechanical comprehension is only marginally significant. Appendix
table B.1 uses each score alone as a proxy for mechanical ability. Each test score negatively predicts
the probability of enrolling in college for men but has no effect on college enrollment for women.
Columns (2) and (4) then uses the measure of gender-based ability constructed from the principal
component analysis. Holding intellectual abilities constant, a standard deviation increase in genderbased ability decreases the probability of attending college by 18 percentage points for men but does
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not affect the probability of attending college for women. Using the coefficient estimates in table
2.3, I construct a control function that estimates the probability that an individual chooses to attend
college as a function of his underlying characteristics. This control function is included in the wage
regressions.
Table 2.4 presents the regression of skill profiles on log initial wages for college-educated men
(1), non-college men (2), college-educated women (3), and non-college women (4). It displays the
estimates from equation (2.4.10). The regression includes individual demographics and the control
function predicted from equation (2.4.9). AFQT is significant and positive on log initial wages for
men, independent of college-going status. AFQT is insignificant for women, but gender-based skill
is positive for women who attended college. For women, gender-based skill is comprised of a linear
combination of Numerical Operations and Coding Speed. College-educated women who score high
on either of these measures are more likely to earn greater initial wages, since high numerical or
coding ability are likely to make them more attractive employees.7
Table 2.5 performs the regression of skill profiles on wage growth rates for college-educated men
(1), non-college men (2), college-educated women (3), and non-college women (4). It displays the
estimates from equation (2.4.11). Mechanical skill increases the rate of wage growth for non-college
men but not college-educated men. This increase in wage growth rate more than compensates for
the decrease in log initial wages that non-college men with high mechanical ability experience (as
shown in table 2.4).8 Together, tables 2.4 and 2.5 suggest that non-college men with high mechanical
ability sort into occupations with low initial wages but high wage growth. This is empirically
observed in the NLSY79 data.
The estimates presented in tables 2.4 and 2.5 are used to construct counterfactual wages, which are
then used to estimate equation (2.4.12). For each individual, the model predicts the log initial wage
7 In alternative specifications, I compose a “mechanical” skill measure for women by taking men’s loadings on the
ASVAB mechanical tests and combining them with women’s corresponding scores. I compose this mechanical skill
measure using both principal component analysis and exploratory factor analysis. This measure does not appear to
influence wage returns for women in either case. The results of these specifications are available upon request.
8 In simulations, the increased wage growth rate leads non-college men with high mechanical ability to enjoy substantially larger income over the life-cycle even at high discount rates, despite their lower initial wages.
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if college was chosen and if college was not chosen, as well as the growth rate of wages if college
was chosen and if college was not chosen. These wage terms are estimated separately for men and
women. Constructing the counterfactual wage terms allows for identification of the α values in
equation (2.4.12), which represent the effect of college and non-college wages over the life-cycle
on the decision to attend college.
Table 2.6 presents the estimates from equation (2.4.12). I regress an indicator for college attendance
on the difference in constructed log initial wages, the wage growth rate for conditional on attending
college, the wage growth rate conditional on not attending college, and the annual discount rate. The
estimates are in line with those from the original Rosen and Willis (1979) model, although they are
more realistic. If the difference in log initial wages increases by 10%, men are 7.5 percentage points
more likely to attend college and women are 14 percentage points more likely to attend college. A
1% increase in the college wage growth rate leads men to be 3.8 percentage points more likely to
attend college and women to be 2.3 percentage points more likely to attend college. For the same
increase in the wage growth rate from not attending college, men are 3.4 percentage points less
likely to attend college and women are 3.8 percentage points less likely to attend college.
The estimates from the model may appear to be high at first, especially compared to the results
presented in Part I. However, a 10% increase in initial wages would be quite large - the difference
in median wages between college-educated men and non-college educated men is a 25% change.
Therefore, a 10% increase in initial wages should generate large responses in the college-going
decision for both men and women. A small increase in the wage growth rate has large ramifications
for earnings over the life-cycle. An increase of 1% should also lead to large responses by men and
women who take into account their lifetime wealth when making their decision to attend college.

2.5.3

Model Fit

To assess how well the model matches to actual wages over the work life, I plot estimated earnings
and actual earnings against the number of years worked. Figure 2.3 presents median hourly earnings
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by gender and education status. Although the model systematically underestimates the level of
earnings, it appears to predict trends in earnings quite well for individuals with fewer than ten years
on the job. For more than ten years on the job, there is a large spike in actual earnings, which cannot
be captured by the simple functional form assumption on wage evolution from Rosen and Willis
(1979). The model also does not account for selection into years worked. One explanation for the
spike in earnings is that people who work more than ten years at a job tend to have systematically
higher earnings than people who work fewer than ten years at a job (potentially because people with
lower earnings also tend to exhibit lower attachment to the labor force, are more likely to fall into
unemployment, are more likely to choose to exit the labor force temporarily, etc.).
Overall, it appears that the model does a satisfactory job of examining changes in wages over time. A
model which more flexibly incorporates wage evolution over the work life and accounts for selection
into labor force participation may better match observed data, especially for workers who have
worked in the labor market for more than ten years. However, adding features which incorporate
differential attachment to the labor force will dramatically complicate the model, and the marginal
benefit of better predictions for workers with greater than ten years of work tenure may not justify
the cost of a significantly more complicated model.

2.6

Conclusion

This paper explores a potential reason behind the extreme occupational sorting among men and
women in the non-college labor market, as well as a mechanism that explains why men earn higher
non-college wages. First, I use principal component analysis to show that men and women possess
skills other than the intelligence measures traditionally used by the labor market literature. These
“gender-based skills”, which consist of mechanical skill in men and numerical ability in women,
also matter in determining educational attainment and labor market outcomes.
I estimate a Roy model, modifying the framework of Rosen and Willis (1979), to examine how multidimensional skill profiles influence earnings and the college-going decision. The model specifies
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separate wage returns to different skills. I find that mechanical skill exists for men but is difficult
to detect in women, and that the labor market rewards high mechanical skill in the form of higher
non-college wages. The higher mechanical skill of men generate greater opportunity costs to attending college. In contrast, the skill profiles of women do not appear to present costs to attending
college – if anything, numerical ability works alongside traditional intelligence to increase women’s
college wages. Thus, multidimensional skill profiles present trade-offs to men in terms of college
and non-college earnings potential, but not women. Ceteris paribus, men with high mechanical skill
are more likely to choose to forego attending college, contributing to the lower college enrollment
of men relative to women.
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Figures
F IGURE 2.1
C OMPONENT L OADINGS FOR ASVAB SCORES , M EN

Notes: Principal component analysis was conducted on Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test scores
for the NLSY79 sample. Figure 2.1 depicts the principal component loadings for men. Component 1 loads onto the ASVAB
designed to measure intellectual ability (word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, arithmetic reasoning, mathematics
knowledge, numerical operations, and coding speed). Component 2 loads onto the ASVAB tests designed to measure
mechanical ability (automobile and shop information, electronics information, mechanical comprehension). The results
indicate that in addition to intellectual ability (captured by component 1) men also possess mechanical ability (captured
by component 2).

93

F IGURE 2.2
C OMPONENT L OADINGS FOR ASVAB S CORES , W OMEN

Notes: Principal component analysis was conducted on Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test scores
for the NLSY79 sample. Figure 2.2 depicts the principal component loadings for women. As with men, component 1 loads
onto most of the test scores designed to measure intellectual ability. Component 1 loads onto the mechanical ability tests
as well. The fact that the same component loads onto tests of both intellectual and mechanical ability for women suggests
that women who perform well on mechanical ability tests do so because of their high intellectual skill. It is not possible
to detect a mechanical ability component for women that is separate from intelligence. Component 2 loads onto coding
and numerical ability for women, suggesting that technical intellectual ability may be an additional skill women possess.
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Notes: The figure plots median hourly wages by gender and education status. The circle markers represent actual wages,
while the diamond markers represent predictions from the model. The model systematically underestimates the level of
hourly earnings, but tracks the changes in earnings over work tenure quite well for people with less than ten years of
work tenure. For workers with more than ten years of work tenure, there are large spikes in actual hourly earnings which
cannot be accounted for in the model due to the model’s simple functional form assumption on wage evolution over time.

F IGURE 2.3
M ODEL P REDICTIONS

Tables
TABLE 2.1
H IGHEST-PAYING O CCUPATIONS AVAILABLE TO H IGH S CHOOL G RADUATES
Occupation

2012 Median Pay

% female

$75,000 or more

2.1

Transit and railroad police

$55,000 to $74,999

6.8

Police and sheriff’s patrol officers

$55,000 to $74,999

20.8

Buyers and purchasing agents, farm products

$55,000 to $74,999

30.2

Postal service mail carriers

$55,000 to $74,999

36.0

Boilermakers

$55,000 to $74,999

1.7

Real estate brokers

$55,000 to $74,999

52.3

Purchasing agents, except wholesale, retail, and farm products

$55,000 to $74,999

53.4

Artists and related workers

$55,000 to $74,999

50.7

Claims adjusters, examiners, and investigators

$55,000 to $74,999

72.9

Electrical power-line installers and repairers

$55,000 to $74,999

3.3

Gaming managers

$55,000 to $74,999

-9

Power planet operators

$55,000 to $74,999

13.7

Farmers, ranchers, and other agricultural managers

$55,000 to $74,999

16.2

Power distributors and dispatchers

$55,000 to $74,999

13.710

Commercial pilots

$55,000 to $74,999

9.5

Detectives and criminal investigators

$55,000 to $74,999

20.811

Nuclear power reactor operators

$55,000 to $74,999

13.712

Elevator installers and repairers

Notes: Table 2.1 lists the highest paying occupations which do not require a college degree, the median salary in 2012, and the
proportion of workers that are female in each occupation. Occupation titles and 2012 median salary information come from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Outlook Handbook (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). The proportion of female workers
per occupation come from the 2010 American Community Survey data (Ruggles et al., 2017).

9 Occupation

not in census data.
not in census data. Proportion taken from power plant operator occupation.
11 Police and detectives are classified together in the census data.
12 Occupation not in census data. Proportion taken from power plant operator occupation.
10 Occupation
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TABLE 2.2
S UMMARY S TATISTICS IN NLSY79 S AMPLE

College
College

Log hourly wages

Male
No College

0.5152
(0.4999)

Female
College No College
0.5709
(0.4950)

2.074
(0.5346)

1.819
(0.5224)

1.844
(0.5224)

1.516
(0.5389)

Log hourly wages: lnwc,`
(at career start)

1.614
(0.629)

0.781
(0.505)

1.425
(0.630)

0.550
(0.541)

Wage growth rate: gc,`

0.0848
(0.0572)

0.0857
(0.0385)

0.0706
(0.0636)

0.0810
(0.0406)

0.515
(1.474)

-0.562
(1.825)

0.352
(1.215)

-0.487
(1.404)

Auto & Shop Score

55.66
(8.592)

52.84
(10.46)

45.46
(6.658)

42.42
(6.51)

Electronics Score

55.96
(8.50)

49.93
(9.914)

47.86
(7.995)

43.23
(7.845)

Mechanical Score

56.32
(8.59)

50.76
(10.22)

48.24
(8.080)

43.45
(7.046)

Numerical Operations

52.60
(8.087)

45.54
(10.23)

53.72
(7.729)

48.46
(9.662)

Coding Speed

50.86
(8.549)

44.34
(8.953)

53.70
(8.728)

50.09
(9.588)

0.879
(0.893)

-0.145
(0.842)

0.647
(0.889)

-0.212
(0.769)

Word Knowledge

53.73
(7.147)

45.73
(10.05)

52.79
(7.682)

45.84
(9.642)

Paragraph Comprehension

53.41
(7.588)

44.99
(10.58)

53.70
(7.650)

47.43
(9.934)

Arithmetic Reasoning

55.55
(8.940)

47.12
(8.976)

51.83
(9.104)

44.53
(7.846)

Gender-based Skill

AFQT (standardized)
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56.18
(9.564)

45.64
(7.616)

53.73
(9.182)

44.98
(7.313)

15.86
(2.016)

15.33
(1.973)

15.67
(1.985)

15.23
(2.043)

Rotter Locus of Control Scale

8.023
(2.362)

8.766
(2.349)

8.222
(2.364)

8.945
(2.332)

Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale

24.89
(4.243)

23.15
(4.255)

23.84
(4.266)

22.89
(4.564)

1171

1102

1425

1071

Mathematics Knowledge

Socio-emotional Skill

N

Notes: Summary statistics for college enrollment status, wages, and skill measures in NLSY79 analysis sample.
“Gender-based skill” for men is comprised of a linear combination of scores on the Auto and Shop Information,
Electronics Information, and Mechanical Comprehension tests in the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
(ASVAB) subtests. “Gender-based skill” for women is a linear combination of scores on the Coding Speed and
Numerical Operations ASVAB subtests. The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score is a composite score
traditionally used to measure cognitive ability (see Neal and Johnson, 1996). AFQT scores are derived from the
Arithmetic Reasoning, Mathematics Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, and Word Knowledge ASVAB subtests.
Socio-emotional skill is the average of scores on the Rotter locus of control scale and the Rosenberg self-esteem scale
(Rotter, 1966; Rosenberg, 1965). This paper examines the impact of “gender-based skill”, controlling for cognitive
skill (as measured by AFQT) and socio-emotional skill, on wage rates and college-going. Standard deviations in
parentheses.
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TABLE 2.3
P ROBIT R EGRESSION OF C OLLEGE ATTENDANCE ON S KILL P ROFILES
Male
College
College
(1)
(2)

Female
College
College
(3)
(4)

-0.183∗∗∗
(0.0354)

0.0199
(0.0298)

gender-based skill

auto shop score

-0.0258∗∗∗
(0.00583)

-0.00241
(0.00588)

electronic score

0.00493
(0.00598)

-0.00246
(0.00537)

mechanical score

-0.00990∗
(0.00559)

-0.00435
(0.00543)

AFQT

0.880∗∗∗
(0.0645)

0.957∗∗∗
(0.0714)

0.941∗∗∗
(0.0613)

0.871∗∗∗
(0.0572)

AFQT 2

0.116∗∗∗
(0.0371)

0.112∗∗∗
(0.0376)

-0.0118
(0.0392)

-0.00489
(0.0403)

socioemotional

0.104∗∗∗
(0.0332)

0.102∗∗∗
(0.0331)

0.0894∗∗∗
(0.0307)

0.0876∗∗∗
(0.0309)

risk aversion

0.0437∗∗∗
(0.0128)

0.0438∗∗∗
(0.0126)

0.0260∗∗
(0.0119)

0.0253∗∗
(0.0119)

annual discount rate

-0.722
(0.508)

-0.750
(0.505)

-0.391
(0.497)

-0.367
(0.498)

Constant

1.349∗
(0.733)

-0.132
(0.689)

1.504∗∗
(0.600)

1.143∗∗
(0.540)

YES
2272
0.253

YES
2272
0.249

YES
2493
0.213

YES
2493
0.213

Demo. controls
Observations
Pseudo R2

Notes: Probit regression of college enrollment status on skill profiles (equation 2.4.9). Regressions control for region of residence, whether residence is urban, height, age, race, and number of siblings. Coefficients on dummies
for missing variables suppressed. Cross-sectional regression at year = 1990. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE 2.4
H ECKMAN S ELECTION C ORRECTED R ESULTS FOR L OG I NITIAL WAGES
Male
College No College
(1)
(2)

Female
College
No College
(3)
(4)

gender-based skill

-0.0319
(0.0296)

-0.0461∗
(0.0241)

0.0437∗∗
(0.0175)

0.0109
(0.0176)

AFQT

0.388∗∗∗
(0.144)

0.232∗∗
(0.101)

0.0670
(0.117)

-0.0116
(0.102)

AFQT 2

0.00538
(0.0273)

0.00870
(0.0337)

-0.00837
(0.0248)

0.0158
(0.0284)

socioemotional

0.0637∗∗∗
(0.0231)

0.0284
(0.0198)

-0.00806
(0.0184)

0.00984
(0.0181)

risk aversion

0.0378∗∗∗
(0.0103)

0.00538
(0.00700)

-0.00510
(0.00719)

0.00771
(0.00699)

Constant

2.051∗∗∗
(0.666)

1.211∗∗∗
(0.341)

3.672∗∗∗
(0.300)

1.476∗∗∗
(0.418)

YES
1132
0.154

YES
1087
0.078

YES
1385
0.211

YES
1036
0.112

Demo. controls
Observations
R2

Notes: Regression of initial wage rate on skill profiles using Heckman selection correction method (equation 2.4.10).
Regressions control for region of residence, whether residence is urban, height, age, race, experience, and experience2 .
Coefficients on dummies for missing variables suppressed. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE 2.5
H ECKMAN S ELECTION C ORRECTED R ESULTS FOR WAGE G ROWTH
Male
College
No College
(1)
(2)

Female
College
No College
(3)
(4)

gender-based skill

0.00257
(0.00272)

0.00403∗∗
(0.00187)

-0.000650
(0.00249)

0.00194
(0.00150)

AFQT

-0.00133
(0.0124)

-0.0130
(0.00959)

0.0115
(0.0106)

0.00415
(0.00678)

AFQT 2

0.000127
(0.00269)

-0.00663∗∗
(0.00283)

-0.000596
(0.00250)

-0.00223
(0.00220)

socioemotional

-0.00401∗
(0.00231)

-0.000954
(0.00143)

0.00175
(0.00208)

-0.000440
(0.00158)

risk aversion

-0.000765
(0.000798)

-0.000508
(0.000547)

0.00129∗∗
(0.000519)

0.0000455
(0.000466)

0.101∗
(0.0529)

0.0880∗∗∗
(0.0254)

0.0265
(0.0320)

0.107∗∗∗
(0.0297)

YES
1118
0.067

YES
1084
0.075

YES
1368
0.025

YES
1035
0.057

Constant

Demo. controls
Observations
R2

Notes: Regression of wage growth rate on skill profiles using Heckman selection correction method (equation
2.4.11). Regressions control for region of residence, whether residence is urban, height, age, race, experience,
and experience2 . Coefficients on dummies for missing variables suppressed. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE 2.6
R EGRESSION E STIMATES : E FFECT OF WAGES ON C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT
Male
(1)

Female
(2)

difference in initial wages

1.830∗∗∗
(0.145)

3.495∗∗∗
(0.173)

wage growth rate, college

47.87∗∗∗
(2.259)

28.57∗∗∗
(4.118)

wage growth rate, non-college

-42.93∗∗∗
(4.583)

-47.64∗∗∗
(5.080)

annual discount rate

-1.261∗∗
(0.571)

-0.0399
(0.475)

Constant

-1.123∗∗∗
(0.328)

-0.120
(0.303)

2273
0.240

2496
0.185

Observations
Pseudo R2

Notes: Regression of college enrollment status on counterfactual initial wage rates, wage growth rates, and discount
rate (equation 2.4.12). Coefficients on dummies for missing variables suppressed. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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CHAPTER 3 : A Field Study of Charitable Giving Reveals that
Reciprocity Decays over Time
3.1

Introduction1

Reciprocity motivates a wide range of cooperative behaviors that are crucial to the functioning of
modern society (Gachter and Herrmann, 2009). Reciprocity can involve rewarding kind actions or
punishing unkind actions. In this paper, we focus on positive reciprocity, defined as any costly behaviors taken to reward a past action that was either kind or beneficial (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006;
McCabe et al., 2003). We present the first evidence from a large-scale field study of a fundamental,
and previously under-appreciated, feature of positive reciprocity: it decays over time. Our findings
have important implications for long-term relationships between individuals as well as the relationships between individuals and organizations. In particular, if feelings of reciprocity diminish over
time, interactions between parties may need to be temporally close in order to sustain strong reciprocal relationships. Our findings also provide guidance for governments and organizations interested
in leveraging reciprocity to generate compliance or contributions. Policy makers and fundraisers
may want to capitalize quickly on the reciprocal motives they induce in others.
Successful fundraising is critical to the survival of most not-for-profit organizations. We study
positive reciprocity in a setting where individuals receive a service from a not-for-profit organization
and subsequently have the option to reciprocate by making a charitable gift. Specifically, we study
giving to a massive hospital system that provides patients with medical care and later solicits them
for charitable contributions. We examine how patients’ propensity to donate relates to the delay
separating their first-ever visit to the hospital and their subsequent receipt of a donation solicitation.
Many non-profit organizations that provide services depend on charitable contributions from those
they have served, just like our partner hospital system. Schools, hospitals, religious organizations,
1 This chapter is a postprint version of an article published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
The article is under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND). Chuan,
A., Kessler, J., Milkman, K., 2018. A Field Study of Charitable Giving Reveals that Reciprocity Decays over Time.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1708293115
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humane societies, and disaster relief providers all deliver services to individuals and later solicit
donations from them. Reciprocity may play a large role in the success of these donation solicitations
(Meer, 2012). Hospitals alone, the focus of our paper, take in over $9.6 billion in donations each
year in the United States (Rosin, 2014).
Past research in economics and psychology has shown that donation decisions are extremely sensitive to context effects (Andreoni and Payne, 2013). Nevertheless, standard theories of economic
behavior do not allow the delay separating a service interaction from a donation solicitation to affect generosity, holding all else constant (e.g., the arrival of new information or an income shock).
On the other hand, psychology research suggests that the timing of a solicitation relative to a recent interaction could indeed affect generosity. Past research on psychological reactance suggests
that requesting a donation too quickly after a service interaction could be off-putting, as it might
appear opportunistic and manipulative (Brehm, 1966; Clee and Wicklund, 1980). If this were the
case, a longer delay separating a service interaction from a donation solicitation would be expected
to increase generosity by reducing reactance. However, there are also reasons to believe that a
longer delay separating a service interaction from a donation solicitation could decrease generosity.
Memories decay rapidly over time (Schacter, 1999) , so if more time separates a service encounter
from a donation solicitation, the gratitude and reciprocity produced by that encounter should be less
vividly recalled. Likewise, to the extent that reciprocity is driven by gratitude – a transient, “hot”
state – longer delays between a service interaction and a solicitation would be expected to reduce
generosity (Loewenstein, 1996; Ritov, 2006; 12. Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999).
Past empirical research has been limited in its ability to isolate the effects of time delays on positive
reciprocity, and studies exploring this topic have yielded mixed results. Some past experiments
suggest that positive reciprocity completely dies out within a day (Gneezy and List, 2006; Bellemare
and Shearer, 2009; Estevez-Sorenson, 2017; Sliwka and Werner, 2017). However, these studies
could not disentangle decaying reciprocity from decaying energy, as they measured reciprocity by
examining study participants’ work output in response to a wage hike, and exhaustion is a powerful
alternative explanation for the decay in output detected over time. Other wage experiments have
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shown that reciprocity stays constant over the course of several hours (Kube et al., 2012; Gilchrist
et al., 2016), but these results could easily be due to the short follow-up periods studied. Finally,
two wage experiments showed increases in reciprocity over the course of several hours (Kube et
al., 2013; Ockenfels et al., 2016). However, these studies again measured reciprocity by examining
worker output and the findings could well be the result of learning effects, whereby practice allows
workers to improve their performance on a task over time.
Past psychology studies offer some support for the possibility that longer delays may decrease
generosity. Using a laboratory experiment and hypothetical scenarios, Burger et al. (1997) showed
that the likelihood of returning a small favor (e.g., the gift of a soda from a confederate, the loan
of pizza money or help with class notes from a hypothetical acquaintance) decreases the longer the
time delay between receiving the favor and an opportunity to reciprocate. Similarly, Flynn (2003)
finds that in workplace surveys and a laboratory experiment, the recipients of favors report valuing
them less when more time has elapsed since the favor. However, these intriguing studies relied on
small samples, idiosyncratic stimuli, and often could not disentangle forgetting about a past favor
from a decaying desire to reciprocate.
One field experiment by Becker et al. (2013) examined how the usefulness of a gift influenced the
likelihood that its recipient will choose to reciprocate by completing a survey. Although the relationship between reciprocity and time was not the focus of this research, the authors present evidence
that a gift encouraged reciprocal behavior six months later but not 18 months later. Importantly,
the same individuals were asked to reciprocate twice, so the lack of reciprocity 18 months after the
receipt of a gift may be due to the fact that those who reciprocated at six months did not feel the
need to reciprocate again.
We build on these past findings with a field study that precisely explores how reciprocity decays
over time periods ranging from several weeks to a few months. To investigate how reciprocity
changes over time in the field, we partnered with a large university hospital system comprised of
a network of eight hospitals. Using data from 82,231 outpatient hospital visits as well as 18,515
donation solicitations and responses to those solicitations, we exploit quasi-experimental variation
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in the delay separating the hospital system’s solicitation mailings from patients’ hospital visits to
study how this delay affects giving. Specifically, the hospital system solicits donations by mailing
solicitations to thousands of recent patients on the same date. Because the timing of patients’
hospital visits is random with respect to the date of this mailing, we can examine how the delay
separating a patient’s recent hospital visit from the receipt of a solicitation affects donations. Our
key finding is that an additional 30-day delay in requesting a donation shortly after the provision of
medical care decreases the likelihood of a donation to the hospital system by over 30%.
Our paper makes several key contributions to our understanding of the relationship between reciprocity and time. First, we document the decay of reciprocity over time in a consequential field
setting, rather than the laboratory. Second, we isolate a decay in reciprocity separately from a decay
in social pressure. In our study, prospective donors receive a request to donate via a mailing that
they open in the privacy of their own homes. Past studies of the sensitivity of reciprocity to time
delays have always examined people’s decisions to return a favor either during a face-to-face interaction, where the request to reciprocate was made by the individual who had already performed a
favor for the subject (Burger et al., 1997), or when the potential beneficiary was in the same room
(Neo et al., 2013; Oechssler et al., 2015; Grimm and Mengel, 2011). These designs not only prevented researchers from separating decays in reciprocity from decays in social pressure, but also
introduced the possibility that study participants distorted their behavior because they were aware
that they were participating in a research study (Burger et al., 1997; Flynn, 2003; Neo et al., 2013; ;
Oechssler et al., 2015; Grimm and Mengel, 2011). Because the individuals we study were not aware
that their behavior would be observed by researchers, our data is not subject to concerns about experimenter demand effects. Third, our paper isolates the effect of time delays on reciprocity, while
many prior studies of gift exchange in the workplace are unable to disentangle the effect of reciprocity from the effects of exhaustion or learning (Gneezy and List, 2006; Bellemare and Shearer,
2009; Esteves-Sorenson, 2017; Sliwka and Werner, 2017; Kube et al., 2013; Ockenfels et al., 2015).
Finally, our study benefits from an extremely large participant sample we are able to examine the
behavior of a far larger population than past studies of reciprocity, which improves the precision of
our estimates and allows us to detect statistically significant evidence of positive reciprocity where
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other studies were under-powered to do so (Oechssler, 2015).
To our knowledge, this is the first large-scale field study to explicitly explore the endurance of reciprocity over time. Our evidence that positive reciprocity decays dramatically over time informs
economists’ understanding of repeated, cooperative interactions and suggests the value of capitalizing quickly on opportunities to benefit from a quid pro quo. Our findings are important for practitioners who often choose to wait before soliciting donations from prospective donors after rendering
them a service. This common practice of waiting to solicit could lead non-profit organizations to
lose substantial fundraising revenue. Our findings indicate that the loss in fundraising revenue from
waiting to solicit is quite large: a back-of-the-envelope calculation comparing our treatment effect
to others in the literature suggests that avoiding an additional 30-day delay between providing a
service and requesting a donation could improve donation rates by as much as offering a one-to-one
matching donation (Karlan and List, 2007). In addition to improving our understanding of how
to promote the provision of public goods, the findings we present have important implications for
leading economic models of reciprocity, which currently fail to incorporate sensitivity to time (Cox
et al., 2007).

3.2

Methods

Human Subjects Protections. Prior to the start of this project, the Institutional Review Board
at the University of Pennsylvania reviewed and approved our study procedure. Since our project
involved analysis of archival data, a waiver of informed consent was deemed appropriate by the
IRB per Federal regulation HHS CFR 45.46.117(c)(2).

Data. We received donation solicitation data on adult outpatients who visited the hospital system
between May 2013 and April 2015.2 These data sets are de-identified and publicly available for
2 The

data the hospital system chose to share with us on charitable giving included all adult outpatients except those
who: (a) had Medicaid as a form of insurance, (b) were behavioral health patients, (c) were younger than 40 years old
and so were never mailed solicitations following the hospital system’s solicitation protocols, (d) were patients of certain
special medical care divisions (e.g., hospices), (e) had incomplete contact information, (f) were on the Do Not Solicit list,
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download on our author websites. To explore the endurance of reciprocity over time, we focus on
outpatients who were solicited for a donation by the hospital system’s Annual Giving Department
in our data window and for whom we have complete information about all hospital visits. This
focus leads to two data restrictions. First, we restrict our analysis to patients whose first visit was
within our data window, allowing us to observe their full visit history at any of the eight hospitals
in the network. Second, we restrict our analysis to patients who were solicited in response to their
first-ever visit to the hospital system,3 which allows us to cleanly estimate how reciprocal giving
is affected by the delay in the timing of a solicitation relative to that first visit. These sample
restrictions leave us with a large pool of patients (Nunique patients = 18, 515; Noutpatient visits = 82, 231)
who were each solicited for a donation by our partner hospital system. It is worth noting that our
results replicate when we do not make these conservative restrictions and instead include the first
observed solicitations by the hospital system to all patients in our dataset (this expands our sample
to 149,817 patients, but we are forced to ignore all hospital visits before May 2013, which do not
appear in our data; see Table C.1 in Appendix C.1).
Table 3.1, column 1 provides main summary statistics for our analysis sample. We report on the
demographic characteristics of patients in our sample, the average number of visits patients made
to the hospital system before receiving a donation solicitation, and the average number of hospital
visits a patient made in the 132 days following her first visit,4 as well as the percentage of patients
who donate upon receiving a solicitation, and the average gift conditional on donation, which was
$49.14. The full list of summary statistics is available in Table C.2, column 1 in Appendix C.1.
Table C.2, columns 2 and 3 present balance regressions confirming that the time delay separating a
patient’s first hospital visit from her first solicitation is (as we will assume throughout our analyses)
approximately random with respect to observable patient characteristics.
(g) were employees of the hospital system, or (h) visited a medical location that was not immediately identifiable as a
medical care location within the hospital system.
3 The hospital system relied on somewhat ad-hoc rules (based on patients’ demographic characteristics) that varied
from mailing to mailing to determine who would receive solicitations. However, we only study those who received
mailings and include fixed effects for mailing date in all analyses, ensuring these selection criteria do not impact our
causal estimates of the relationship between delay and reciprocity.
4 132 days is the longest period separating a first hospital visit from an initial donation solicitation in our data sample.
We use the number of visits a patient made within 132 days of her first visit as a control for a patient’s sickliness in some
of our analyses.
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Econometric Model.

Our empirical approach leverages the fact that while patients’ first hospital

visits occur continuously throughout the year, donation solicitation mailings from our partner hospital system are sent in batches on fixed dates. On these fixed dates, solicitation mailings are sent
simultaneously to all patients whose first visit to the hospital system occurred at any time during
a predetermined, preceding two-month visit window called a mailing cycle. The timing of these
batch mailings is such that two patients whose first visits occurred up to 60 days apart, but whose
first visits occurred during the same mailing cycle, would receive solicitations on the same date.
Table 3.2 shows the range of potential dates of a patient’s first hospital visit within each mailing
cycle, and the associated month and year in which solicitations were sent to patients. The dates
associated with a mailing cycle always include two consecutive calendar months (e.g., the first
mailing cycle in our data includes patient visits in May and June of 2013). The solicitation mailing
date for a mailing cycle is generally a few weeks after the last recorded patient visit date associated
with that cycle, as this gives the development office time to organize the relevant patient information
and send out mailings.5 We estimate our effects within mailing cycles. That is, we compare people
whose first visit falls earlier in a specific mailing cycle to people whose first visit falls later in
that same mailing cycle by including mailing cycle fixed effects in all of our regression analyses.6
We take two complementary econometric approaches to estimating the effect of time delays on
reciprocity.
Econometric approach # 1 - time delay between a patient’s first visit and solicitation
Our first strategy is to examine the effect of the time delay between a patient’s first hospital visit and
5 There

are some exceptions to this rule, but we avoid any confounds from these exceptions by estimating our effects
within mailing cycles. Namely, if a particular mailing cycle is delayed, this will not bias our estimates since we will only
compare patients from a delayed mailing cycle to each other when estimating the effect of a time delay on giving. For
additional details, see Appendix C.1.
6 Since the timing of the first patient visit relative to the end of a mailing cycle is presumably exogenous, we are able
to use this variation to generate a causal estimate of the effect of the delay between service provision and solicitation
on donation decisions. Patients would need to be strategically timing first visits to the hospital around unannounced and
variable solicitation mailing cycle dates for this assumption to be violated. While it is possible for unobserved factors
to influence both the timing of each patient’s visit and the donation decision, this is unlikely. These factors would have
to influence first visit timing relative to the date of the solicitation mailing and simultaneously influence the donation
decision. This possibility appears to be ruled out by our tests of the balance of our sample across solicitation mailing
delays, shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table C.2.
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the mailing of a solicitation request on that patient’s donation decision by estimating the following
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression:

Any Donationi = β0 + β1 First Visit Delayi + βControlsi + εi

(3.2.1)

where Any Donationi equals 0 if individual i did not donate in our data set and 100 if individual i
made a donation (so estimated coefficients can be interpreted in percentage points). First Visit Delayi
is the delay between patient i0 s first hospital visit and the date on which he or she was solicited by
mail to donate, and

1

is the coefficient of interest. Controlsi is a vector of controls. In all of our

regressions, this vector of controls includes dummies for mailing cycle, to restrict comparison to
patients within the same mailing cycle, as well as hospital and medical department dummies, since
different types of individuals may visit different hospitals and medical departments.7
We test the robustness of all of our analyses to the addition of further control variables. One (uninteresting) way that the time delay separating a patient’s first visit from a solicitation could affect
her donation decision is by changing the number of subsequent visits to the hospital she has time
to make before being solicited, since additional hospital visits may alter a patient’s willingness to
donate. Therefore, in some regressions, we add controls for the number of hospital visits a patient
made between her first visit and the date when a donation solicitation was mailed. We include
dummy variables for each possible number of visits before the solicitation to non-parametrically
control for pre-solicitation hospital visits. When we add controls for the number of pre-solicitation
visits, however, our analyses compare patients with the same number of visits spread out over different time durations (i.e., different time lags between first visit and solicitation), making it critical
to also control for the sickliness of patients, since a patient who visits the hospital three times in one
week is likely sicklier than a patient who visits three times in one month. In these regressions, we
thus also control non-parametrically for the number of visits patients make within 132 days of their
first hospital visit. The addition of these controls, along with indicators for the medical department a
7 Our identification assumption is that a patient’s first visit occurs on a random date within a mailing cycle conditional

on the hospital and medical department that patient visits.
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patient visited (previously mentioned), proxy for a patient’s sickliness. Finally, we also add controls
for all observable patient demographic characteristics deducible from data provided by the hospital
system, which include gender, age (at date of solicitation), marital status, and state of residence.
As noted above, these empirical specifications rely on the assumption that the delay between a patient’s first hospital visit and her first receipt of a solicitation from the hospital system is exogenous
after including our vector of controls. Given that it would be nearly impossible for patients to time
their hospital visits strategically around (unknown) future solicitation dates,8 we are confident that
this assumption is valid. Also noted above, consistent with this assumption, columns 2 and 3 of
Table C.2 report the results of balance regressions, which show that the date of a patient’s first
visit within a mailing cycle is uncorrelated with observable patient characteristics with either set of
controls in place.
Econometric approach # 2 - time delay between a patient’s last visit and solicitation:
The large majority of patients in our sample (77.16%) make multiple hospital visits before they
receive a solicitation triggered by their first visit. It could be argued that the delay following service
provision most likely to impact reciprocity would be the delay separating a patient’s last visit prior
to solicitation and the receipt of a mailing. Thus, our second econometric approach to estimating
the impact of a time delay on reciprocity investigates how a delay between a patient’s last visit and
the date of a solicitation mailing affects giving. This exercise is complicated by the fact that the
timing of a patient’s last visit is endogenous to her total number of hospital visits such that more
frequent visitors are more likely to have a last visit closer to a solicitation date.
To take advantage of the fact that we expect the timing of a patient’s first visit to be exogenous with
respect to total hospital visits, conditional on our controls, our second empirical strategy relies on an
instrumental variables approach (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), treating the timing of the first visit as
an instrument for the timing of the last visit. We estimate our two-stage least squares instrumental
variables regressions as shown in equations 3.2.2 and 3.2.3:
8 Note

that the solicitation schedule is set in advance and does not respond to the characteristics of recent hospital

patients.
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Last Visit Delayi = α0 + α1 First Visit Delayi + αControlsi + ui

(3.2.2)

Any Donationi = γ0 + γ1 Last Visit Delayi + γControlsi + νi

(3.2.3)

As defined previously, Any Donationi equals 0 if individual i did not donate in our data set and 100
if individual i made a donation (so estimated coefficients can be interpreted in percentage points).
Last Visit Delayi is the delay between patient i’s last pre-solicitation hospital visit and the date of
solicitation. Also, as defined previously, First Visit Delayi is the delay between patient i’s first hospital visit and the date of solicitation and Controlsi is a vector of controls, which includes the same
^Delayi is the predicted
sets of variables included our previously described regressions. Last Visit
delay between patient i’s last pre-solicitation visit and the solicitation date, it is the exogenous component of Last Visit Delayi estimated from equation 3.2.2, and γ1 is the coefficient of interest.
Note that interpreting γ1 as the causal effect of Last Visit Delayi on Any Donationi requires both
that the First Visit Delayi be exogenous conditional on our vector of controls (which we justify
above) and that the only effect First Visit Delayi has on Any Donationi is through its influence
on Last Visit Delayi . This means that our second specification is valid only under the assumption
that donation decisions are driven primarily by the last pre-solicitation visit to the hospital, and
that earlier visits play a negligible role in the decision to donate. Under this assumption, our first
specification can be viewed as the reduced form of our second specification.

3.3

Results

Donation rates decline as the time separating a patient’s hospital visit and solicitation increases.
This result holds in both of our empirical approaches described above. Figure 3.1 presents the raw
correlation between the time delay separating a patient’s (first or last) hospital visit from her receipt
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of a solicitation mailing and the likelihood a patient made a donation to our partner hospital system.
It shows that the percentage of patients who donate decreases considerably (from almost 1.5% to
0.4%) as the time delay separating a visit from a solicitation increases. This decline over time holds
for both the first and the last pre-solicitation hospital visit.
We observe the same relationship depicted in the raw data in Figure 3.1 in our regression analyses,
reported in Table 3.3. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.3 report the coefficient estimates from our first
regression specification in which we estimate the effect of the delay between a patient’s first hospital
visit and her first receipt of a donation solicitation on the likelihood of giving. In column 1, we only
include our key controls: fixed effects for mailing cycle, hospital visited, and medical department
visited. We find that increasing the delay separating a patient’s first visit and her solicitation by
30 additional days decreases the probability that the patient will donate by 0.30 percentage points
(p < 0.05). This effect represents a 36% decrease in the donation rate relative to the mean donation
rate, across the whole sample, of 0.83 percentage points. In column 2, we add further controls to
eliminate the possible impact of “extra” opportunities to visit the hospital pre-solicitation that may
arise when patients’ first visits come earlier in a mailing cycle. In particular, as described previously,
we add non-parametric controls for the total number of visits a patient made to the hospital before a
solicitation was mailed, non-parametric controls for the number of visits within a fixed window of
132 days following a patient’s first hospital visit (a proxy for sickliness), and demographic controls.
Our column 2 results remain extremely similar to those presented in column 1: increasing the lag
time separating a patient’s first visit from her first receipt of a solicitation by an additional 30 days
decreases the probability of donation by 0.25 percentage points (p < 0.05), a 30% decrease relative
to the average donation rate.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.3, we present the results of our instrumental variable (IV) regressions.
These regressions estimate the effect of the delay separating a patient’s last hospital visit from the
mailing of a donation solicitation on donation likelihood using the delay between a patient’s first
hospital visit and the date of the solicitation mailing as an instrument. As shown in Table 3.3, both
F-statistics are above 3,000, demonstrating a strong first stage and avoiding any potential concerns
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about weak instruments (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Column 3 of Table 3.3 includes the same
controls as column 1 and estimates that an additional 30 days separating a patient’s last hospital
visit from the date of her first donation solicitation decreases the probability of a donation by 0.51
percentage points (p < 0.05), a 61% decrease from the average donation rate. Column 4 includes
the same additional controls as column 2 and estimates a comparable 0.41 percentage point decrease
in the probability of donation for an additional 30 days separating a patient’s last visit and the date
on which the hospital system sent her a donation solicitation (p < 0.05). As shown in our Appendix
C.1 (Table C.3), these results are robust to including a wide range of different subsets of the full set
of controls included in columns 2 and 4.9
We conducted a series of supplemental analyses detailed in Appendix C.1 to shed additional light on
the psychological mechanism responsible for our findings. If gratitude is a hot state that decays over
time driving reductions in reciprocity, we would expect reciprocity to decay more rapidly among
patients with more severe ailments who have more reason to be grateful for their care. To measure
ailment severity, we asked three physicians at our partner hospital system to independently rate each
of the 11 medical departments that handled more than 1,000 outpatients in our data set. The physicians unanimously rated oncology, cardiology, and surgery as departments with the most severe
cases. We thus classified patients who visited the oncology, cardiology, or surgery departments as
“severe” and patients who only visited other rated departments as “not severe”. We then reproduced
our primary analyses (presented in Table 3.3) separately for “severe” patients and for not severe patients (presented in Table C.5). The results demonstrate that severe patients show significantly more
pronounced decays in reciprocity over time than other patients (p < 0.05 in all Wald Tests). While
these results suggest that those who were more grateful display more decay, consistent with the
possibility that gratitude is a “hot” state that wanes quickly, we cannot rule out other explanations
for the decay in reciprocity among patients with severe illnesses (e.g., income effects).10
9 We

also examine the effect of a time delay on the donation amount (in natural logs, with log donation amount equal
to 0 for non-donors) in Table C.10 to determine if a time delay influences the amount donated. Consistent with our main
result that a time delay in soliciting a donation decreases the proportion who give, we find that the unconditional donation
amount decreases as the solicitation delay increases.
10 For example, patients with more severe illnesses have to spend more money on treatment, leaving them less able to
donate to the hospital over the duration of the treatment.
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To bolster our interpretation that gratitude is central to our decay results, the Appendix C.1 provides
three additional empirical exercises comparing the decay observed among patients who likely had
better experiences with the hospital system to the decay observed among patients who likely had
worse experiences with the hospital system. In particular, we proxy for better experiences with the
hospital system using: 1) the likelihood of returning to the hospital system for additional outpatient
care, 2) having visited a higher ranked hospital, and 3) having visited a higher ranked medical
provider based on survey data collected by the hospital system. These three analyses all suggest
that reciprocity decays faster (directionally, but not significantly) among patients whose experiences
were better, consistent with gratitude playing a central role in driving our results.

3.4

Discussion

Past research indicates that reciprocity is a major driver of generosity (Andreoni and Payne, 2013;
Gneezy and List, 2006). Thus, when an individual receives a service, she may feel inclined to
behave reciprocally (e.g., perhaps by donating to the provider of the service in the form of a tip). In
this paper, we provide field evidence that such reciprocity wanes over time. Currently, behavioral
models of reciprocal motives do not incorporate time-sensitivity; instead, they implicitly assume that
the willingness to reciprocate is constant (Cox et al., 2007). Some psychological theories suggest
that soliciting reciprocity too soon (e.g., asking a beneficiary of a charitable organization to donate
soon after receiving a service) could decrease reciprocity because the request may be viewed as
opportunistic or manipulative (Brehm, 1966; Clee and Wicklund, 1980). Other theories leave open
the possibility that reciprocity could decline over time due to either forgetfulness (Schacter, 1999)
or the fleeting nature of visceral states that may contribute to it (e.g., gratitude; Loewenstein, 1996;
Ritov, 2006; Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Burger et al., 1997; Flynn, 2003; Neo et al., 2013). Our
findings inform both economic and psychological theories of reciprocity by providing field evidence
that reciprocity declines precipitously over the course of a few months.
We study decays in reciprocity by examining patient decisions about giving to a university hospital
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system that has provided them with medical care. We show that reciprocity decreases as the delay
between a visit to the hospital and a solicitation for a donation increases. An additional 30-day delay
in requesting a donation after a patient’s first hospital visit decreases the likelihood of a donation by
30% or more, while a 30-day added delay separating a patient’s last hospital visit from a solicitation
decreases donations by approximately 50%.
Our results significantly extend past research by cleanly isolating the relationship between reciprocity and time in a field setting. The rate of decay reported in our paper is roughly five times
slower than that reported in Burger et al. (1997)’s study of favors, which finds that the tendency
to return a small favor declines by 64% over one week. However, given that we study positive
reciprocity towards a hospital system providing potentially life-saving treatment and Burger et al.
(1997) explored positive reciprocity towards someone who provided a trivial favor (e.g., offering
a stranger a soda), it is unsurprising that we find more persistent reciprocity. It is also likely that
participants in Burger et al.’s studies simply forgot they had received a small gift two weeks prior,
while the donation solicitation letters we studied ensured that participants recalled their interactions
with the hospitals requesting reciprocal donations. In addition, the rate of decay in reciprocity we
detect is roughly four times faster than the rate detected by in Becker et al. (2013). However, Becker
et al. measure decay in reciprocal behavior by examining whether households agree to participate in
a national survey both six and 18 months after receiving a gift, and therefore cannot isolate a decay
in reciprocity from the possibility that households are unwilling to reciprocate twice for a single
gift.
Our findings have immediate practical implications for charitable organizations. Organizations
that provide a service or otherwise interact with potential donors may be able to dramatically increase donation rates and fundraising revenue by decreasing the delay between an interaction with
a prospective donor and a donation request. Comparing our effect size estimates to those from past
research suggests that for an organization like the one we studied that sends out solicitation requests every two months, changing to a schedule involving solicitation mailings every month could
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increase donation rates by as much as introducing a 1-to-1 donation match incentive.11
Finally, while our analysis focuses on charitable giving to a university hospital system, our results
speak to contexts outside of charitable giving. Since reciprocity is important across a wide variety
of contexts, our findings have implications for our understanding of myriad social interactions. For
example, stores may increase long-term customer loyalty if they can decrease the time between a
customer’s initial purchase and her next visit. Partnerships may enjoy greater longevity and success
if both parties engage in frequent contact early on in relationships. And after two people first
meet, they may be more prone to collaborate toward a shared goal the sooner such an opportunity
presents itself. To the extent that the time delays separating interactions can be controlled, it may
be valuable for individuals and organizations to consider our findings regarding the time-sensitivity
of reciprocity when scheduling such interactions.

11 In our setting, we find that a 30-day decrease in delay increases donation rates by at least 0.3 percentage points.
Estimates from previous experimental work have found a similar 0.3 percentage point increase in donation rates due to
the introduction of a 1-to-1 match (see Karlan and List, 2007).
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Figures
F IGURE 3.1
R AW R ELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE D ELAY S EPARATING A H OSPITAL V ISIT FROM A
S OLICITATION AND A PATIENT ’ S D ONATION L IKELIHOOD
2.0%

Percent of solicited patients who donate

First visit

Last visit

1.5%

1.0%

0.5%

0.0%
0-29 days
30-59 days
60-89 days
90-119 days
Delay (in Days) Separating Hospital Visit from Solicitation Mailing

Notes: This graph presents raw data. The x-axis shows the delay separating a patient’s hospital visit and the date of the
patient’s first solicitation for a donation. The y-axis shows the percent of solicited patients who donated. The top dashed
line corresponds to data on patients’ first-ever hospital visits, while the bottom solid line corresponds to data on patients’
last hospital visits (following their first-ever hospital visit) prior to being solicited.

Tables
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TABLE 3.1
S UMMARY S TATISTICS FOR M AIN A NALYSIS S AMPLE
Patient Demographics
Age
Female name
Male name
Gender of name unknown
Hospital Visits
# Hospital visits between 1st visit and solicitation
# Hospital visits within 132 days of 1st visit
Donations
Percent Donate
Donation|Donation > 0

Avg.= 64.19
(S.D.= 11.45)
45.71%
46.14%
8.15%
Avg.= 3.42
(S.D.= 3.11)
Avg.= 4.44
(S.D.= 4.74)
0.83%
Avg.= $49.14
(S.D.= 36.68)
18,515

Patients

Table 3.1 presents main summary statistics describing our study sample. Sample means are shown with standard
deviations in parentheses. Several patients’ age data was missing from our primary age data source (solicitation
administrative data); for these patients, we imputed age from the date of birth in the administrative health data
(N = 3, 695). To protect patient privacy, imputed age was top-coded at 90 in the data. Gender was imputed from
patients’ first names using the mapping in Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2003).
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TABLE 3.2
M AILING C YCLE DATES
Associated range of dates of patients’ first visits
May 1 - Jun 30, 2013

Associated solicitation mailing date
July 2013

July 1 - Aug 31, 2013

September 2013

Sep 1 - Oct 31, 2013

December 2013

Nov 1 - Dec 31, 2013

January 2014

Jan 1 - Feb 28, 2014

March 2014

Mar 1 - Apr 30, 2014

July 2014

May 1 - Jun 30, 2014

July 2014

Jul 1 - Aug 31, 2014

September 2014

Sep 1 - Oct 31, 2014

December 2014

Nov 1 - Dec 31, 2014

February 2015

Jan 1 - Feb 28, 2015

March 2015

Mar 1 - Apr 30, 2015

May 2015

Table 3.2 describes the timing of mailing cycles and solicitation mailings. The first column reports the range of
hospital visit dates associated with the mailing cycle. The second column reports the month and year in which the
corresponding solicitation mailing was sent. For example, all patients who visited the hospital between July 1st,
2014 and August 31st, 2014 would have their solicitations sent on one day in September, 2014. The minimum delay
between hospital visit and the solicitation mailing is 24 days. The maximum is 132 days. The median is 68 days, and
the mean is 67.34 days (standard deviation 20.94 days).
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TABLE 3.3
E FFECT OF T IME D ELAY ON R ECIPROCITY

Delay (in days) between first
visit and solicitation x 30
Delay (in days) between last
visit and solicitation x 30
R-squared
Key Controls
Additional Controls
First Stage F-Statistic

% Donate
(1)
-0.298∗∗
(0.122)

0.006
YES

% Donate
(2)
-0.247∗∗
(0.125)

0.019
YES
YES

% Donate
(3)

% Donate
(4)

-0.509∗∗
(0.208)
0.006
YES

-0.407∗∗
(0.204)
0.019
YES
YES
6,757

3,092

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient estimates from regressions predicting a
patient’s decision to donate with the time delay separating that patient’s first hospital visit from the date when she
was solicited. Columns 3 and 4 report coefficient estimates from instrumental variables analyses in which the delay
between a patient’s first hospital visit and the date of a solicitation mailing is used as an instrument for the delay
between a patient’s last pre-solicitation hospital visit and the date of a solicitation mailing. Columns 1 and 3 include
“Key Controls”: dummies for mailing cycle, hospital visited, and medical department visited. Columns 2 and 4
add “Additional Controls”: dummies for a patient’s total number of hospital visits before the solicitation mailings
were sent, dummies for a patient’s number of hospital visits within 132 days of her first hospital visit (a proxy for
sickliness), and controls for gender, age, marital status, and state of residence. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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APPENDIX - Chapter 1

A.1

Chapter 1 Appendix: Tables and Figures

Figures
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F IGURE A.1
L OG WAGE G AP (W EIGHTED BY O CCUPATION ) BETWEEN C OLLEGE AND H IGH S CHOOL
G RADUATES

1950

1960

1970

1980

Census year

Male, no college
Male, college

1990

2000

2010

Female, no college
Female, college

Notes: Figure A.1 depicts median earnings weighted by the labor share of each worker type in an occupation, where
worker type is indexed by college status and sex. The explicit formula used to calculate weighted median earnings is
!
h
total workers in occgender,college i
ln median earnings = ln ∑ median(earningsocc )
total workersgender,college
gender,college
occ
Any differences in median earnings between worker types stems entirely from distributional differences of worker types
across occupations. The data come from the decennial census microdata from 1950 to 2000 and from the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) data. To focus on the discrepancy among young workers, only 18-30 year olds are included.
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Data from census and American Community Survey microdata. Men aged 18-30.
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Data from census and American Community Survey microdata. Women aged 18-30.
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Task Characteristics (Women)

J OB C HARACTERISTICS OVER T IME

F IGURE A.2

Notes: Figure A.2 depicts average routine-intensity, manual-intensity, abstract-intensity, and RTI (the composite measure) in the labor force for young men (left) and young women (right). This figure shows that the displacement of high-RTI
jobs by automation fell on women but not men among young workers. The evidence suggests that the employment opportunities of women were most affected by the erosion of routine-intensive jobs. Data obtained from census microdata, ACS
data, and the job characteristic measures constructed by Autor and Dorn (2013). Only individuals between the ages of
18 and 30 are included.
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F IGURE A.3
ON R ELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAGE R ATES AND C OLLEGE -G OING
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Notes: The figure depicts the effect of increasing time net of housework, T2 f , on the responsiveness of women’s collegegoing to their wage rates. The effect of college wage rates on women’s college-going,

dγ f
dw f

, is weakly positive, while the

dγ f
dw f

effect of non-college wage rates on women’s college-going,
, is strictly negative. When T2 f < w1f , married women do
not work and only non-college wage rates influence the college-going decision, since they represent the opportunity costs
to attending college in period 1 while single. When T2 f ∈ [ w1f , w1 ], only married women with college degrees work, and
f

dγ f
dw f
dγ f
dw f

increases with T2 f . Finally, when T2 f >

1
wf

, married women without college degrees also join the work force and

becomes more negative with increasing T2 f .
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Tables
TABLE A.1
E MPLOYMENT C HANGES IN O IL AND G AS I NDUSTRY
Oil and Gas Industry

Non-college men
College men
Non-college women
College women

Oil, Gas, and Related
Industries

1970-1980

2000-2010

1970-1980

2000-2010

1.18%
0.73%
0.02%
0.24%

0.42%
0.09%
-0.07%
0.13%

4.18%
0.81%
0.29%
0.55%

1.65%
-0.63%
0.07%
-0.06%

Notes: Table A.1 shows the change in employment in the oil and gas industry or in the oil, gas, and related industries
as a proportion of total employment for men and women based on college status. The table examines two decades in
which national growth in oil and gas employment was large: 1970-1980 and 2000-2010. In both of of these periods,
non-college men experienced much larger changes in employment share in the relevant industries than college men,
college women, or non-college women. This provides further evidence that employment changes in these industries
impact the non-college labor market returns of men.
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TABLE A.2
S UMMARY S TATISTICS BY S TATE R ESOURCE L EVEL , 1970

Female college enrollment
Male college enrollment
% female
% black
% 18-25 years old
% 26-35 years old
% 36-45 years old
% 46-55 years old
% 56-65 years old
% older than 65 years old
Observations

Low-Resource
0.347
(0.0173)
0.423
(0.0277)
0.518
(0.00205)
0.111
(0.0260)
0.119
(0.00295)
0.125
(0.00343)
0.120
(0.00274)
0.111
(0.00395)
0.0908
(0.00446)
0.0864
(0.00508)
10

High-Resource
0.374
(0.0187)
0.464
(0.0127)
0.513
(0.00397)
0.122
(0.0275)
0.126
(0.00298)
0.118
(0.00446)
0.110
(0.00297)
0.113
(0.00342)
0.0925
(0.00574)
0.0885
(0.00643)
8

Difference
-0.0272
(0.0256)
-0.0414
(0.0331)
0.00586
(0.00421)
-0.0111
(0.0381)
-0.00731
(0.00425)
0.00688
(0.00553)
0.00930∗∗
(0.00406)
-0.00260
(0.00538)
-0.00175
(0.00715)
-0.00209
(0.00807)

Table A.2 reports the results of a t-test comparing the characteristics of high-resource states with the characteristics
of low-resource states. Overall, there are few significant differences in observed composition between high- and
low-resource states. The proportion of 36-45 year olds is significantly different (p < 0.05). These differences are
insignificant for almost all other years. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars denote significant differences between
high- and low-resource states. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE A.3
S UMMARY S TATISTICS BY S TATE R ESOURCE L EVEL , 1980

Female college enrollment
Male college enrollment
% female
% black
% 18-25 years old
% 26-35 years old
% 36-45 years old
% 46-55 years old
% 56-65 years old
% older than 65 years old
Observations

Low-Resource
0.396
(0.00999)
0.396
(0.00878)
0.514
(0.00181)
0.0845
(0.0156)
0.150
(0.00210)
0.157
(0.00224)
0.117
(0.00202)
0.103
(0.00207)
0.0936
(0.00166)
0.0964
(0.00255)
28

High-Resource
0.400
(0.0172)
0.408
(0.0129)
0.513
(0.00229)
0.106
(0.0227)
0.148
(0.00315)
0.157
(0.00386)
0.110
(0.00207)
0.0978
(0.00231)
0.0907
(0.00262)
0.101
(0.00454)
20

Difference
-0.00456
(0.0187)
-0.0126
(0.0151)
0.000504
(0.00289)
-0.0215
(0.0266)
0.00234
(0.00364)
0.0000911
(0.00420)
0.00706∗∗
(0.00296)
0.00543∗
(0.00314)
0.00285
(0.00296)
-0.00490
(0.00487)

Table A.3 reports the results of a t-test comparing the characteristics of high-resource states with the characteristics
of low-resource states. Overall, there are few significant differences in observed composition between high- and lowresource states. The proportion of 36-45 year olds is significantly different (p < 0.05), and the proportion of 46-55
year olds is marginally significantly different (p < 0.10). Standard errors in parentheses. Stars denote significant
differences between high- and low-resource states. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE A.4
S UMMARY S TATISTICS BY S TATE R ESOURCE L EVEL , 1990

Female college enrollment
Male college enrollment
% female
% black
% 18-25 years old
% 26-35 years old
% 36-45 years old
% 46-55 years old
% 56-65 years old
% older than 65 years old
Observations

Low-Resource
0.479
(0.0111)
0.456
(0.0111)
0.520
(0.00353)
0.0846
(0.0176)
0.150
(0.00370)
0.223
(0.00616)
0.187
(0.00530)
0.130
(0.00387)
0.113
(0.00418)
0.145
(0.00570)
28

High-Resource
0.479
(0.0195)
0.428
(0.0201)
0.528
(0.00528)
0.102
(0.0258)
0.156
(0.00521)
0.227
(0.00812)
0.185
(0.00496)
0.132
(0.00398)
0.108
(0.00545)
0.137
(0.00575)
20

Difference
-0.000114
(0.0211)
0.0282
(0.0214)
-0.00748
(0.00611)
-0.0174
(0.0301)
-0.00586
(0.00621)
-0.00413
(0.0100)
0.00238
(0.00755)
-0.00139
(0.00569)
0.00568
(0.00675)
0.00807
(0.00832)

Table A.4 reports the results of a t-test comparing the characteristics of high-resource states with the characteristics
of low-resource states. Overall, there are no significant differences in observed demographic characteristics between
high- and low-resource states. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars denote significant differences between highand low-resource states. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE A.5
S UMMARY S TATISTICS BY S TATE R ESOURCE L EVEL , 2000

Female college enrollment
Male college enrollment
% female
% black
% 18-25 years old
% 26-35 years old
% 36-45 years old
% 46-55 years old
% 56-65 years old
% older than 65 years old
Observations

Low-Resource
0.629
(0.0170)
0.569
(0.0160)
0.516
(0.00388)
0.0967
(0.0186)
0.137
(0.00486)
0.172
(0.00583)
0.217
(0.00501)
0.172
(0.00386)
0.115
(0.00375)
0.149
(0.00552)
28

High-Resource
0.611
(0.0207)
0.576
(0.0175)
0.518
(0.00389)
0.0991
(0.0203)
0.153
(0.00492)
0.169
(0.00803)
0.207
(0.00760)
0.168
(0.00436)
0.111
(0.00571)
0.151
(0.00803)
20

Difference
0.0181
(0.0267)
-0.00701
(0.0241)
-0.00150
(0.00565)
-0.00236
(0.0279)
-0.0159∗∗
(0.00710)
0.00290
(0.00967)
0.0101
(0.00874)
0.00388
(0.00587)
0.00375
(0.00655)
-0.00229
(0.00941)

Table A.5 reports the results of a t-test comparing the characteristics of high-resource states with the characteristics of low-resource states. Overall, there are few significant differences in observed demographic characteristics
between high- and low-resource states. In 2000, the proportion of 18-25 year olds differs significantly between lowand high-resource states (p < 0.05). However, this difference is insignificant for all other years. Standard errors in
parentheses. Stars denote significant differences between high- and low-resource states. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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TABLE A.6
S UMMARY S TATISTICS BY S TATE R ESOURCE L EVEL , 2010

Female college enrollment
Male college enrollment
% female
% black
% 18-25 years old
% 26-35 years old
% 36-45 years old
% 46-55 years old
% 56-65 years old
% older than 65 years old
Observations

Low-Resource
0.659
(0.0118)
0.566
(0.0137)
0.517
(0.00141)
0.102
(0.0175)
0.141
(0.00389)
0.166
(0.00484)
0.166
(0.00325)
0.188
(0.00428)
0.152
(0.00442)
0.152
(0.00429)
28

High-Resource
0.641
(0.0165)
0.565
(0.0169)
0.514
(0.00202)
0.102
(0.0222)
0.143
(0.00497)
0.165
(0.00655)
0.174
(0.00402)
0.178
(0.00492)
0.148
(0.00600)
0.156
(0.00778)
20

Difference
0.0178
(0.0197)
0.00101
(0.0217)
0.00285
(0.00239)
-0.000169
(0.0279)
-0.00209
(0.00623)
0.000610
(0.00797)
-0.00788
(0.00514)
0.0105
(0.00655)
0.00403
(0.00728)
-0.00404
(0.00830)

Table A.6 reports the results of a t-test comparing the characteristics of high-resource states with the characteristics
of low-resource states. Overall, there are no significant differences in observed demographic characteristics between
high- and low-resource states. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars denote significant differences between highand low-resource states. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE A.7
F IRST S TAGE R EGRESSION OF O IL & G AS E MPLOYMENT ON I NSTRUMENTS
(D ID NOT MIGRATE FOR WORK PURPOSES )
Oil & Gas Employment
(1)

Oil, Gas, & Related Employment
(2)

Specification 1: Employment IV (rs E−s,t )
Employment IV
F-statistic

2.168∗∗∗
(0.810)
12.277

3.218∗∗∗
(1.011)
21.891

Specification 2: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Average Prices
Employment IV
Price IV
F-statistic
Demographic controls
State FE
Observations

1.454∗
(0.869)
8.5e-05∗
(4.8e-05)
11.041

2.546∗∗∗
(0.860)
8.5e-05∗∗
(3.5e-05)
12.224

Yes
Yes
1782

Yes
Yes
1782

Notes: First stage regression of employment share on instruments. Sample of workers who did not report moving
across states for work purposes. Regressions control for proportion female, proportion black, proportion by ten-year
age bin, year dummies, and state dummies. All regressions conducted at the state-year level. Standard errors clustered at state level. Specification 1 uses only the employment instrument. Specification 2 uses both the employment
and the price instrument. In all cases, the first stage regression passes the Anderson-Rubin test for weak instruments.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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TABLE A.8
2SLS R EGRESSION OF C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT ON O IL & G AS E MPLOYMENT
(D ID NOT MIGRATE FOR WORK PURPOSES )
Male Enrollment
Full-time Part-time
(1)
(2)

Female Enrollment
Full-time
Part-time
(3)
(4)

Specification 1: Employment IV (rs E−s,t )
Oil & Gas Employment

-1.616
(1.786)

-3.576∗∗∗
(1.006)

-1.877
(1.348)

-1.153
(0.766)

Specification 2: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Average Prices
Oil & Gas Employment

Demographic controls
State FE
Observations

-1.773
(1.442)

-3.668∗∗∗
(1.039)

-1.861
(1.511)

-1.026
(0.710)

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Notes: Second stage regression of college enrollment on employment share in the oil & gas industry. Sample of
workers who did not report moving across states for work purposes. Regressions control for proportion female,
proportion black, proportion by ten-year age bin, year dummies, and state dummies. All regressions conducted at
the state-year level. Standard errors clustered at state level. Specification 1 uses only the employment instrument.
Specification 2 uses both the employment and the price instrument. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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TABLE A.9
2SLS R EGRESSION OF C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT ON O IL , G AS , & R ELATED E MPLOYMENT
(D ID NOT MIGRATE FOR WORK PURPOSES )
Male Enrollment
Full-time Part-time
(1)
(2)

Female Enrollment
Full-time
Part-time
(3)
(4)

Specification 1: Employment IV (rs E−s,t )
Oil, Gas, & Related Employment

-1.069
(1.060)

-2.366∗∗∗
(0.535)

-1.242
(0.838)

-0.763
(0.563)

Specification 2: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Average Prices
Oil, Gas, & Related Employment

Demographic controls
State FE
Observations

-1.045
(0.812)

-2.187∗∗∗
(0.482)

-1.075
(0.823)

-0.362
(0.507)

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Notes: Second stage regression of college enrollment on employment share in the oil, gas, & related industries.
Sample of workers who did not report moving across states for work purposes. Regressions control for proportion female, proportion black, proportion by ten-year age bin, year dummies, and state dummies. All regressions
conducted at the state-year level. Standard errors clustered at state level. Specification 1 uses only the employment
instrument. Specification 2 uses both the employment and the price instrument. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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TABLE A.10
F IRST S TAGE R EGRESSION OF O IL & G AS E MPLOYMENT ON I NSTRUMENTS
(D ID NOT MIGRATE IN PAST YEAR )
Oil & Gas Employment
(1)

Oil, Gas, & Related Employment
(2)

Specification 1: Employment IV (rs E−s,t )
Employment IV
F-statistic

2.129∗∗∗
(0.786)
11.258

3.239∗∗∗
(0.998)
22.388

Specification 2: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Average Prices
Employment IV
Price IV
F-statistic
Demographic controls
State FE
Observations

1.344
(0.823)
9.4e-05∗
(5.0e-05)
9.891

2.515∗∗∗
(0.821)
9.1e-05∗∗
(3.9e-05)
11.850

Yes
Yes
1782

Yes
Yes
1782

Notes: First stage regression of employment share on instruments. Sample of workers who reported not having
moved across states in the past year. Regressions control for proportion female, proportion black, proportion by
ten-year age bin, year dummies, and state dummies. All regressions conducted at the state-year level. Standard
errors clustered at state level. Specification 1 uses only the employment instrument. Specification 2 uses both the
employment and the price instrument. In all cases, the first stage regression passes the Anderson-Rubin test for weak
instruments. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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TABLE A.11
2SLS R EGRESSION OF C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT ON O IL & G AS E MPLOYMENT
(D ID NOT MIGRATE IN PAST YEAR )
Male Enrollment
Full-time Part-time
(1)
(2)

Female Enrollment
Full-time
Part-time
(3)
(4)

Specification 1: Employment IV (rs E−s,t )
Oil & Gas Employment

-1.857
(1.691)

-3.721∗∗∗
(1.022)

-2.035
(1.338)

-0.955
(0.680)

Specification 2: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Average Prices
Oil & Gas Employment

Demographic controls
State FE
Observations

-2.143∗
(1.259)

-3.893∗∗∗
(1.073)

-1.890
(1.490)

-0.794
(0.607)

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Notes: Second stage regression of college enrollment on employment share in the oil & gas industry. Sample of
workers who reported not having moved across states in the past year. Regressions control for proportion female,
proportion black, proportion by ten-year age bin, year dummies, and state dummies. All regressions conducted at
the state-year level. Standard errors clustered at state level. Specification 1 uses only the employment instrument.
Specification 2 uses both the employment and the price instrument. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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TABLE A.12
2SLS R EGRESSION OF C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT ON O IL , G AS , & R ELATED E MPLOYMENT
(D ID NOT MIGRATE IN PAST YEAR )
Male Enrollment
Full-time Part-time
(1)
(2)

Female Enrollment
Full-time
Part-time
(3)
(4)

Specification 1: Employment IV (rs E−s,t )
Oil, Gas, & Related Employment

-1.192
(0.954)

-2.388∗∗∗
(0.477)

-1.307
(0.811)

-0.613
(0.475)

Specification 2: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Average Prices
Oil, Gas, & Related Employment

Demographic controls
State FE
Observations

-1.195∗
(0.720)

-2.250∗∗∗
(0.448)

-1.137
(0.792)

-0.198
(0.413)

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Notes: Second stage regression of college enrollment on employment share in the oil, gas, & related industries.
Sample of workers who reported not having moved across states in the past year. Regressions control for proportion female, proportion black, proportion by ten-year age bin, year dummies, and state dummies. All regressions
conducted at the state-year level. Standard errors clustered at state level. Specification 1 uses only the employment
instrument. Specification 2 uses both the employment and the price instrument. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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TABLE A.13
F IRST S TAGE R EGRESSION OF E MPLOYMENT ON I NSTRUMENTS
(ROBUSTNESS )
Main Analysis Sample
Oil & Gas Employment Oil, Gas, & Related Employment
(1)
(2)
Specification 1: Employment IV (rs E−s,t )
Employment IV
F-statistic

2.087∗∗∗
(0.804)
11.684

3.223∗∗∗
(1.028)
20.441

Specification 2: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Average Prices
Employment IV
Price IV
F-statistic

1.433∗
(0.853)
7.8e-05∗
(4.6e-05)
10.860

2.614∗∗∗
(0.865)
7.7e-05∗∗
(3.6e-05)
11.580

Specification 3: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
OPEC Prices
Employment IV
Price IV
F-statistic

1.432∗
(0.851)
7.5e-05∗
(4.4e-05)
10.648

2.603∗∗∗
(0.863)
7.5e-05∗∗
(3.4e-05)
11.479

Specification 4: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Non-OPEC Prices
Employment IV
Price IV
F-statistic
Demographic controls
State FE
Observations

1.439∗
(0.847)
8.1e-05∗
(4.8e-05)
11.038

2.633∗∗∗
(0.864)
7.9e-05∗∗
(3.7e-05)
11.653

Yes
Yes
1782

Yes
Yes
1782

Notes: First stage regression of employment share on instruments. Regressions control for proportion female, pro-
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portion black, proportion by ten-year age bin, year dummies, and state dummies. All regressions conducted at the
state-year level. Standard errors clustered at state level. Specification 1 uses only the employment instrument. Specifications 2, 3, and 4 use both the employment and the price instrument. In Specification 2, the price instrument is
constructed from the average landed costs of crude oil. In Specification 3, the price instrument is constructed from
the average landed costs of crude oil from OPEC countries. In Specification 3, the price instrument is constructed
from the average landed costs of crude oil from non-OPEC countries. In all cases, the first stage regression passes
the Anderson-Rubin test for weak instruments. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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TABLE A.14
2SLS R EGRESSION OF C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT ON O IL & G AS E MPLOYMENT
(ROBUSTNESS )
Main Analysis Sample
Male Enrollment
Female Enrollment
Full-time Part-time
Full-time
Part-time
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Specification 1: Employment IV (rs E−s,t )
Oil & Gas Employment

-1.777
(1.773)

-3.805∗∗∗
(1.055)

-1.871
(1.358)

-1.414∗
(0.765)

Specification 2: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Average Prices
Oil & Gas Employment

-1.806
(1.334)

-3.838∗∗∗
(1.089)

-1.811
(1.431)

-1.095
(0.698)

Specification 3: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
OPEC Prices
Oil & Gas Employment

-1.892
(1.282)

-3.832∗∗∗
(1.087)

-1.801
(1.425)

-1.086
(0.698)

Specification 4: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Non-OPEC Prices
Oil & Gas Employment

Demographic controls
State FE
Observations

-1.728
(1.382)

-3.842∗∗∗
(1.091)

-1.844
(1.439)

-1.115
(0.700)

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Notes: Second stage regression of college enrollment on employment share in the oil & gas industry. Regressions
control for proportion female, proportion black, proportion by ten-year age bin, year dummies, and state dummies.
All regressions conducted at the state-year level. Standard errors clustered at state level. Specification 1 uses only
the employment instrument. Specifications 2, 3, and 4 use both the employment and the price instrument. In Specification 2, the price instrument is constructed from the average landed costs of crude oil. In Specification 3, the price
instrument is constructed from the average landed costs of crude oil from OPEC countries. In Specification 3, the
price instrument is constructed from the average landed costs of crude oil from non-OPEC countries. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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TABLE A.15
2SLS R EGRESSION OF C OLLEGE E NROLLMENT ON O IL , G AS , & R ELATED E MPLOYMENT
(ROBUSTNESS )
Main Analysis Sample
Male Enrollment
Full-time Part-time
(1)
(2)

Female Enrollment
Full-time
Part-time
(3)
(4)

Specification 1: Employment IV (rs E−s,t )
Oil, Gas, & Related Employment

-1.101
(0.981)

-2.358∗∗∗
(0.503)

-1.159
(0.833)

-0.876∗
(0.521)

Specification 2: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Average Prices
Oil, Gas, & Related Employment

-0.990
(0.709)

-2.114∗∗∗
(0.436)

-0.817
(0.808)

-0.369
(0.444)

Specification 3: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
OPEC Prices
Oil, Gas, & Related Employment

-1.035
(0.686)

-2.122∗∗∗
(0.437)

-0.834
(0.810)

-0.377
(0.444)

Specification 4: Employment (rs E−s,t ) + Price (rs pt ) IVs
Non-OPEC Prices
Oil, Gas, & Related Employment

Demographic controls
State FE
Observations

-0.949
(0.728)

-2.107∗∗∗
(0.435)

-0.791
(0.806)

-0.364
(0.446)

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Yes
Yes
1248

Notes: Second stage regression of college enrollment on employment share in the oil, gas, & related industries. Regressions control for proportion female, proportion black, proportion by ten-year age bin, year dummies, and state
dummies. All regressions conducted at the state-year level. Standard errors clustered at state level. Specification 1
uses only the employment instrument. Specifications 2, 3, and 4 use both the employment and the price instrument. In
Specification 2, the price instrument is constructed from the average landed costs of crude oil. In Specification 3, the
price instrument is constructed from the average landed costs of crude oil from OPEC countries. In Specification 3,
the price instrument is constructed from the average landed costs of crude oil from non-OPEC countries. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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TABLE A.16
C ORRELATIONS BETWEEN G ENDER AND J OB C ONTENT
Year

Corr(female no college, routine)

Corr(female college, abstract)

1950

0.142∗∗∗

0.0433∗∗∗

1970

0.133∗∗∗

0.107∗∗∗

1980

0.0775∗∗∗

0.117∗∗∗

1990

0.0341∗∗∗

0.147∗∗∗

2000

0.00420∗∗∗

0.156∗∗∗

Notes: The table presents pairwise correlations of worker type and task-intensity. Non-college women are significantly more likely to work in routine-intensive occupations, but this likelihood declines over time. College women
are significantly more likely to work in abstract-intensive occupations, and this likelihood increases over time. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

141

A.2

Chapter 1 Appendix: Theory

A.2.1

College-going decision for men

The assumption T1 > w1 +1 guarantees that single men will have time for both leisure and schooling
m

in period 1, and guarantees that married men will always work in period 2 (T2m > w1 ).1 The marginal
m
returns to leisure are strictly decreasing while the marginal costs are constant, guaranteeing a unique
solution to the utility maximization problem defined by equations (1.5.1), (1.5.2), and (1.5.3) for
men.
Proposition (Proposition A.2.1). The schooling rule for men can be defined by a threshold value
γm , such that men will attend college if and only if they draw non-monetary costs ε where ε < γm .
"

#

sm = 1 γm > ε

h
where γm = β T2m (wm − wm ) − ln

wm
wm

i

(A.2.1)

− wm − d

Proof. For men, the indirect utility from choosing to attend college is given by

h
i



V1 (s = 1, z = 1) = β wm [T2m − 1/wm ] + ln 1/wm + wm T1 − 1/wm − 1 − d − ε + ln 1/wm (A.2.2)
The indirect utility from choosing to not attend college is given by
h 

i



V1 (s = 0, z = 1) = β wm T2m − 1/wm + ln 1/wm + wm T1 − 1/wm + ln 1/wm

(A.2.3)

Men will attend college if and only if V1 (s = 1, z = 1) −V1 (s = 0, z = 1) > 0. Taking the difference
between (A.2.2) and (A.2.3), we have


V1 (s = 1, z = 1) −V1 (s = 0, z = 1) = β T2m (wm − wm ) − ln wm/wm − wm − d − ε
(A.2.4)
The schooling rule is therefore defined as
"

#


sm = 1 β T2m (wm − wm ) − ln
1 Since

T2m > T1 by assumption, then T2m > T1 >

1
wm

+1 >
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wm/wm

1
wm .



− wm − d > ε

(A.2.5)

Equation (A.2.1) demonstrates that men choose to attend college if and only if their future discounted additional earnings in period 2 exceeds the future discounted loss in utility from less leisure
in period 2, their foregone earnings from attending college in period 1, and the total (monetary and
non-monetary) college costs in period 1.

A.2.2

College-going decision for women

The focus of this model is the change in labor force participation of married women over time, so
for ease of exposition I assume that single women with and without children have time for both
leisure and schooling in period 1 (T1 > w1 + 1). Married women may or may not work in period
f
2. If they do work, female college graduates will work strictly more than women without college
degrees.2
Proposition (Proposition A.2.2). The college enrollment rule for women is given by the threshold
value γ f , such that women will attend college if and only if they draw non-monetary costs ε where
ε < γ f . Threshold value γ f takes on different values depending on whether or not it is optimal for
married women to work.
"

#

sf = 1 γf > ε

(A.2.6)

where

γf

=


−[1 − q f (1 − z)](w f + d)





if wives do not work (T2 f ≤ w1f )









β(1 − q f )w f T2 f − 1 − ln(w f T2 f ) − [1 − q f (1 − z)](w + d)
f
1
1

if
only
female
college
graduates
work
(
<
T
≤
2f

wf
wf )










β(1 − q f ) T2 f (w f − w f ) − ln w f/w f − [1 − q f (1 − z)](w f + d)



 if all wives work ( 1 < T )
2f
w
f

Proof. For women, the indirect utility from attending college depends on whether or not it is optimal
for them to work when married in period 2.
Case 1: It is not optimal for married women to work in period 2 (T2 f ≤
from choosing to attend college is
2 This

1
wf

). The indirect utility

stems from the assumption that utility is quasilinear in consumption and that women with college degrees earn
higher wage rates than those without: w f > w f .
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h

i
EV (1, z) = (1 − q f ) w f (T1 − 1/w f − 1) − d − ε + ln 1/w f + βln T2 f +
h

i
q f w f (T1 − 1/w f − z) − dz − ε + ln 1/w f + βln T2 f
(A.2.7)
The indirect utility from choosing to not attend college is


EV (0, z) = w f (T1 − 1/w f ) + ln 1/w f + βln T2 f

(A.2.8)

Subtracting A.2.8 from A.2.7, provides the schooling rule:
"

#

"

#

s f = 1 EV (1, z) − EV (0, z) > 0 = − [1 − q f (1 − z)][w f + d] − ε > 0

(A.2.9)

Case 2: It is only optimal for married women with college degrees to work in period 2 ( w1f ≤
T2 f <

1
wf

). The indirect utility from choosing to attend college is

h


i
EV (1, z) = (1 − q f ) w f (T1 − 1/w f − 1) − d − ε + ln 1/w f + β w f (T2 f − 1/w f ) + ln 1/w f +
i
h

q f w f (T1 − 1/w f − z) − dz − ε + ln 1/w f + βln(T2 f ) (A.2.10)
The indirect utility from choosing to not attend college is

EV (0, z) = w f (T1 − 1/w f ) + ln 1/w f + βln(T2 f )

(A.2.11)

The difference in indirect utilities obtained from subtracting A.2.11 from A.2.10 is given by

"

#

s f = 1 EV (1, z) − EV (0, z) > 0 =
"

#



β(1 − q f ) w f (T2 f − 1/w f ) − ln w f T2 f − [1 − q f (1 − z)][w f + d] − ε > 0

Case 3: It is optimal for married women to work in period 2 (T2 f >
from choosing to attend college is given by
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1
wf

(A.2.12)

). The indirect utility

h



EV (1, z) = (1 − q f ) w f (T1 − 1/w f − 1) − d − ε + ln 1/w f + β w f (T2 f − 1/w f ) + ln 1/w f +
h


i
q f w f (T1 − 1/w f − z) − dz − ε + ln 1/w f + β w f (T2 f − 1/w f ) + ln 1/w f
(A.2.13)
The indirect utility from choosing to not attend college is given by



EV (0, z) = w f (T1 − 1/w f ) + ln 1/w f + β w f (T2 f − 1/w f ) + ln 1/w f

(A.2.14)

The difference in indirect utilities obtained from subtracting A.2.14 from A.2.13 yields

"

#

s f = 1 EV (1, z) − EV (0, z) > 0 =
"

h
β(1 − q f ) T2 f (w f − w f ) − ln

w f/w f

i

#
− [1 − q f (1 − z)][w f + d] − ε > 0

(A.2.15)

Based on Proposition A.2.2, the schooling rule for women will always depend on women’s noncollege wage rates, even if they will not work in period 2. However, women’s schooling rule does
not depend on college wage rates if it is not optimal for female college graduates to work.

A.2.3

Effect of wage rates on college-going

Men choose to attend college if and only if they draw non-monetary costs ε ∼ G(ε) below γm , and
women choose to attend college if and only if they draw ε ∼ G(ε) below γ f . Proposition A.2.3
summarizes how these threshold values change given changes in non-college wage rates.
Proposition (Proposition A.2.3). The effect of non-college wage rates in decreasing college-going
is strictly larger in magnitude for men than women.
0>

dγ f
dγm
>
dw f
dwm

(A.2.16)

Proof. Taking the derivative of the threshold college-going value for men, γm , with respect to men’s
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non-college wage rates, wm , we have

dγm
1 
= −β T2m −
−1
dwm
w
| {z m}

(A.2.17)

∗ (sz<1)
x2m

The first term in equation A.2.17 shows that a marginal decline in the non-college wage rate for
men increases the college-going threshold by the optimal labor amount, weighted by the discount
factor for period 2 utility. The second term in equation A.2.17 shows that a marginal decline in the
non-college wage rate increases the college-going threshold by decreasing the marginal opportunity
cost of schooling in period 1.
Taking the derivative of the threshold college-going value for women γ f with respect to women’s
non-college wage rates, w f , we have


−[1 − q f (1 − z)]





1 
dγ f
= −β(1 − q f ) T2 f − w − [1 − q f (1 − z)]
dw f 
f


| {z }


∗
x (sz<1)

if T2 f ≤

1
wf

if T2 f >

1
wf

(A.2.18)

2f

For women, a marginal decline in the non-college wage rate increases the college-going threshold
by the expected optimal labor amount weighted by the discount factor β, provided that women’s
time net of housework exceeds their optimal leisure amount and that they have time left over to
work (T2 f > w1 ). A marginal decline in the non-college wage rate also increases the college-going
f
threshold by decreasing the expected marginal opportunity cost of schooling in period 1.
Optimal time spent at work x2∗ = T2 − w1 is increasing in wage rates w, so w f < wm and T2m > T2 f
∗ . Moreover, (1 − q ) < 1 and 1 − q (1 − z) < 1. Therefore, each term in
implies that x2∗ f < x2m
f
f
equation (A.2.18) is smaller in magnitude than each term in equation (A.2.17) and
dγ f
dγm
<
<0
dw f
dwm

(A.2.19)

The effect of non-college wages in decreasing college-going rates is stronger for men than women,
for three reasons. First, women’s non-college wage rates are lower than men’s, which decreases
the amount of labor time women optimally choose to supply. Second, married women’s time net
of housework is less than married men’s, which leaves them with less time they can convert to
labor. Third, the probability of an unplanned pregnancy decreases the likelihood that women who
attend college will earn a college degree, which decreases the period 2 expected earnings gain from
attending college. The effect of any increase in non-college wage rates on college-going is smaller
given this lower expected earnings gain. On an additional interesting side note, the risk of leaving
school having only finished partway decreases the period 1 cost of college for women, by decreasing
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the earnings women expect to forego while in school.
On the other hand, the effect of college wage rates on college-going is positive, strictly for men and
weakly for women. There are two results to highlight. First, men’s college-going decision is more
responsive to their college wage rates than women’s. Second, women’s college wage rates have no
effect on women’s college-going if female college graduates do not work in period 2, but women’s
non-college wage rates always have a negative effect on women’s college-going (even if they do not
work in period 2). These results are formalized in proposition A.2.4.
Proposition (Proposition A.2.4). The effect of college wage rates in increasing college-going is
strictly larger in magnitude for men than women.
dγ f
dγm
>
≥0
dwm dw f

(A.2.20)

where the last relationship holds with equality if married female college graduates do not work
(T2 f ≤ w1f ).
Proof. Taking the derivative of the threshold college-going value for men, γm , with respect to men’s
college wage rates, wm , we have
dγm
= β[T2m − 1/wm ] > 0
| {z }
dwm

(A.2.21)

∗ (sz=1)
x2m

For men, a marginal increase in the college wage rate increases the college-going threshold by the
optimal labor amount, weighted by the discount factor for period 2 utility.
Taking the derivative of the threshold college-going value for women, γ f , with respect to women’s
college wage rates, w f , we have

0





1 
dγ f
= β(1 − q f ) T2 f −
wf
dw f 

| {z }



if T2 f ≤

1
wf

if T2 f >

1
wf

(A.2.22)

x2∗ f (sz=1)

For women, a marginal increase in the college wage rate increases the college-going threshold by
the expected optimal labor amount weighted by the discount factor for period 2 utility, provided
that it is optimal to work when married in period 2. If it is not optimal for married women to work,
changes in the college wage rate have no effect on the college-going threshold.
Since it is assumed that T2m > 1/wm , the amount of time men spend at work is always positive.
Therefore, the effect of college wage rates on the college-going threshold γm for men is strictly
positive. If it is optimal for women with college degrees to work (T2 f > 1/w f ), the effect of their
college wage rates on their college-going threshold γ f is also positive. However, because 1) w f < wm

147

and optimal time spent at work is increasing in wage rates, and because 2) women have less time net
of household production than men do (T2 f < T2m ), women will spend strictly less time at work than
∗ (sz = 1). The responsiveness of college-going to
men: x2∗ f (sz = 1) = T2 f − 1/w f < T2m − 1/wm = x2m
college wage rates will therefore be higher for men than women.
If it is not optimal for married women with college degrees to work (T2 f ≤
college wage rates w f on γ f is 0.

A.2.4

1
wf

), then the effect of

Roles of increasing household production efficiency and declining fertility risk

Increasing household production efficiency
Increases in the efficiency of household production α decrease the time needed for housework and
increase the time individuals allocate to labor and leisure. This analysis focuses on the effect of a
rise in α on the time women have to allocate to labor and leisure, T2 f . The results for the time men
can allocate to labor and leisure, T2m , are similar.
Figure A.3 illustrates how the effect of wage rates on college-going changes as T2 f increases. For
values of T2 f below w1f , wives do not work in period 2. Only non-college wage rates influence
enrollment, since women must still forego earnings in order to attend school in period 1 even if
they did not expect to work in period 2. As T2 f increases past w1f , it becomes optimal for only
wives with college degrees to work. The effect of college wage rates on female enrollment grows
discontinuously from 0 to β(1 − q f )[T2 f − w1f ], since women now experience an expected earnings
gain in period 2 from obtaining a college degree. As T2 f increases past w1 , it becomes optimal for
f
wives without college degrees to join wives with college degrees in the workforce. The negative
effect of non-college wages on female enrollment jumps from −[1 − q f (1 − z)] to −β(1 − q f )[T2 f −
1
w f ] − [1 − q f (1 − z)]. If women expect to work even without a college degree, pursuing a college
degree now entails sacrificing their non-college earnings, so the effect of non-college wage rates is
stronger than the case where women don’t expect to earn anything if they did not attend college.

Declining fertility risk
I will next examine how changes in the probability of an unplanned pregnancy, q f , influences the
response of female enrollment to changes in college and non-college wage rates. Taking the derivadγ
dγ
tives of dwf and dwff with respect to q f , we have
f

d2γ f
1
= βmax[T2 f − , 0] + 1 − z where z < 1
dw f dq f
wf

(A.2.23)

d2γ f
1
= −βmax[T2 f − , 0]
dw f dq f
wf

(A.2.24)
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As access to contraceptive technologies expanded, the probability of an unplanned pregnancy, q f ,
declined. Equations (A.2.23) and (A.2.24) show that this increased the role of expected wage rates
in the college-going decisions of women. First, declining fertility risk increased the probability
that women who enrolled in college would actually obtain a college degree. Consequently, the
expected earnings gain to attending college rose. Any changes in wage rates would have a larger
effect on the expected earnings gain to attending college, as shown by both equations (A.2.23) and
(A.2.24). Second, women expected to spend more time in college since they had a lower probability
of dropping out. Any changes in non-college wage rates would then have a larger effect in changing
the total foregone earnings of college enrollment, as shown by the second term in equation (A.2.23).
As contraceptive technologies decreased the probability of unplanned pregnancies, college and noncollege wage rates became increasingly important in the college-going decision of women. First,
declining fertility risk increased the expected earnings gain from attending college, because women
had higher expectations that they would complete college and receive wage rate w f in period 2.
A decline in non-college wage rates or an increase in college wage rates would therefore have a
larger impact in increasing the expected period 2 earnings gains of attending college, as shown by
equations (A.2.23) and (A.2.24). Second, the lower likelihood of leaving school partway means
women expected to spend more time in college. Any declines in non-college wage rates had a larger
impact in decreasing the earnings women must forego to attend college, as shown by equation
(A.2.23).3

A.2.5

When is enrollment higher for men than women? When is enrollment higher
for women than men?

Figure 1.12 delivers the final result of the model. The left panel summarizes the role of increasing
housework efficiency and declining fertility risk on how wage rates affect women’s college-going.
The x-axis is T2i = T − Hα2i , time net of housework for gender i. The figure depicts how γi , the
threshold college-going value for gender i, changes as T2i increases.
The effect of increasing household efficiency on how female college-going responds to wage rates
is represented by increasing time net of housework for women, T2i = T2 f . Female college-going
threshold γ f grows as T2 f increases, represented by right-ward movement along the x-axis. This
growth stems entirely from the result that increasing T2 f increases the strength of the college-going
response to wage rates. This growth is discontinuous, depending on the relationship between time
net of housework T2 f and wage rates (w f , w f ). When T2 f < w1f , it is not optimal for married women
to work in period 2. They will attend college if and only if ε < −[1 − q f (1 − z)](w f + d). A
marginal increase in α will do nothing to increase the college-going threshold γ f along this interval.
On the other hand, if α is sufficiently high such that T2 f ∈ ( w1f , w1 ), then only married women
f
with college degrees will work in period 2. A marginal increase in α increases the threshold γ f by
H
β(1 − q f ) α22f [w f − T12 f ], which is positive due to the assumption that T2 f > w1f . Lastly, if T2 f > w1 , it
f

3 In addition, equation (A.2.23) demonstrates that fertility risk influences the effect of non-college wage rates whether
d2 γ f
f dq f

or not women work ( dw

> 0), while equation (A.2.24) demonstrates that fertility risk only influences the effect of
d2 γ

college wage rates when women with college degrees work ( dw f dqf f < 0 if and only if T2 f >
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1
wf

).

is optimal for all married women to work. The slope of γ f is the largest in this region – a marginal
H
increase in α increases the threshold γ f by β(1 − q f ) α22f [w f − w f ].
The figure also graphs male enrollment, γm which grows as time net of housework for men T2i = T2m
increases (represented by a right-ward shift along the same x-axis).
The effect of declining fertility is represented by the shift from γ f (e
q f ) to γ f (b
q f ), where qef > 1 −
wm −wm
wm −wm
b
>
q
.
Again,
1
−
is
the
threshold
below
which
it
is
possible
for
female enrollment to
f
w f −w f
w f −w f
surpass male enrollment. For this reason γ f (b
q f ) crosses γm , but γ f (e
q f ) never crosses γm .
Proposition A.2.5, which is the same as Proposition 1 in the main text, summarizes the conditions
which create gender differences in college enrollment.
Proposition (Proposition A.2.5). Let T2 f denote time net of housework for women and q f denote the
probability that a woman will experience an unanticipated pregnancy in period 1. Let T2m denote
w −w
the time net of housework for men. If q f < 1 − wmf −wm , then there exists Tb where γ f (q f , Tb) ≥ γm (Tb).
f

Then ∀T2 f ∈ (Tb2 f , Tb2m ),
γ f (q f , T2 f ) > γm (Tb2m )
Women will exceed men in college enrollment.
For T2 f < Tb2 f when q f < 1 −

wm −wm
w f −w f

or for T2 f < T2m when q f ≥ 1 −

wm −wm
w f −w f

γ f (q f , T2 f ) < γm (Tb2m )
Men will exceed women in college enrollment.
Proof. The slope of γm is β[wm − wm ]. For T2 f > w1 , the slope of γ f is β(1 − q f )[w f − w f ]. Because
f
w f − w f > wm − wm , there exists a q f ∈ (0, 1) such that β(1 − q f )[w f − w f ] exceeds β[wm − wm ]. For
a sufficiently large value of Tb, γ f (Tb) ≥ γm (Tb). For any arbitrary Tb2m above Tb, γ f (q f , Tb2m ) > γm (Tb2m )
(as depicted by figure 1.12). Since both γm and γ f are continuous with constant slope, there exists
Tb2 f < Tb2m such that γ f (q f , Tb2 f ) = γm (Tb2m ). For all T2 f ∈ (Tb2 f , Tb2m ), γ f (q f , T2 f ) > γm (Tb2m ). In other
words, there exists an interval (Tb2 f , Tb2m ) such that for all values of time net of housework for women
T2 f within this interval, the college-going threshold for women γ f will exceed the college-going
threshold for men γm at Tb2m .
Proposition A.2.5 demonstrates that necessary conditions for women to exceed men in college enw −w
rollment are that fertility risk q f must fall below 1 − wmf −wm and that housework must fall to a point
f
where it is optimal for college women to work (in other words, time net of housework T2 f must
exceed w1f ). Once these two conditions are met, it is possible for women to take advantage of their
higher labor market returns. Because w f − w f > wm − wm , the slope of female enrollment γ f exceeds the slope of male enrollment γm . As long as housework time for women is sufficiently low,
female college-going will be higher than male college-going even if women have less time for work
and lower wage rates than men.
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The right panel of figure 1.12 represents the change in female college-going threshold γ f given a
decline in the female non-college wage rate w f . Consider a decline in w f to w f , which pushes the
y-intercept up and shifts the vertical axis

1
wf

further to the right, increasing the slope of γ f . This
change is represented by the shift from γ f (w f ) to γ f (w f ). For any Tb2m , define Tb2 f and Tb 2 f to be
such that γm (Tb2m ) = γ f (w f , Tb2 f ) = γ f (w , Tb ). Claim 1 shows that Tb < Tb2 f .
f

2f

2f

Claim 1. Tb 2 f < Tb2 f .
Proof. Choose any Tb2m > Tb, where Tb is defined such that γm (Tb) ≤ γ f (w f , Tb).
Denote g1 (T2i ) = γ f (w f , T2i )−γm (Tb2m ) and denote g2 (T2i ) = γ f (w f , T2i )−γm (Tb2m ). Since γ f (w f , T2i ) >
γ f (w f , T2i ) ∀T2i , g2 (T2i ) > g1 (T2i ) ∀T2i . Both g1 (T2i ) and g2 (T2i ) are strictly increasing but initially
negative. Therefore, g2 (T2i ) intersects the y-axis at a lower level of T2i than g1 (T2i ).
Let Tb2 f , Tb 2 f be such that g1 (Tb2 f ) = 0 and g2 (Tb 2 f ) = 0. Then Tb 2 f < Tb2 f .
This result is significant because it shows that declines in non-college wage rates for women complement increasing housework efficiency and decreasing fertility risk in enabling female enrollment
to grow and overtake male enrollment. A decline in non-college wage rates enable female college
enrollment to exceed male college enrollment at lower levels of household efficiency and higher
levels of fertility risk. Declining employment opportunities in the non-college market therefore
help explain not only why women overtook men in college enrollment, but also why the overtaking
occurred as early as the 1980s, when household efficiency and declining fertility risk had shown
significant advancements but had not yet reached current levels.

A.2.6

Extension: Gender Wage Gap

Figure 1.12 reveals that women are willing to accept lower college wage rates than men to enter
the college market, due to the large imbalance in non-college wage rates between men and women.
The difference between college and non-college wage rates is greater for women (w f − w f > wm −
wm ) and this is sufficient to entice a greater proportion of women to choose to attend college than
men, even though college wage rates are higher for men than women (wm > w f ). The empirical
disparity in non-college job prospects, documented in Section 1.2, may therefore explain why the
gender wage gap in college occupations has been so persistent. Since women have access to fewer
lucrative options in the non-college labor market, they are willing to enter the college market for
lower pay relative to men, and therefore men continue to enjoy greater college earnings than women
on average.
One implication of this argument is that external measures to narrow the gender gap in wages will
widen the gender gap in college enrollment. Policy interventions to make women’s college earnings
equal to that of men will lead female college enrollment, γ f , to increase relative to male college
enrollment, γm . For symmetric reasons, external measures to narrow the gender gap in college enrollment will widen the gap in wages. The model suggests that gender differences in the non-college
labor market link the gender gap in college enrollment with the gender gap in college earnings.
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Current policies aimed at leveling one inequality may exacerbate the other, since prior research has
overlooked the role of the non-college market in contributing to both.

A.3

Chapter 1 Appendix: Data

A.3.1

Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPSASEC) Data

In Sections 1.2 and 1.3, I use data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current
Population Surveys (CPS-ASEC), which is jointly conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and the
Bureau of Labor Studies and provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS;
Flood et al., 2015). I use the sample of 16-64 year olds from the years 1970-2010, although for
many measures I restrict the sample to just 18-25 year olds or 18-30 year olds. In most of the
analysis, I restrict the sample to full-time (at least 35 hours worked per week), full-year (at least 40
weeks worked per year) workers using the definitions employed by Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
The main outcome variable used to measure college enrollment is SCHLCOLL, the proportion of
16-24 year olds who report that they are currently enrolled in college full-time or part-time. To
exclude students who may not have graduated from high school at the time of data collection,
I restrict this sample to 18-24 year olds. Individuals who did not report an education level are
excluded from the analysis.
Workers are coded potentially affected by the oil and gas industry if they belong to the following industries: petroleum and coal production, mining (including oil and gas extraction), trucking
services, warehousing and storage. Workers are coded as potentially affected by the oil, gas, and
related industries if they belonged to any of the aforementioned industries or were employed in the
following occupations: construction inspectors; inspectors and compliance officers; metallurgical
and materials engineers; petroleum, mining, and geological engineers; chemical engineers; electrical engineers; industrial engineers; mechanical engineers; geologists; drillers of earth, construction
trades (not elsewhere classified); extractive occupations (drillers of oil wells, explosives workers,
miners, other mining occupations); supervisors of motor vehicle transportation; truck, delivery, and
tractor drivers; transport equipment operatives; material moving equipment operators; helpers, constructive, and extractive occupations.
Annual earnings data is obtained from the income from INCWAGE, the pre-tax income from wages
and salary variable. Earnings are top-coded at the 95th percentile of reported earnings and bottomcoded at the 1st percentile of reported earnings. All annual earnings are inflated to 2008 dollars.
Only workers who reported being in the labor force, whether employed or unemployed, are included.
All regressions using CPS-ASEC data are conducted at the state-year level. Microdata are aggregated up to the state level using person-level weights for CPS supplement data. For the subsample
analysis of non-migrants in Section 1.3, I only include workers who reported living in the same
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house, moving within the county, or moving to a different county in the same state. I exclude workers who reported moving between states or moving abroad. I also exclude workers who did not
respond to the migration questions. Workers are classified as moving for work if they report that
they moved: for a new job or transfer, to look for work or lost a job, for an easier commute, or for
other job-related reasons.

A.3.2

Census and American Community Survey (ACS) Microdata

In Sections 1.2 and 1.4, I use the decennial census microdata from 1950 to 2000 and the annual
American Community Survey (ACS) microdata from 2001-2010, which are both conducted by the
U.S. Census Bureau and provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS, Ruggles
et al., 2017). I use the sample of 16-64 year olds, but for some analyses I restrict the sample to just
18-25 year olds or 18-30 year olds. In most of the analysis, I restrict the sample to full-time (at
least 35 hours worked per week), full-year (at least 40 weeks worked per year) workers using the
definitions employed by Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
The college enrollment variable is constructed using the harmonized EDUCD variable. Individuals
are coded as having ever enrolled in college if they report having at least some college education.
Individuals are coded as having never enrolled in college if their highest reported level of educational
attainment was a high school diploma or equivalent. Individuals who did not report an education
level were excluded from the analysis.
Annual earnings data is obtained from the variable INCWAGE, the pre-tax individual income from
wages and salary. Annual earnings are only computed for workers who report working for wages
or salary. Individuals who report being self-employed or an unpaid family worker, and individuals
who report working no weeks in the previous year, are excluded. Annual earnings are topcoded
at the pre-determined Census topcode levels, which vary from year to year. Annual earnings are
bottom coded as the 1st percentile of reported earnings for each year. All earnings are inflated to
2008 dollars.
The census and ACS data are merged to the occupational task intensity data compiled by Autor
and Dorn (2013) using the OCC1990 variable, which is harmonized across all years. The Routine
Task Intensity (RTI) measure is the primary measure I use to determine how “routine-intensive” an
occupation is. An occupation is classified as highly routine-intensive occupation if its RTI measure
scores in the top third of all RTI. Out of 330 total occupations, 113 occupations fit this criterion.
All regressions are conducted at the commuting zone-year level. The census and ACS data are
merged to corresponding commuting zones using the crosswalks provided by Autor and Dorn
(2013). Demographic characteristics, occupations, education, earnings, and work variables are aggregated up to the commuting zone level using person-level weights.
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APPENDIX - Chapter 2

B.1

Chapter 2 Appendix: Tables and Figures

Tables
TABLE B.1
P ROBIT R EGRESSION OF C OLLEGE ATTENDANCE ON S KILL P ROFILES - S UBTEST S CORES

College
(1)
auto shop score

Male
College
(2)

College
(3)

-0.0285∗∗∗
(0.00474)

College
(4)

College
(6)

-0.00424
(0.00557)
-0.0135∗∗∗
(0.00512)

electronic score

Female
College
(5)

-0.00375
(0.00516)
-0.0216∗∗∗
(0.00472)

mechanical score

-0.00533
(0.00517)

AFQT

0.859∗∗∗
(0.0557)

0.791∗∗∗
(0.0592)

0.851∗∗∗
(0.0580)

0.909∗∗∗
(0.0522)

0.915∗∗∗
(0.0564)

0.922∗∗∗
(0.0553)

socioemotional

0.102∗∗∗
(0.0332)

0.0994∗∗∗
(0.0331)

0.104∗∗∗
(0.0332)

0.0900∗∗∗
(0.0308)

0.0897∗∗∗
(0.0307)

0.0884∗∗∗
(0.0308)

risk aversion

0.0431∗∗∗
(0.0127)

0.0435∗∗∗
(0.0126)

0.0449∗∗∗
(0.0126)

0.0256∗∗
(0.0118)

0.0257∗∗
(0.0118)

0.0258∗∗
(0.0119)

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

1.191∗
(0.708)

0.771
(0.715)

1.205∗
(0.722)

1.306∗∗
(0.564)

1.284∗∗
(0.560)

1.397∗∗
(0.580)

2272
0.252

2272
0.241

2272
0.246

2493
0.213

2493
0.213

2493
0.213

Demo. controls
Constant

Observations
Pseudo R2

Notes: Probit regression of college enrollment status on ASVAB subtest scores for Auto & Shop Information, Electronics Information, or Mechanical Comprehension (modified version of equation 2.4.9). Regressions control for region of residence, height, age, and race. Coefficients on dummies for missing variables suppressed. Cross-sectional
regression at year = 1990. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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APPENDIX - Chapter 3

C.1

Chapter 3 Appendix: Tables

C.1.1

Additional Data Details

As mentioned in the main text, our partner hospital system typically sends solicitation mailings to
patients a few weeks after the end of a mailing cycle. There are some exceptions to this rule: patients
whose first visit occurred in September or October were solicited in December in an attempt by
the hospital system to leverage potentially higher giving rates during the holiday season. Patients
whose first visit occurred in March or April of 2014 were not solicited until July 2014, about six
weeks later than usual, due to idiosyncratic logistical issues arising from the centralization of patient
information into a new data warehouse.

C.1.2

Additional Methods and Results

Analysis by Severity of Illness
In additional analyses, we repeat each of the two empirical approaches described in the main text,
but we split patients based on a proxy for the severity of their medical condition. To measure the
severity of patients’ ailments, we asked three physicians at our partner hospital system to independently rate each of the 11 medical departments that handled more than 1,000 outpatients in our data
set. Physicians were asked to rate departments on a scale from 1 (lowest severity) to 7 (highest severity). Inter-rater agreement was strong (Cronbachs alpha = 0.88 across the ratings). The physicians
unanimously rated oncology, cardiology, and surgery to be the medical departments that handled
the most severe cases. We classified the 6,257 patients who visited the oncology, cardiology, and
surgery departments as “severe”, and we classified the 8,495 patients who did not visit these departments but visited other rated departments as “not severe”. 3,763 patients only visited small
(unclassified) departments and were dropped from these secondary analyses. Table C.4 provides
summary statistics describing these subsamples of our data and Table C.5 presents the regression
results separately for “severe” and “not severe” patients.
Table C.4 shows how “severe” and “not severe” patients compare to one another and the full sample
along observable demographic characteristics. Table C.5 displays the same analyses presented in
Table 3.3 separately for “severe” patients (Panel A) and for “not severe” patients (Panel B). The
coefficient estimates demonstrate that decay in reciprocity over time is particularly large among
patients with “severe” ailments: a 30-day delay between visiting the hospital and receiving a solicitation decreases the donation rate by at least 0.7 percentage points (p < 0.01 in all cases). In
contrast, the decay over time in reciprocity is insignificant among “not severe” patients. Wald tests,
presented in the bottom row of table C.3, show that the decline in giving over time is significantly
steeper among “severe” patients than among “not severe” patients (p < 0.05 in all cases).
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Analysis by Patient Experience
To assess whether positive reciprocity is driving our results, we separately explore the behavior of
patients who likely had more positive experiences with the hospital system and patients who likely
had less positive experiences. We take three approaches, which all provide suggestive evidence that
patients who are more satisfied with their experiences, and thus are more likely to exhibit positive
reciprocity, display directionally larger decay.
First, we separately examine outpatients who (a) choose to return vs. (b) choose not to return to
our hospital system within a set window after their initial visit (132 days, the longest period of time
between an initial visit and the corresponding solicitation mailing date). Outpatients who choose
to return to the hospital system are likely more satisfied on average with their experience than
outpatients who do not. If decays in reciprocity over time are driven by gratitude, and not salience
or forgetfulness, time-dependent positive reciprocity should be observed for more satisfied patients
(i.e., repeat visitors). The results are summarized in Table C.6. (Note that we only look at first visits
in this analysis, since for patients who only visit the hospital system once, the first visit and last visit
are the same.) We indeed find that the decay in giving that we observe overall is primarily driven
by patients who make multiple visits to the hospital system. For patients who did not make repeat
visits to the hospital system, the decay is directionally smaller in magnitude and insignificant.
Second, we use the data on hospital ratings from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) website as a proxy for patient satisfaction.1 Only large hospitals receive a rating, and the
three hospitals in our dataset with ratings include 14,504 of the 18,515 total patients in the analysis
sample (about 78% of our data). As Table C.7 shows, we find that patient giving statistically significantly declines over time for the two hospitals with 4-star rating. This decline is directionally
smaller in magnitude and insignificant for the hospital with a lower, 3-star rating.
Third, we construct measures of medical provider quality using patient experience survey data from
Press Ganey. We then investigate how the decay differs according to whether a patient visited
a provider with above-median scores or a provider with below-median scores. We consider the
provider associated with the first visit when analyzing the effect of the timing of the first visit
and the provider associated with the last visit when analyzing the effect of the timing of the last
visit. We obtained average responses to 47 questions from Press Ganey surveys of patients about
a variety of topics and use factor analysis to identify the questions that are correlated with each
other. There are two factors that meet the Kaiser criterion, whose eigenvalues are greater than or
equal to unity (Yeomans and Golder, 1982). Factor 1 loads on the following sections of the survey:
quality of care provider, personal issues like cleanliness and sensitivity to needs, overall experience,
quality of medical care given by care provider. Factor 2 loads on the following sections of the
survey: ease of accessing care, quality of the waiting areas, quality of the nursing staff, and quality
of the receptionists and clerks. We investigate Factor 1 in Table C.8 and Factor 2 in Table C.9.
Patients whose first visit is with providers who scored above the median on the second factor have
directionally larger decays than patients who visited providers who scored below the median on the
1 These data are publicly provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and
are a common measure of hospital quality (see Werner et al., 2011).
https://www.cms.gov/medicare/
quality-initiatives-patient-assessment-instruments/hospitalqualityinits/hospitalcompare.html.
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second factor. The difference in decay between above-median and below-median providers on the
second factor gets directionally larger when considering the last visit. In contrast, we find that the
first factor is not very predictive of decay.
These analyses provide additional evidence suggesting that patients with more positive experiences
(i.e., those who chose to return to the hospital system for further care after a presumably positive first
interaction, those who visited a higher rated hospital, and those who visited higher rated providers)
generally showed directionally larger declines in giving over time, relative to patients with less
pleasant experiences. While power limitations make it quite difficult for us to find statistically
significant differences in the rate of decay across groups based on these measures, the magnitudes
of decay all trend in line with our predictions and provide suggestive evidence that we are observing
a decay in positive reciprocity over time.

Tables
TABLE C.1
E FFECT OF T IME D ELAY ON R ECIPROCITY
Outpatients first solicited in Mar 2013 - Apr 2015
% Donate % Donate % Donate
(1)
(2)
(3)
Delay (in days) between first
-0.0921∗∗
-0.112∗∗
visit and solicitation x 30
(0.0395)
(0.0399)
Delay (in days) between last
-0.209∗∗
visit and solicitation x 30
(0.0898)
Observations
149,817
149,817
149,817
R-squared
0.002
0.007
0.003
Key Controls
YES
YES
YES
Additional Controls
YES
First Stage F-Statistic
12,980

% Donate
(4)

-0.200∗∗
(0.0708)
149,817
0.007
YES
YES
31,602

Notes: This table reproduces Table 3.3 in the main text with a larger sample of outpatients. We use all outpatients
who were solicited for a donation for the first time during March 2013 - April 2015 and ignore all of their visits to
the hospital system before March 2013, which do not appear in our data. Compared to our main analysis sample,
this sample includes outpatients who had visited the hospital system before the visit that triggered a solicitation.
Baseline giving in this larger sample is 0.61%. Columns 1 and 2 report ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient
estimates from a regression of the delay between a patient’s first hospital visit and the date of a solicitation mailing
on donation rates. Columns 3 and 4 report coefficient estimates from instrumental variables analyses in which the
delay between a patient’s first hospital visit and the date of a solicitation mailing is used as an instrument for the
delay between a patient’s last pre-solicitation hospital visit and the date of a solicitation mailing. Columns 1 and
3 include “Key Controls”: dummies for mailing cycle, hospital visited, and medical department visited. Columns
2 and 4 add “Additional Controls”: dummies for a patient’s total number of hospital visits before the solicitation
mailings were sent, dummies for a patient’s number of hospital visits within 132 days of her first hospital visit, and
controls for gender, age, marital status, and state of residence. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE C.2
S UMMARY S TATISTICS AND R EGRESSIONS T ESTING D EMOGRAPHIC BALANCE ACROSS
S OLICITATION D ELAYS
Summary Statistics
(1)
Patient Demographics
Age

Regressions Predicting
Timing of First Visit
(2)
(3)

Avg.= 64.19
(S.D.= 11.45)
18.50%

0.0189
(0.0123)

0.0185
(0.0120)

Married

64.09%

Divorced

5.87%

Separated

0.60%

Widowed

8.21%

-0.0381
(0.326)
-0.304
(0.575)
-0.403
(1.560)
-0.0525
(0.543)

-0.177
(0.318)
-0.340
(0.560)
-0.130
(1.533)
-0.0395
(0.530)

Marital Status Unknown

2.73%

In-State Resident

57.87%

Female name

45.71%

Male name

46.14%

-12.76
(12.50)
-0.525
(0.460)
-0.0809
(0.460)

-10.44
(10.54)
-0.452
(0.447)
-0.0223
(0.447)

Gender of name unknown

8.15%

18,515
0.048
YES
YES

18,515
0.104
YES
YES
YES
YES

Single

Hospital Visits
# Hospital visits between 1st visit and solicitation
# Hospital visits within 132 days of 1st visit
Donations
Percent Donate
Donate|Donate > 0
Patients
R-squared
Key Controls
State Dummies
# Hospital visits between first visit and solicitation
# Hospital visits within 132 days of first visit
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Avg.= 3.42
(S.D.= 3.11)
Avg.= 4.44
(S.D.= 4.74)
0.83%
Avg.= $49.14
(S.D.= 36.68)
18,515

F statistic
p-value

1.010
0.455

1.041
0.391

Notes: Column 1 presents summary statistics describing our study sample. Sample means are shown with standard
deviations in parentheses. Several patients’ age data was missing from our primary age data source (solicitation
administrative data); for these patients, we imputed age from the date of birth in the administrative health data
(N = 3, 695). To protect patient privacy, imputed age was top-coded at 90 in the data. Gender was imputed from
patients’ first names using the mapping in Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2003). Columns 2 and 3 present
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the timing of a first patient visit on demographic variables with standard
errors shown in parentheses. Specifically, we regress the time delay separating a patient’s first hospital visit from
the date of their first solicitation on the patient’s age when solicited, marital status (single is the omitted category),
imputed gender based on first names (gender of name unknown is the omitted category), and state of residence. We
perform a joint F-test on these demographic characteristics and report the F-statistic and p-value in the bottom two
rows. Column 2 includes the control variables included in all of our later regressions (mailing cycle, hospital, and
medical department visited). Column 3 adds additional controls (dummies for number of hospital visits between the
first patient visit and the solicitation mailing, dummies for number of hospital visits within 132 days of first visit).
The F-tests presented here show that patient demographics do not jointly predict the time delay separating a patient’s first hospital visit from her receipt of a solicitation, suggesting that this time delay is uncorrelated with other
factors that might influence donation decisions (as we assume throughout our analyses). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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% Donate
(2)
-0.298∗∗
(0.122)
-0.509∗∗
(0.208)
18,515

% Donate
(3)
-0.301∗∗
(0.123)
-0.477∗∗
(0.195)
18,515
YES

% Donate
(4)
-0.274∗∗
(0.126)
-0.452∗∗
(0.207)
18,515
YES
YES

% Donate
(5)
-0.247∗∗
(0.125)
-0.407∗∗
(0.204)
18,515
YES
YES
YES

Notes: Estimated effects of the delay between a hospital visit and a solicitation on donation rates. The first row represents the estimated effect of a solicitation delay
since the first hospital visit using ordinary least squares regressions. The second row represents the estimated effect of a solicitation delay since the last hospital visit
using instrumental variables regressions. Column 1 includes no controls. Column 2 controls for hospital visited, mailing cycle of patient visit, and medical department
visited (replicating column 1 of Table 3.3 in the main text). Column 3 adds control dummies for number of hospital visits before the solicitation mailings were sent.
Column 4 adds controls for the patients number of hospital visits within 132 days of first hospital visit. Finally, column 5 adds controls for patient gender, age, marital
status, and state of residence (replicating column 2 of Table 3.3 in the main text). Standard errors are in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Delay (in days) between first
visit and solicitation x 30
Delay (in days) between last
visit and solicitation x 30
Observations
# Hospital visits between first visit and solicitation
# Hospital visits within 132 days of first visit
Demographic Controls

% Donate
(1)
-0.184∗
(0.0973)
-0.330∗
(0.174)
18,515

TABLE C.3
D ELAY BETWEEN H OSPITAL V ISIT AND S OLICITATION , ROBUSTNESS C HECKS

TABLE C.4
S UMMARY S TATISTICS BY PATIENT S EVERITY
Full Sample

Severe

Not Severe

Avg.= 64.19
(S.D.= 11.45)
18.50%

Avg.= 65.29
(S.D.= 11.45)
17.07%

Avg.= 63.50
(S.D.= 11.37)
18.08%

Married

64.09%

64.65%

65.45%

Divorced

5.87%

5.61%

5.74%

Separated

0.60%

0.67%

0.55%

Widowed

8.21%

9.16%

7.30%

Marital Status Unknown

2.73%

2.84%

2.87%

In-State Resident

57.87%

51.29%

62.47%

Female Name

45.71%

44.94%

45.18%

Male Name

46.14%

48.22%

46.40%

Gender of Name Unknown

8.15%

6.84%

8.42%

Avg.= 3.42
(S.D.= 3.11)
Avg.= 4.44
(S.D.= 4.74)

Avg.= 4.60
(S.D.= 3.66)
Avg.= 6.00
(S.D.= 5.74)

Avg.= 2.84
(S.D.= 2.11)
Avg.= 3.71
(S.D.= 3.54)

0.83%
Avg.= $49.14
(S.D.= 36.68)
18,515

1.29%
Avg.= $48.64
(S.D.= 36.10)
6,257

0.62%
Avg.= $47.30
(S.D.= 32.09)
8,495

Patient Demographics
Age
Single

Hospital Visits
# Hospital visits between 1st
visit and solicitation
# Hospital visits within 132
days of 1st visit
Donations
Percent Donate
Donate|Donate > 0
Patients

Notes: Sample means are shown for each population with standard deviations in parentheses. The first column
shows summary statistics for the full analysis sample. The second column shows summary statistics for patients who
visited a medical department classified as handling severe ailments (oncology, surgery, or cardiology). The third
column shows summary statistics for patients who only visited other departments that were classified in our analysis
(primary care, dermatology, ear nose and throat, gastroenterology, orthopedics, radiology, neurology, and urology).
The remaining 3,763 patients only visited small or unclassified departments and were excluded from our secondary
analyses examining ailment severity as a moderator of our main effect. Several patients’ age data was missing from
our primary age data source (solicitation administrative data); for these patients, we imputed age from the date of
birth in the administrative health data (N = 3, 695). To protect patient privacy, imputed age was top-coded at 90 in
the data. Gender was imputed from patients’ first names using the mapping in Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso
(2003).
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TABLE C.5
E STIMATING THE E FFECT OF A T IME D ELAY ON R ECIPROCITY FOR PATIENTS WITH S EVERE
A ILMENTS VS . OTHERS
% Donate % Donate % Donate % Donate
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Medical departments classified as handling severe ailments
(oncology, surgery, cardiology), N = 6, 257
Delay (in days) between first
-0.735∗∗∗ -0.781∗∗∗
visit and solicitation x 30
(0.264)
(0.274)
Delay (in days) between last
-1.420∗∗∗ -1.420∗∗∗
visit and solicitation x 30
(0.511)
(0.491)
R-squared
0.004
0.032
0.000
0.027
First Stage F-Statistic
774
1,757
Panel B: Other medical departments, N = 8, 495
Delay (in days) between first
-0.0223
0.115
visit and solicitation x 30
(0.158)
(0.157)
Delay (in days) between last
-0.0402
0.185
visit and solicitation x 30
(0.285)
(0.251)
R-squared
0.004
0.018
0.004
0.017
First Stage F-Statistic
1,212
3,255
Key Controls
YES
YES
YES
YES
Additional Controls
YES
YES
Wald Test p-value: Severe vs. Other
0.021
0.005
0.013
0.004
Notes: Panel A presents the results of the same set of regressions presented in Table 3.3 for patients visiting medical
departments that handle particularly severe ailments as rated by physicians at our partner hospital system. Panel B
presents the results for patients visiting only departments that handle less severe ailments. Columns 1 and 2 report
ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient estimates from a regression of the delay between a patient’s first hospital
visit and the date of a solicitation mailing on donation rates. Columns 3 and 4 report coefficient estimates from instrumental variables analyses in which the delay between a patient’s first hospital visit and the date of a solicitation
mailing is used as an instrument for the delay between a patient’s last pre-solicitation hospital visit and the date of
a solicitation mailing.
Columns 1 and 3 include “Key Controls”: dummies for mailing cycle, hospital visited, and medical department visited. Columns 2 and 4 add “Additional Controls”: dummies for a patient’s total number of hospital visits before the
solicitation mailings were sent, dummies for a patient’s number of hospital visits within 132 days of her first hospital
visit, and controls for gender, age, marital status, and state of residence. Medical departments classified as severe
are: cancer, cardiology, and surgery. Medical departments that were not classified as severe include: primary care,
dermatology, ear nose and throat, gastroenterology, orthopedics, radiology, neurology, and urology. The p-values
from Wald tests comparing the effect of a delay between patients with severe vs. other ailments is reported in the
bottom row. Standard errors are in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE C.6
D ONATION B EHAVIOR FOR PATIENTS WITH O NE VERSUS R EPEAT PATIENT V ISITS
% Donate % Donate
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Patients with multiple visits in 132 days, N = 14, 898
Delay (in days) between first
-0.377∗∗∗
-0.300∗∗
visit and solicitation x 30
(0.139)
(0.142)
R-squared
0.007
0.023
Panel B: Patients with only one visit in 132 days, N = 3, 617
Delay (in days) between first
-0.0573
-0.0708
visit and solicitation x 30
(0.249)
(0.252)
R-squared
0.011
0.029
Key Controls
YES
YES
Additional Controls
YES
Wald Test p-value: One Visit vs. Multiple Visits
0.263
0.429
Notes: The regressions reproduce the main regressions in table 3.3, using patients who chose to return to hospital
system more than once in 132 days (Panel A) and using only the subsample of patients who visited the hospital system
once in 132 days (Panel B). 132 days is the largest window of time between a patient’s first hospital visit and the
solicitation mailing in the analysis sample.
Column 1 controls for mailing cycle, hospital, and medical department. Column 2 additionally controls for the number of hospital visits between the first visit and the solicitation date, the number of hospital visits within 132 days,
and demographic controls. The last row displays the p-value of a Wald test comparing the coefficient estimates for
patients who visited the hospital system once compared to patients who visited the hospital system more than once
(Panel A compared to Panel B). Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE C.7
D ONATION B EHAVIOR BY H OSPITAL R ATING
% Donate % Donate % Donate
(1)
(2)
(3)
Panel A: Hospitals with 4-star ratings (N = 12, 079)
Delay (in days) between first
-0.362∗∗
-0.295∗
visit and solicitation x 30
(0.160)
(0.165)
Delay (in days) between last
-0.635∗∗
visit and solicitation x 30
(0.281)
R-squared
0.007
0.026
0.006
First Stage F-Statistic
1,859
Panel B: Hospital with 3-star rating (N = 2, 425)
Delay (in days) between first
-0.174
-0.138
visit and solicitation x 30
(0.258)
(0.269)
Delay (in days) between last
-0.269
visit and solicitation x 30
(0.397)
R-squared
0.013
0.037
0.002
First Stage F-Statistic
576
Key Controls
YES
YES
YES
Additional Controls
YES
Wald Test p-value: 4-star vs. 3-star
0.536
0.620
0.450

% Donate
(4)

-0.511∗
(0.285)
-0.001
3,796

-0.209
(0.400)
0.001
1,054
YES
YES
0.533

Notes: The regressions reproduce the main regressions in table 3.3 using the three largest hospitals in the hospital
system, which are the only hospitals large enough to have official patient experience ratings in the CMS Hospital
Compare data. We compare the two hospitals with a 4-star rating (Panel A) to the one hospital with a 3-star rating
(Panel B). Patients who visited hospitals with high ratings are likely to have more positive patient experiences on
average than patients who visited hospitals with lower ratings.
Columns 1 and 3 control for mailing cycle, hospital, and medical department. Columns 2 and 4 additionally control
for the number of hospital visits between the first visit and the solicitation date, the number of hospital visits within
132 days, and demographic controls. The last row displays the p-value of a Wald test comparing the coefficient estimates for patients of the 4-star hospitals to patients of the 3-star hospital (Panel A compared to Panel B). Standard
errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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TABLE C.8
D ONATION B EHAVIOR BY M EDICAL P ROVIDER R ATING (FACTOR 1)

Delay (in days) between first
visit and solicitation x 30
Delay (in days) between last
visit and solicitation x 30
Patients
R-squared
First Stage F-Statistic

% Donate % Donate
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Above median
-0.523∗
-0.366
(0.268)
(0.276)

4,745
0.016

4,745
0.047

Panel B: Below median
Delay (in days) between first
-0.570∗∗
-0.529∗∗
(0.235)
(0.237)
visit and solicitation x 30
Delay (in days) between last
visit and solicitation x 30
Patients
4,724
4,724
R-squared
0.016
0.084
First Stage F-Statistic
Key Controls
YES
YES
Additional Controls
YES
Wald Test p-value: Above vs. Below Median
0.895
0.655

% Donate
(3)

% Donate
(4)

-1.235∗∗
(0.563)
4,908
0.011
551.3

-0.800
(0.512)
4,908
0.000
1,358

-0.571
(0.356)
4,934
-0.004
749.4
YES

-0.434
(0.337)
4,934
-0.001
1,737
YES
YES
0.550

0.318

Notes: The regressions reproduce the main regressions in table 3.3, using patients who visit medical providers who
score above the median in Factor 1 (Panel A) and patients who visit medical providers who score below the median
in Factor 1 (Panel B). Factor 1 is a variable computed from exploratory factor analysis of Press Ganey Patient Experience Survey data. Factor 1 loads on the following sections in the Press Ganey survey: quality of care provider,
personal issues like cleanliness and sensitivity to needs, overall experience, quality of medical care given by care
provider.
Columns 1 and 3 control for mailing cycle, hospital, and medical department. Columns 2 and 4 additionally control
for the number of hospital visits between the first visit and the solicitation date, the number of hospital visits within
132 days, and demographic controls. The last row displays the p-value of a Wald test comparing the coefficient
estimates for patients who visited a provider who scored above the median in Factor 1 and patients who visited a
provider who scored below the median in Factor 1. Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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TABLE C.9
D ONATION B EHAVIOR BY M EDICAL P ROVIDER R ATING (FACTOR 2)

Delay (in days) between first
visit and solicitation x 30
Delay (in days) between last
visit and solicitation x 30
Patients
R-squared
First Stage F-Statistic

% Donate % Donate
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Above median
-0.713∗∗∗ -0.710∗∗∗
(0.270)
(0.266)

4,718
0.015

4,718
0.051

Panel B: Below median
Delay (in days) between first
-0.364
-0.156
visit and solicitation x 30
(0.228)
(0.238)
Delay (in days) between last
visit and solicitation x 30
Patients
4,751
4,751
R-squared
0.013
0.087
First Stage F-Statistic
Key Controls
YES
YES
Additional Controls
YES
Wald Test p-value: Above vs. Below Median
0.323
0.121

% Donate
(3)

% Donate
(4)

-1.152∗∗
(0.451)
4,910
0.004
700.9

-1.057∗∗∗
(0.409)
4,910
-0.001
1,661

-0.659
(0.467)
4,932
-0.001
604
YES

-0.0971
(0.441)
4,932
0.000
1,417
YES
YES
0.111

0.448

Notes: The regressions reproduce the main regressions in table 3.3, using patients who visit medical providers who
score above the median in Factor 2 (Panel A) and patients who visit medical providers who score below the median
in Factor 2 (Panel B). Factor 2 is a variable computed from exploratory factor analysis of Press Ganey Patient Experience Survey data. Factor 2 loads on the following sections in the Press Ganey survey: ease of accessing care,
quality of waiting areas, quality of the nurse, and quality of the clerks and receptionists.
Columns 1 and 3 control for mailing cycle, hospital, and medical department. Columns 2 and 4 additionally control
for the number of hospital visits between the first visit and the solicitation date, the number of hospital visits within
132 days, and demographic controls. The last row displays the p-value of a Wald test comparing the coefficient
estimates for patients who visited a provider who scored above the median in Factor 2 and patients who visited a
provider who scored below the median in Factor 2. Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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TABLE C.10
E FFECT OF T IME D ELAY ON L OG D ONATION A MOUNT

Delay (in days) between first
visit and solicitation x 30
Delay (in days) between last
visit and solicitation x 30
Observations
R-squared
Key Controls
Additional Controls
First Stage F-Statistic

Log
(Donation)
in $ + 1)
(1)
-0.011∗∗
(0.0046)

18,515
0.006
YES

Log
(Donation)
in $ + 1)
(2)
-0.0090∗
(0.0048)

18,515
0.021
YES
YES

Log
(Donation)
in $ + 1)
(3)

Log
(Donation)
in $ + 1)
(4)

-0.019∗∗
(0.0079)
18,515
0.006
YES

-0.015∗
(0.0078)
18,515
0.021
YES
YES
6,757

3,092

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient estimates from a regression of the delay
between a patient’s first hospital visit and the date of a solicitation mailing on the logged donation received (set to
0 for non-donors). Columns 3 and 4 report coefficient estimates from instrumental variables analyses in which the
delay between a patient’s first hospital visit and the date of a solicitation mailing is used as an instrument for the
delay between a patient’s last pre-solicitation hospital visit and the date of a solicitation mailing. Columns 1 and
3 include “Key Controls”: dummies for mailing cycle, hospital visited, and medical department visited. Columns
2 and 4 add “Additional Controls”: dummies for a patient’s total number of hospital visits before the solicitation
mailings were sent, dummies for a patient’s number of hospital visits within 132 days of her first hospital visit, and
controls for gender, age, marital status, and state of residence. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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